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Theories of exchange-rate determination have generated a vast theoretical and
empirical literature. This thesis adds to that body of literature by asking three
questions. (i) How do policymakers respond to exchange-rate misalignment?
(ii) How does misalignment a®ect the decisions of ¯nancial-market participants?
(iii) What do exchange-rate dynamics reveal about the choices of investors in
the face of currency risk? These three questions are tackled with studies that
o®er broad and tractable conclusions and contribute to furthering the current
¯eld of research.
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1Chapter 1
Overview
This chapter describes the motivating forces behind the three studies that make
up this thesis and o®ers an overview of the methodologies, ¯ndings and conclu-
sions.
1.1 Introduction
The desire to understand what governs the movement of exchange rates is a core
driver of ¯nancial and international economic research. Policymakers require an
understanding of how exchange rates a®ect macroeconomic policy and on the
basis of that understanding, °awed or otherwise, they may wish to initiate pol-
icy that attempts to in°uence the exchange rate's value. Investors, meanwhile,
are concerned with currency movements in as much as they a®ect their deci-
sions over portfolio allocation and risk. Forecasting exchange-rate movements
is important. As is understanding interdependencies with other asset classes.
Over the years economics has volunteered a number of theories of exchange-
rate determination. Equilibrium models (MacDonald, 2000), liquidity models
(Grilli and Roubini, 1992), the portfolio balance approach (Dooley and Isard,
1979) and the °exible price monetary model (Frenkel, 1976)|overshadowed sub-
sequently by the sticky-price model of overshooting|dominated research during
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Since the 1990s, following the work of Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995), new open economy macroeconomics has proposed that exchange-
rate movements are best explained by dynamic general equilibrium models.
Market microstructure approaches to exchange-rate determination have o®ered
perhaps the best account of the high-frequency volatility of exchange rates. But
for the purposes of policy, predictability and estimates of misalignment, market
microstructure approaches fall short. Structural approaches continue to domi-
2nate both policy and research.1
Despite the progress made in the modelling of exchange rates, many ques-
tions regarding currency movement, misalignment and spill-over e®ects remain
unanswered. This thesis tackles three questions. Firstly, how do policymakers
respond to exchange-rate misalignments? Speci¯cally, when policymakers inter-
vene in the currency markets in response to misalignments, what in°uences the
decision to intervene? This thesis o®ers a study of Japanese intervention in the
currency markets in an e®ort to throw light on the determinants of intervention
policy and to gauge the extent to which the intervention decision is driven by
perceptions of exchange-rate misalignment. The second research question can
be stated as, how does misalignment a®ect the decisions of ¯nancial-market
participants? A partial answer is o®ered by investigating the role played by
perceptions of misalignment, de¯ned as deviations from covered and uncovered
interest-rate parity, in shaping the decision to denominate debt in foreign cur-
rencies. The investigation incorporates a large sample of foreign bonds in a panel
count model of currency choice. The third question asks, what do exchange-rate
dynamics reveal about the choices of investors in the face of currency risk? To
tackle this question this thesis undertakes an analysis of the extent to which
currency dynamics and conditional correlations o®er clues as to the suitability
of other assets as hedging instruments. The empirical focus is on gold as a hedge
against the US dollar.
A number of important results arise from this research. Those with the
broadest implications can be summarised as follows. First, the perception of
misalignment does indeed in°uence o±cial intervention in the currency markets.
Judging by Japan's history of o±cial intervention, the larger the misalignment,
the more likely the intervention. Second, perceptions of misalignment play an
important role in shaping the borrowing decisions of corporate and public issuers
of international debt: choice of issuance currency is sensitive to deviations from
uncovered interest-rate parity. Third, the dynamics of the US dollar reveal that
the suitability of other asset classes as hedging instruments varies over time.
In recent years gold has become an increasingly suitable hedge against dollar
volatility.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the ¯rst study on
misalignment and intervention policy. Section 1.3 previews the study on market
response to perceived misalignment and Section 1.4 introduces the ¯nal study
on currency dynamics and hedging. Some conclusions are o®ered in Section 1.5.
1For a recent survey of methodological advances in the estimation of equilibrium exchange
rates see Bussiere et al. (2010).
31.2 Misalignment and intervention
This section introduces the research presented later in this thesis on currency
misalignment and o±cial intervention.
Despite falling out of fashion in the 1990s, o±cial intervention in the cur-
rency markets has in recent years re-established itself as an important tool of
exchange-rate policy for many countries. The Swiss National Bank revived its
intervention policy in March 2009 in an attempt to prevent the Swiss franc from
rising sharply in value. The aim, according to Swiss National Bank Chairman
Philipp Hildebrand, was to \prevent an excessive appreciation" of the domes-
tic currency. China continues to intervene heavily to stem the strength of the
renminbi. Brazil, Poland, India, South Africa and South Korea all engaged in
currency intervention in 2009 and 2010. America's monetary authorities o®er
clear advice regarding their stance on currency intervention:
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the
United States has used currency intervention both to slow rapid
exchange rate moves and to signal the US monetary authorities'
view that the exchange rate did not re°ect fundamental economic
conditions. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (May 2007)
US intervention was considerable in the 1980s but became much less frequent
in the 1990s. The American monetary authorities intervened in the currency
markets on eight occasions in 1995, but only twice between August 1995 and
December 2006.
Japan, meanwhile, has had an active intervention policy during recent decades.
It has engaged in more than US$620bn-worth of interventions in the currency
markets since 1991. In November 2009, comments from senior Japanese ¯nance
o±cials suggested the Bank of Japan was closer to currency intervention than
at any time since it last intervened in March 2004.
However, while Japan ranks as perhaps the most proli¯c o±cial intervener
in currency markets, its reasons for intervening are understood barely, if at all.2
Do Japan's monetary authorities intervene in the foreign-exchange markets in
order to keep the yen close to a ¯xed, pre-determined value? To keep it within
¯xed bounds of tolerance? Within time-varying bounds of tolerance? Crucially,
what role is played by perceptions of misalignment?
These questions form the motivating force behind the ¯rst study presented
in this thesis, a study of the intervention policy of Japan between 1991 and
2006. The intention is that ¯ndings from this study o®er valuable information,
2For surveys of intervention policy see Edison (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and
Sarno and Taylor (2001).
4both in approach and conclusions, that can be used to further research into
intervention policy more widely.
The study runs as follows. First is a presentation of the stylised facts,
describing the movement of the yen against the US dollar during the sample
period and the timing and size of interventions. Two features are clear. (i)
Intervention is infrequent. (ii) When intervention does occur, sales of yen are
undertaken when the Japanese currency is strong relative to its unconditional
mean and purchases of yen are undertaken when it is relatively weak. Next, the
study o®ers a theoretical model of Japan's intervention policy. An intervention
reaction function is derived. The reaction function proposes that intervention
can be described adequately by assuming the central bank desires to minimise
deviations from a time-varying currency target. The currency target is assumed
to re°ect, in this case, a capital-enhanced version of purchasing power parity
(MacDonald and Marsh, 1997).
Following the theoretical model is a description of the empirical model in
which the dependent variable, intervention, is represented as a qualitative de-
pendent variable carrying a natural order, or rank, describing three categorical
states: yen-selling intervention, no intervention, yen-buying intervention. The
main contribution of the empirical model is to add °exibility over and above
that present in other similar studies. Speci¯cally, the empirical framework is a
generalised ordinal logit model which accounts for asymmetry and, in particu-
lar, allows for the possibility that deviations from the currency target may have
marginal e®ects that vary according to the intervention category. Results are
then presented and conclusions drawn.
1.3 Misalignment and market response
This section introduces the second study in this thesis. The second study is an
analysis of the role played by currency misalignment in a®ecting the decisions
of ¯nancial-market participants, speci¯cally issuers of international debt.
Issuance of foreign-currency-denominated debt securities has been an impor-
tant feature in global ¯nancial markets for many years, with net issuance more
than tripling in value during the past decade (measured at constant exchange
rates), reaching USD 1.4 trillion in 2007. The choice of issuance currency is
a®ected by a number of factors. One major factor is the issuer's desire to en-
sure its ¯nancial obligations are in currencies that match the currencies of its
cash in°ows. By doing so, the issuer creates a \natural hedge" against its cur-
rency risk. Another factor is strategy. The issuer's strategic considerations may
include the desire to diversify its investor base and, for large-size bond issues,
the opportunity to exploit fewer credit constraints in more liquid, foreign bond
5markets. A third factor a®ecting the choice of issuance currency (and a factor
that is not well explored in the academic literature) is the scope for reductions
in borrowing costs through issuing bonds in whichever currencies o®er the low-
est e®ective cost of capital. Lower e®ective borrowing costs can mean lower
covered costs (incorporating the cost of covering against exchange-rate risk) or
lower nominal costs, re°ecting, simply, lower nominal interest rates. Anecdo-
tally, participants in the international bond markets report that both covered
and uncovered costs play important roles in the choice of issuance currency.
The second study in this thesis assesses the extent to which perceptions
of currency misalignment, in the form of deviations from covered interest-rate
parity and uncovered interest-rate parity, in°uence the decision to issue bonds
denominated in foreign currencies. In other words, this study asks, does cur-
rency misalignment a®ect the choice of issuance currency?
Many existing studies of debt issuance o®er plausible accounts of the mo-
tivating factors behind the issuance of international bonds. What they ignore,
however, is the possibility that issuance in a foreign currency is driven largely
by an opportunistic desire to lower costs. That is, they ignore the possibility
that at the time of issuance, issuers choose to denominate their borrowing in one
currency rather than another simply because the chosen currency o®ers lower
e®ective borrowing costs.
The idea that cost savings can be secured by issuing bonds in low-interest-
rate currencies does, of course, violate traditional interest-rate-parity conditions
that seek to explain the short-term movement, and misalignment, of interna-
tional exchange rates. The condition of uncovered interest-rate parity asserts
that any discount in foreign interest rates will be o®set exactly by the expected
appreciation of the foreign currency. If this parity condition holds true, it leaves
no scope for exploitable cost savings from opportunistic issuance. Empirically,
however, uncovered interest-rate parity does not, in general, hold true.3 Most
empirical studies ¯nd that low-interest-rate currencies do not systematically ap-
preciate over time as suggested by uncovered interest-rate parity. In fact, they
tend to do the opposite: they depreciate. This suggests that in practice there are
cost savings to be secured by leaving exchange-rate risk uncovered and issuing
bonds in low-interest-rate currencies.
The second study in this thesis o®ers a closer examination of the respon-
siveness of international bond issuance to not just deviations from uncovered
interest-rate parity but also from covered interest-rate parity. It draws on a
large, unique dataset, employs a utility-consistent model, and adopts a novel
empirical approach to tackle the question of currency choice in international
bond issuance by focussing on the number, not the value, of bonds issued in
3See, for instance, Isard (1996).
6international currencies.
The study takes the following format. First is presented a model of cur-
rency choice over time: a choice among major issuance currencies by issuers of
international bonds. A description is given explaining how this model can be
embedded within a utility-consistent framework. The complication here is that
the dependent variable is chosen to be number of bonds issued rather than value
of bonds issued. The reason for this is straightforward: there exists evidence to
suggest that it is the number of issues, not the value, that responds to currency
misalignment. This is because the issuer's decision over the value of any bond
o®ering tends to be determined before the actual date of the o®ering, sometimes
up to a year before. Irrespective of the value of the bond issue, a broker will
advise the issuer of the most advantageous time to execute the bond o®ering.
This advice will be based, for issuers of international bonds, on an evaluation
of ¯nancial conditions including currency movements. At an aggregate level,
therefore, the main, detectable response to deviations from covered and uncov-
ered interest-rate parity, in any given period, will not, necessarily, be a change
in total value of bonds issued in a certain currency, it will be a change in total
number of bonds issued. The appropriate empirical model is, as such, a panel
count model, a model that is shown to be consistent with utility theory.
Next the study provides a description of the dataset, compiled using thou-
sands of individual records of bond issues dovetailed with the constructed mea-
sures of currency misalignment: deviations from covered and uncovered interest-
rate parity. There is a description of how the dataset is split into three maturity
brackets: short, medium and long. Also, there follows an overview of how the
concepts of uncovered interest-rate parity and covered interest-rate parity can
be made relevant for the types of time horizons that are applicable to bond
issuance|namely, horizons of one year to ten years and beyond. Central is
the role of the swaps market, allowing for a revised, non-arbitrage condition
called swaps-covered interest-rate parity. Subsequent to this is a discussion of
the empirical results, robustness checks and ¯nally some concluding remarks.
1.4 Currency dynamics and hedging
This section introduces the third study in this thesis, which asks the question,
what do currency dynamics reveal about the choices investors make when faced
with currency risk?
The increasing role played by globalised ¯nancial markets in in°uencing the
economic fortunes of the developed world o®ers a persuasive basis for investi-
gating possible relationships between changes in the value of exchange rates and
the returns on risky assets. Indeed, in the last ten years a strand of research
7has developed exploring the nature of the relationship between the dynamics of
exchange rates and the returns on stocks and bonds. Important contributors to
this work are Brandt et al. (2001), Pavlova and Rigobon (2003) and Hau and
Rey (2006). Their ¯ndings suggest the relationships are strong and meaningful.
The third study in this thesis looks at the link between exchange-rate dy-
namics and commodity returns. In particular the focus is on the US dollar and
changes in the price of gold. The main reason for this focus is that in ¯nancial
markets the nature of the relationship between gold and the US dollar tends to
be commented upon widely but understood little. Market wisdom has it that
when the US dollar depreciates, the price of gold rises, and when the US dollar
appreciates, the price of gold falls. When such price movements do coincide,
market reports o®er hazy rationalisations based on, among other things, sub-
stitution e®ects, pricing conventions and hedging motives. None of these o®er
convincing descriptions.
This thesis assesses the extent to which an inverse relationship between the
price of gold and the value of the US dollar does, in fact, exist, and asks,
does gold act as a hedge against the US dollar, as a safe haven, or neither?
Speci¯cally, the focus is on the association between movements in the price
of gold and the US dollar using a model of dynamic conditional correlations
covering 23 years of weekly data for 16 major US dollar-paired exchange rates.
The study runs as follows. First, de¯nitions are established. What, exactly,
is a hedge? What is a haven? After this is some background discussion regarding
correlation models. Why does the concept of correlation feature heavily in the
models of risk and return? What is required to ensure accurate estimation of
correlations? Discussion centres on observability, on the need to incorporate
dynamics and on the curse of dimensionality.
Next there is a description of the correlation model employed in the study:
a model allowing for dynamic conditional correlations. The description outlines
the model's origins and starts with the model of constant conditional correla-
tions ¯rst proposed by Bollerslev (1990). Next is a discussion of estimation
methodology. Estimation is a two-stage process (Engle, 2002). In the ¯rst
stage, univariate GARCH models are estimated for each returns series. In the
second stage, the ¯rst-stage residuals are taken and transformed by their stan-
dard deviations in order to estimate the parameters of the dynamic conditional
correlation model. Following this is a discussion of the data, presentation of the
empirical results and some concluding remarks.
81.5 Conclusions
The aim of this thesis is three-fold: to throw light on the link between currency
misalignment and policy, between currency misalignment and market response,
and between currency dynamics and hedging. This section summarises the
main ¯ndings and highlights the contribution this thesis makes to the existing
literature.
The ¯rst study, exploring the link between currency misalignment and inter-
vention policy, estimates a reaction function for o±cial Japanese intervention in
the currency markets between April 1991 and March 2006. Estimation results
show that intervention during the sample period conforms to a model in which
the monetary authorities intervene in order to prevent the yen from straying
too far from an equilibrium value de¯ned by a capital-enhanced version of pur-
chasing power parity. Predictability is good. A generalised ordered logit model
provides the empirical framework and results show that studies of intervention
that ignore violations of the proportional odds assumption are likely to su®er
from speci¯cation error.
There are two primary contributions that this study makes to the existing
literature. First, it tests the hypothesis that the aim of optimal intervention
policy in Japan is to prevent the nominal exchange rate from straying too far
from its medium-run equilibrium. Medium-run equilibrium is de¯ned in terms
of a capital-enhanced version of purchasing power parity.4 By incorporating
a measure of exchange-rate equilibrium explicitly within the intervention reac-
tion function, this study improves over other studies that assume the monetary
authorities desire nothing more than a backward-looking adjustment towards
trend.
The other main contribution of this study is empirical: a partial proportional
odds model of intervention is adopted that allows for asymmetry in the interven-
tion objective function. Asymmetry is, indeed, shown to be present. By taking
this °exible approach to estimation this study improves over other studies that
do not allow for violations of the proportional odds assumption.
The second study contained in this thesis focuses on the market response of
issuers of international debt to currency misalignment. Summarising the main
results, this study ¯nds that a signi¯cant response in terms of number of bonds
issued in a given currency is, indeed, associated with deviations from uncovered
interest-rate parity and, by extension, associated with perceptions of currency
misalignment. If, in any given period, the basis-point measure of deviations from
uncovered interest-rate parity for, say the euro, rises by 20 basis points, then the
4The capital-enhanced version of purchasing power parity is outlined by Juselius (1991,
1995), MacDonald and Marsh (1997, 1999) and Juselius and MacDonald (2000b,a).
9expected number of international bonds issued in euros increases, on average,
by almost 10%. Furthermore, in terms of number of bonds issued, ¯nancial
corporations are even more responsive than the average issuer to deviations
from uncovered interest-rate parity.
This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First,
it employs a unique dataset that draws on the entire population of interna-
tional bond issues during the sample period. Second, it presents an analysis
of the issuance of foreign-currency bonds by number of issues rather than, as
is customary in the literature, by value of issues (that is, this study draws on
count-data techniques). Third, this study embeds its model of bond issuance
within a framework of random utility maximisation.
The ¯nal study presented in this thesis investigates the relationship between
currency dynamics and hedging. Speci¯cally, the investigation assesses the role
of gold as a hedge against the US dollar. Key ¯ndings are as follows. First,
during the past 23 years gold has behaved as a hedge against the US dollar|
that is, gold-price returns have, on average, been correlated negatively with US
dollar returns. Second, there is no evidence to suggest that gold has acted as a
consistent and e®ective safe haven. Third, in recent years gold has become an
increasingly e®ective hedge against the US dollar, with conditional correlations
more negative now than they have been at any point during the past two and a
half decades.
The contribution of this study to the existing literature is two-fold. First, the
study o®ers an empirical analysis of the relationship between gold-price returns
and exchange-rate returns, modelling the time-varying correlations between a
17-variable system of returns using the correlation modelling techniques of Engle
(2002). As far as the author is aware no other study o®ers such an analysis.
Second, this study assesses the role of gold as both a hedge and a safe haven
with respect to the US dollar. While other work has investigated the role of
gold as a hedge and a haven for bonds and equities, no study has tackled the
same subject with a speci¯c focus on exchange rates.
In sum, the hope is that this thesis o®ers a useful contribution to the ¯elds
of international ¯nance and applied econometrics. Findings are clear and well-
de¯ned and open up a number of potential avenues for future research.
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Misalignment and
intervention
This chapter estimates a reaction function for o±cial Japanese intervention in
the currency markets between April 1991 and March 2006. The sample data
is daily with intervention data provided by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.
Estimation results show that intervention during the sample period conforms
to a model in which the monetary authorities intervene in order to prevent the
yen from straying too far from an equilibrium value de¯ned by a capital-enhanced
version of purchasing power parity. Predictability is good. A generalised ordered
logit model provides the empirical framework and results show that studies of
intervention that ignore violations of the proportional odds assumption are likely
to su®er from speci¯cation error.
2.1 Introduction
O±cial intervention in the currency markets has in recent years been labelled
variously as unsuccessful, ine®ective, and even counterproductive,1 and yet in-
tervention remains an important tool of exchange-rate policy for many coun-
tries today. At the start of 2009, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, India
and Indonesia were all intervening actively in the currency markets. Meanwhile,
Japanese authorities came under increasing pressure to intervene in the currency
markets in what would represent Japan's ¯rst o±cial intervention in ¯ve years.2
Of the world's biggest economies, Japan stands out for having had the most
1For recent studies of the e®ectiveness of intervention in the currency markets see, among
others, Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Ito (2002), King and Fatum (2005), McLaren (2002),
Neely (2005a), and Sarno and Taylor (2001).
2The Economist (2009) discusses recent pressure for Japanese intervention.
11active intervention policy during the past 20 years, engaging in more than
US$620bn-worth of interventions in the currency markets since 1991. US in-
terventions over the same period amounted to less than a tenth of this value.
Yet, despite Japan's activism in the currency markets, very little is known about
what drives Japan's interventions. Do Japan's monetary authorities intervene
in the foreign-exchange markets in order to keep the yen close to a ¯xed, pre-
determined value? To keep it within ¯xed bounds of tolerance? Within time-
varying bounds of tolerance?
Common wisdom has it that most monetary authorities aim to maintain
a stable exchange rate that is consistent with underlying economic fundamen-
tals. But Japan's monetary authorities do not disclose publicly the precise
aims of their intervention policy.3 All we have is evidence of Japan's past
interventions|in the form of the recorded dates of intervention, the amount of
yen purchased or sold on the given dates, and the partner currencies involved
in the intervention transactions|to o®er us clues as to the ultimate aim of
intervention policy. A small number of academic studies have used this infor-
mation to construct plausible models, known as reaction functions, of Japan's
intervention policy. None has been particularly successful.
Ito and Yabu (2007) estimate a reaction function for Japanese intervention
with a model that assumes that the Bank of Japan, which has operational
control of intervention policy in Japan, intervenes in order to keep the national
currency, the yen, close to trend historical values.4 Covering the period 1991 to
2002 and using in-sample prediction, the reaction function proposed by Ito and
Yabu (2007) predicts at best 18% of actual interventions. At worst it predicts
18 instances of intervention when no intervention actually took place.
Frenkel et al. (2002) estimate a reaction function that assumes Japanese
interventions in the foreign-exchange market respond to deviations of the yen-
dollar exchange rate from a short-term, and a long-term, exchange-rate target.
Their model anticipates correctly 52% of actual interventions. Ito (2002) es-
timates an intervention reaction function without appealing to any theoretical
framework, while Almekinders and Eij±nger (1996) propose a friction model
as the best description of Japan's intervention policy, whereby pursuit of an
optimal intervention policy is compromised by friction costs that are associated
with the political implementation of policy.
This study adopts the friction-model approach of Almekinders and Eij±nger
(1996) but incorporates a number of additional features that add signi¯cantly
to the empirical performance of the model. An intervention reaction function is
3For surveys of intervention policy see, for example, Edison (1993), Dominguez and Frankel
(1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001).
4The Bank of Japan acts as an agent for the implementation of intervention policy. Policy
itself, and the intervention decision, is determined by Japan's Ministry of Finance.
12estimated for Japan covering the period April 1991 to March 2006. The data is
daily.
This study makes two main contributions to the existing literature. Firstly,
it tests the hypothesis that the aim of optimal intervention policy in Japan is to
prevent the nominal exchange rate from straying too far from its medium-run
equilibrium. Too far is de¯ned in relation to a tolerance zone for the exchange
rate, while medium-run equilibrium is de¯ned in terms of a capital-enhanced
version of purchasing power parity.5 By incorporating a measure of exchange-
rate equilibrium explicitly within the intervention reaction function, this study
improves over other studies that assume the monetary authorities desire nothing
more than a backward-looking adjustment towards trend.
The second main contribution is empirical: this study adopts a partial pro-
portional odds model of intervention that allows for asymmetry in the interven-
tion objective function. That is, by employing a partial proportional odds model
it is possible to test the idea that the monetary authorities in Japan do not react
symmetrically to deviations in the value of the yen from its equilibrium value.
By taking this °exible approach to estimation this study improves over other
studies that do not allow for violations of the proportional odds assumption.
Key ¯ndings can be summarised as follows. (i) Between 1991 and 2006 Japan
did, indeed, intervene in the currency markets in a manner that suggests its in-
terventions were timed in order to prevent the yen from straying excessively
from its medium-run equilibrium value against the US dollar. (ii) Medium-run
equilibrium can be de¯ned in terms of a capital enhanced version of purchasing
power parity. (iii) The Japanese monetary authorities do not react symmetri-
cally to deviations in the value of the yen from its target value. (iv) Studies
of intervention that ignore violations of the proportional odds assumption are
prone to speci¯cation error.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the
stylised facts: the movement of the yen against the US dollar during the sample
period and the timing and size of intervention activity.6 Section 2.3 derives
a reaction function for Japanese intervention while Section 2.4 describes the
estimation methodology. Section 2.5 describes the data. Section 2.6 presents
the empirical results and Section 2.7 o®ers concluding remarks.
5The capital-enhanced version of purchasing power parity is outlined by Juselius (1991,
1995), MacDonald and Marsh (1997, 1999) and Juselius and MacDonald (2000b,a).
6Note that the sample period is determined solely by availability of data. Japan's Ministry
of Finance discloses information on all daily intervention activities after 01 April 1991.
132.2 Stylised facts
This section presents an overview of both Japanese intervention in the currency
markets and movements in the value of the yen against the US dollar during
the sample period.
Between 1991 and 2006 the yen experienced a number of signi¯cant °uctua-
tions against the US dollar. Figure 2.1 shows the major highs and lows. In April
1995 the yen hit a post-war high of 81 yen per US dollar as diplomatic frictions
over US-Japanese trade policy sparked heavy selling of US dollars. Three years
later, in August 1998, the Japanese currency slumped to 148 yen per US dollar,
its weakest level during the 15-year sample period, amid knock-on e®ects from
the ¯nancial crisis that struck Asia in the late 1990s. Throughout the sample
period the yen averaged 115 yen per US dollar, and traded, mostly, between 100
yen and 140 yen per US dollar.
Figure 2.2 shows the extent to which the Bank of Japan intervened in the cur-
rency markets between 1991 and 2006 in order to either weaken, or strengthen,
the yen. Positive amounts of intervention indicate purchases of yen. Negative
amounts indicate sales of yen. The average value of a single intervention during
the sample period is US$1.8bn.
Five main features characterise Japan's intervention behaviour during the
sample period. First, intervention is infrequent: on most days during the sample
period (91% of all days) there is no intervention.
Second, when intervention does occur, sales of yen are undertaken when the
Japanese currency is strong relative to its average value and purchases of yen
are undertaken when it is relatively weak. This chimes with the commonly
encountered explanations for intervention being to either prevent too much ap-
preciation or too much depreciation. Too much appreciation, the argument goes,
would harm exporters, while too much depreciation would harm importers and
con¯dence. More often than not, monetary authorities have justi¯ed interven-
tion as a means of helping to maintain a stable exchange rate that is consistent
with underlying economic fundamentals. For surveys see, for instance, Edison
(1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001).
Third, if intervention occurs on day t¡1, the direction of intervention subse-
quently, on day t, is identical. That is, purchases of yen follow purchases of yen,
and sales of yen follow sales of yen. There are no instances when a purchase is
followed directly by a sale, or a sale by a purchase.7
Fourth, intervention policy is asymmetric: there are many more instances of
yen-selling intervention, than yen-buying intervention.
7Neely (2000) provides a comprehensive discussion of the common practical features of
currency intervention.
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Figure 2.2: Japanese intervention in the currency markets
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Notes: Dotted line shows Japanese yen in terms of yen per US dollar, reverse
scale, measured on the left-hand axis. Solid line shows the amount, in US
dollar billions, of Japanese intervention in the currency markets, measured
on the right-hand axis. Frequency is daily. Positive amounts of intervention
indicate purchases of yen. Negative intervention indicates sales of yen. Source:
Japanese Ministry of Finance and Bloomberg.
15Fifth, during the sample period the last recorded intervention occurred on
16 March 2004 when the Bank of Japan stepped in to sell Y68bn in exchange
for US dollars. The sample records no subsequent instances of intervention.
For a discussion of the policy debate involved in the the design of Japanese
intervention policy in 2004, and the curtailment of interventions, see Taylor
(2010).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of the value of the yen from 1991 to
2010. The ¯gure shows the cessation of Japan's interventions in 2004 and the
resumption in 2010 (with a single instance of yen-selling intervention valuing
US$24bn occurring on 15 September 2010). The ¯gure, on its own, gives no
clear indication of whether the break in interventions after 2004 is consistent
with previous breaks, or whether it represents a change in intervention regime.
As such, this chapter looks only at the early period of interventions, allowing
the sample to run to 2006, not 2010.
2.3 Model of intervention
This section presents a model of o±cial intervention in the currency markets
for Japan between 1991 and 2006. The model is presented in three stages.
First, Section 2.3.1 outlines an intervention loss function for the central bank,
whereby policy loss is driven by the central bank's desire to minimise deviations
of the exchange rate from a time-varying target. Section 2.3.2 discusses the
exchange-rate target. Section 2.3.3 introduces into the model a role for policy
friction, which helps to explain why intervention occurs intermittently rather
than continually.
2.3.1 Loss function
Most studies of the objectives of central-bank intervention, if they take a reaction-
function approach to the subject, tend to construct these functions without ap-
pealing to any particular theory. Edison (1993) discusses many of these atheo-
retical approaches. A handful of investigations do, however, adopt intervention
reaction functions that are derived from theory. Almekinders and Eij±nger
(1996), for instance, combine a model of the exchange rate with a loss function
for the central bank in order to derive an intervention reaction function. The
loss function is fashioned around the idea that the central bank would prefer, if
able, to minimise deviations of the exchange rate from a target level. The extent
of policy loss is assumed to increase with both negative and positive deviations
from the target level.
Another formal derivation of the intervention reaction function is provided
16by Frenkel et al. (2002). The authors assume, like Almekinders and Eij±nger
(1996), that the central bank conforms to a policy loss function whereby it
aims to minimise deviations of the exchange rate from a target level. They also
assume that the central bank aims to minimise deviations from a target level
of intervention, where the intervention target is set (for a °exible exchange-rate
regime) at zero.
The assumption of an intervention target may, on the surface, seem fairly
innocuous. However, the implication is that intervention policy is independent
of exchange-rate developments. This would be the case if the central bank were
to pursue an objective aimed at either adding to or depleting its stock of foreign-
exchange reserves at a pre-determined rate. But in reality, such an objective
is highly uncommon|or it is, at least, in developed countries. This suggests
that there is little justi¯cation, here, for including an intervention target in the
central bank's loss function. Indeed, this study takes the view, like Ito and
Yabu (2004), that a more plausible loss function will include a target for the
exchange rate and nothing else. More speci¯cally, the loss function is assumed
to take the following form
MinEt¡1(LCB
t ) = Et¡1(st ¡ sT
t )2 (2.1)
where st is the log of the yen-per-dollar spot exchange rate at date t (which
in this case is the close of the New York trading day), where sT
t represents the
exchange-rate target at date t, and where the implication of the loss function
in this form is that the central bank's expected policy loss increases more than
proportionately with both positive and negative deviations from the exchange-
rate target.8
Note, Et¡1 implies that expectations are formed on the basis of information
available to both the central bank and market agents on day t ¡ 1. This as-
sumption is not without its faults. It has been criticised in particular by Sarno
and Taylor (2001), who suggest it is not appropriate to assume that both the
central bank and market agents base their expectations on the same informa-
tion. If both the central bank and market agents use the same information to
form expectations, then market agents have no incentive to monitor the central
bank because monitoring will provide no additional information. Sarno and
Taylor (2001) argue that in practice market agents do monitor central banks.
Indeed, ¯nancial markets in developed countries subject their central banks to
an immense amount of scrutiny.
On the surface, therefore, it seems that Sarno and Taylor (2001) have a
8Date t is centred on the New York closing rate because, as explained by Ito (2002),
Japanese intervention on day t can be carried out during the Tokyo trading day, the European
trading day, or the New York trading day.
17point. It makes sense to think that that the central bank may have an infor-
mational advantage and that it will know more about its own future actions
than will market agents. This will be the case if o±cial interventions are not
announced publicly but are, instead, undertaken secretly in order to increase
e®ectiveness. Such behaviour would be in keeping with theories espoused by, for
example, Balke and Haslag (1992), who suggest that in order for intervention
to be e®ective the central bank must maintain an informational advantage.
The problem with this idea and, by association, the °aw in the argument
put forward by Sarno and Taylor (2001), is that there is good evidence to
suggest central banks do not operate with information that is any better than
that available to market agents. Humpage (1997), for instance, ¯nds that US
intervention in the currency markets between 1990 and 1997 did not convey to
market agents any information that they would not have possessed otherwise.
The central bank did not, in short, possess an informational advantage.
It is the supposition of this study that the ¯ndings of Humpage (1997) are a
fair description of the balance of information in the intervention process and that
neither the central bank nor market agents wield an informational advantage.
Expectations, as a result, are formed on the basis of information available to
both the central bank and market agents at time t ¡ 1, and this behaviour is
re°ected in the formulation of the loss function represented by Eqn.(2.1).
Implicit in Eqn.(2.1) is the idea that the monetary authorities aim to use in-
tervention to minimise the loss function. This does, of course, leave unanswered
the question of just how, in the absence of intervention, does the exchange rate
behave? It is assumed here that the central bank believes that the exchange
rate behaves as a random walk and that intervention at date t, should it occur,
has a contemporaneous e®ect on the exchange rate. The exchange rate can,
therefore, be de¯ned as
st = st¡1 + ¸Intt + ut (2.2)
where the implication is that the yen-per-dollar level of the exchange rate is
determined by the exchange rate's own recent past st¡1, by intervention Intt,
and by ut, a white-noise error. Intt takes a positive value to represent yen
purchases and a negative value to represent yen sales.
If intervention is successful in causing not just a slowing of the exchange
rate's movement, but an actual reversal, then ¸ should be negative. To see this,
note that if yen-selling intervention by the monetary authorities (represented
by a negative value for Intt) causes, as intended, a depreciation in the value of
the yen (with st ¡ st¡1 > 0) then ¸ should, logically, take a negative sign.
In a survey of 22 monetary authorities, Neely (2000) found that 90% of
authorities say they intervene sometimes or always in order to resist short-run
18trends in the exchange rate. Meanwhile, 67% of monetary authorities agreed
with the premise that they intervene in order to return exchange rates to \fun-
damental values."
To treat the exchange rate as a random walk, or more generally as a mar-
tingale process, implies that the Japanese authorities accept the thesis of Meese
and Rogo® (1983) who ¯nd that a random walk provides an adequate descriptive
model of the behaviour of the exchange rate. Assuming random-walk behaviour
implies that intervention may a®ect the exchange rate via the co-ordination
channel, a channel of in°uence proposed by Taylor (1994, 2004, 2005). The co-
ordination channel implies that central-bank intervention drives the exchange
rate towards its fundamentals-based value by resolving a failure of co-ordination
in the currency markets: if misalignments of the exchange rate are caused by
non-fundamental factors (such as the in°uence of chartist traders) and it is only
a failure of co-ordination among market participants that is preventing the ex-
change rate from returning to equilibrium, then o±cial intervention may prove
to be e®ective by acting as a co-ordinating signal that causes speculators to
enter the market and resume true, fundamentals-based trading decisions that
will return the exchange rate towards a level that is consistent with fundamental
values.
Of course, the co-ordination channel is not the only channel through which
intervention can in°uence the exchange rate. Two other channels are the sig-
nalling channel and the portfolio-balance channel. For further discussion see
Sarno and Taylor (2001). It is also possible that intervention could in°uence the
exchange rate via market-microstructure processes. See Lyons (2001). But these
processes do not seem to account for prolonged e®ects on exchange rates|see
Reitz and Taylor (2008)|and neither the signalling channel nor the portfolio-
balance channel receive much empirical support in the current academic litera-
ture. The co-ordination channel does, therefore, seem to represent a plausible
mechanism for the in°uence of intervention on the exchange rate where the
exchange rate is assumed to behave like a random walk.
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
One drawback in adopting a random-walk model is that it is not the most °ex-
ible description of the exchange rate, especially when the empirical framework
is one of daily data, as it is here. A more °exible model would, perhaps, be
one that acknowledges the fact that a common form of heteroscedasticity in
daily exchange-rate data is autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (mean-
ing that large and small residuals tend to come in clusters). An obvious approach
would be to adopt the model proposed by Bollerslev (1986), which captures
19generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, otherwise known as a
GARCH model.
It is well documented that GARCH models o®er good descriptions of the
returns from daily spot exchange rates. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989a), for in-
stance, ¯nd that for six di®erent currencies a GARCH model with daily dummy
variables and conditionally t-distributed errors provides a good description of
the kurtosis and time-dependent conditional heteroscedasticity in the exchange-
rate data. Studies by Taylor (1986) and McCurdy and Morgan (1988), among
many others, ¯nd that the most appropriate formulation of the GARCH model
for daily exchange-rate data is a GARCH(1,1) model.
All this support for a GARCH approach when modelling exchange rates
has led, not surprisingly perhaps, to GARCH techniques being employed by a
number of intervention studies in recent years. Dominguez (1998) was the ¯rst
to use GARCH conditional variances (alongside implied volatilities from cur-
rency options) to study the relationship between central-bank intervention and
exchange-rate volatility, ¯nding that intervention tends to increase volatility|
or that it did, at least, for the US, Japan and Germany between 1977 and 1994.
Using similar GARCH methods, Ito (2002), Frenkel et al. (2005), Hillebrand and
Schnabl (2005), and Harada and Watanabe (2005), look speci¯cally at Japan,
investigating the impact of Japanese foreign-exchange intervention on the daily
volatility of the yen's exchange rate against the US dollar.
Endogeneity
Unfortunately, using a GARCH framework to analyse central-bank intervention
in the currency markets does have its drawbacks. One important drawback has
been highlighted by Hillebrand et al. (2006), who note that GARCH approaches
do not deal successfully with the problem (encountered in all intervention stud-
ies) of endogeneity.
Endogeneity is a problem in intervention studies because the close correla-
tion that exists between intervention and exchange-rate movements does not
necessarily imply that intervention is the cause of changes in the exchange rate.
Correlation could imply the opposite|that exchange-rate movements cause the
central bank to intervene. Hillebrand et al. (2006) suggest that GARCH ap-
proaches, especially in the GARCH mean equations, have failed to resolve this
issue of endogeneity and point out that, partly as a result, the GARCH ap-
proach to intervention has lost some of its appeal among researchers in recent
years and has been replaced, to a certain extent, by event studies.
20Event studies
Event studies look at the behaviour of the exchange rate not over a continuous
time series but over small windows of data clustered around periods of inter-
vention. Event studies avoid the problem of endogeneity so long as two things
hold true: ¯rst, so long as there is no error in the measurement of the timing
of intervention; and second, so long as the frequency of the data is high enough
(eg, intra-day data) to preclude the monetary authorities from reacting to mar-
ket developments within the data interval.9 If these two assumptions hold true,
then there is no contemporaneous impact of the exchange rate on intervention
and, as such, no endogeneity.
However, intra-day event studies are not without their limitations. One
major limitation, as highlighted by Neely (2005b), is that only one country
(namely Switzerland) has so far released o±cial intra-day data on the precise
timing of interventions, and as a result intra-day event studies are restricted
to examining just one sample. Inferences cannot, therefore, be assumed to be
particularly robust. A second limitation is the arbitrary choice of data-window
size. The data window needs to be large enough to register the full e®ects
of intervention and in intra-day event studies common wisdom has it that a
two-hour period either side of the intervention should provide a window that is
roughly large enough to capture all necessary e®ects (see, for instance, Payne
and Vitale (2003)). But as Neely (2005a) notes, it is entirely possible that
intervention has its full e®ect over days, if not weeks. Two ¯fths of central
bankers surveyed by Neely (2000) said they believe that intervention takes at
least a couple of days to have its full e®ect.
Structural approach to intervention
Perhaps the biggest limitation of event studies is, however, their inability to say
anything useful about causality. The most that event studies can do is paint
a statistical picture of the behaviour of the exchange rate around periods of
intervention. Event studies reveal nothing about the reason for the observed
behaviour. In order to throw light on the underlying causality, it is necessary
to assume some structure for the system|and perhaps construct a structural
equation model (Haavelmo, 1943).
Hillebrand et al. (2006) take a structural approach to intervention, using
the concept of realised volatility as proposed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)
to identify explicitly the e®ect of intervention on exchange rates. Kearns and
Rigobon (2005) and Neely (2005b) also take structural approaches in their anal-
yses of the exchange rate's response to intervention. All of these studies, since
9See Neely (2005b) for a full discussion.
21they aim to create a system in which all structural parameters are identi¯ed,
have the advantage of being able to deal directly with the problem of endogene-
ity.10
Single-equation approach
This study employs a single-equation approach, with structure, to the analysis
of intervention. A number of other studies have employed a single-equation
approach to intervention. One technique is to model intervention as a binary-
choice dependent variable, with the dependent variable existing in one of two
states: intervention or no intervention.11
Another valid single-equation technique is to approach intervention using
a friction model, as ¯rst proposed by Rosett (1959). In Rosett's model the
dependent variable takes the value of zero if the explanatory variables are close
to their desired levels. If the dependent variable is intervention, the implication
is that intervention occurs only when the explanatory variables stray outside an
empirically-determined tolerance zone. The central bank, in other words, will
maintain a policy of non-intervention so long as the factors that condition its
decision to intervene do not breach pre-determined thresholds.
Almekinders and Eij±nger (1996) use a friction model to analyse the in-
tervention policies of both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve during the
late 1980s. An intervention reaction function is derived by combining a GARCH
model of the exchange rate with a loss function for the central bank. The de-
pendent variable in the reaction function is intervention amount. Ito and Yabu
(2004) also adopt a friction-model approach to intervention, but the dependent
variable in their reaction function is not intervention amount. Instead, it is an
intervention indicator function, which can take one of three values (1, 0, or -1),
representing either the sale of foreign currency (1), no intervention (0), or the
purchase of foreign currency (-1). This seems to be a °exible approach and one
that will be pursued in this study.
Endogeneity in the single-equation approach
Of course, the important question to ask is, Can a single-equation approach deal
adequately with the problem of endogeneity? On the surface, using a single-
equation approach might seem to free the economist from the problem of endo-
geneity because there will be less need to make assumptions about the structure
of the economy. The single-equation approach of the event study, for instance,
10Since the structural parameters are identi¯ed, it is possible to estimate the parameters
consistently.
11Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Dominguez (1998) and Frenkel et al. (2002) provide examples
of this binary-choice approach.
22makes precious few assumptions about the system's structure. However, Neely
(2005a) suggests that event studies do, in fact, make hidden assumptions about
structure that can lead to simultaneous-equations bias if intervention a®ects
exchange-rate returns contemporaneously (with a contemporaneous interaction
occurring if, for instance, daily data is employed rather than intra-day data).
Furthermore, it is di±cult to correct for this simultaneous-equation bias us-
ing an instrumental-variables approach because reliable instruments are hard to
¯nd.12
Clearly, event studies su®er from a number of weaknesses when it comes to
dealing with endogeneity. While this study is not an event study, it still needs
to contend with many of the same problems that cause event studies to be vul-
nerable to simultaneous-equations bias when deployed as tools for intervention
analysis.
The obvious problem is that, as can be seen from equation Eqn.(2.2), inter-
vention does, in this model, have a contemporaneous impact on the exchange
rate. However, the reason why the results of this study are not tainted with
simultaneous-equations bias is due to the fact that the intervention variable,
Intt, is not intervention amount, but is instead an indicator function.
Representing intervention with an indicator function means that using data
of a daily frequency, as is done in this study, does not cause an endogeneity
problem as would, normally, be expected. Under normal circumstances it would
make sense to expect daily data on intervention to generate an endogeneity
problem because during the course of a full day of trading hours, the central
bank will be able to react to any given exchange-rate development and, as a
result, there will be a contemporaneous interaction between intervention and
exchange-rate returns.
However, this contemporaneous interaction does not result in an endogeneity
problem so long as intervention is represented by an indicator function. The
reason why boils down to the timing of the intervention decision: the decision to
intervene on any given day occurs prior to the start of trading hours and so it is
not possible for the intervention decision to react contemporaneously to events
in the currency market during the day in question. If, however, intervention were
to be represented by intervention amount rather than an indicator function then
things would be very di®erent. A contemporaneous interaction would, in fact,
occur. The reason is that while the decision to intervene on any given day is
taken before the start of market trading hours, the decision as to just how much
to spend on intervention is taken during, not prior to, trading hours. Exchange-
rate developments and intervention amount would, therefore, be free to interact
12As Neely (2005b) notes, it is di±cult to ¯nd instruments that are correlated reliably with
intervention but not with exchange-rate returns.
23contemporaneously.
To support this argument it is necessary to be more explicit about the daily
timeline of events that form the mechanics of the model in this study. Japan's
intervention decision is assumed to take place during the three hours prior to the
opening of the Tokyo currency market|that is, between 0600hrs and 0900hrs
Tokyo time. The important thing about this three-hour window is that it rep-
resents the gap, in terms of time, between the close of New York trading day
(at 0600hrs Tokyo time, or 0700hrs if daylight-saving time is being observed in
the US) and the opening of the Tokyo trading day (at 0900hrs).
The implication of all this is that the decision to intervene on day t is made
prior to the opening of market-trading hours and is based on all the information
available at the end of day t ¡ 1. During the three hours prior to market
opening, the decision is taken to intervene or not, but even if intervention is
indeed sanctioned, there will not, necessarily, be a decision taken on the precise
amount to be spent on intervention. The precise amount of intervention on
day t will be decided during the course of trading on day t and will depend on
the movement of the exchange rate.13 Intervention amount will, as a result, be
associated with an endogeneity problem. But there will be no such problem
associated with an intervention indicator function.
Adopting an intervention indicator does unfortunately have its drawbacks,
the biggest of which is a loss of e±ciency. A loss of e±ciency is experienced
because by adopting an indicator function, which indicates only the direction of
intervention, we are ignoring information on intervention amount which is both
available and quanti¯able. As a result the information set is only partial. This
is not ideal. But the bene¯ts of the indicator function|chie°y its usefulness as
an aid to avoiding the endogeneity problem|are considered to be big enough
to outweigh the drawbacks of forcing self-imposed limits on the information set.
This study proceeds, therefore, with an intervention indicator function.14
Returning to the mathematical derivation of the model being used in this
study, it is possible, using Eqn.(2.2) and Eqn.(2.1), to derive an intervention
reaction function and an expression for optimal intervention, Int¤
t. The loss
function Eqn.(2.2) is minimised subject to the constraint represented by the
exchange rate Eqn.(2.1), leaving optimal intervention to be de¯ned as
Int¤
t = ¡
1
¸
(st¡1 ¡ sT
t ) (2.3)
13In a survey of 22 monetary authorities, Neely (2000) reports that 21 authorities say that
market reaction sometimes or always a®ects the size of any given intervention.
14One possible means of avoiding this loss of e±ciency would be to construct an intervention
index, whereby an intervention is de¯ned to consist of those sales or purchases that occur over
consecutive periods. This possibility is not pursued here but is left for future research.
242.3.2 Target exchange rate
On ¯rst inspection, the intervention reaction function represented by Eqn.(2.3)
is no di®erent to the expression for optimal intervention proposed by Ito and
Yabu (2004). However, there is an important di®erence. The di®erence is that
the target exchange rate, sT, is constructed, in this study, in a manner that
allows for a more sophisticated target.
Weighted target
In the intervention reaction function proposed by Ito and Yabu (2004), the
monetary authorities use a target for the exchange rate that is calculated as a
weighted average of past exchange rates. More speci¯cally, the authors construct
a composite measure of the target exchange rate that includes the average of
the spot exchange rate during the previous day, st¡2, the average of the spot
exchange rate during the preceding four weeks (or in practice, 21 business days),
sM, and the average of the exchange rate during the preceding 12 months, sY .
In this form, the target exchange rate can be represented as
sT
t = ®1st¡2 + ®2sM + ®3sY (2.4)
where ®1+®2+®3 = 1. The implication is that if the central bank is focused on
long-run stability of the exchange rate then ®3 will take a value close to unity.
When short-run stability is the priority, ®1 will take a value close to unity, and
when the medium term is the main focus, ®2 will lie close to unity.
The weighted average approach to target exchange rates, represented by
Eqn.(2.4), can be thought of as a generalisation of the construction used by
Almekinders and Eij±nger (1996) where the central bank's target is a long-
run target and ®3 is equal to unity. There are, of course, alternatives to the
weighted-average approach. Baillie and Osterberg (1997), for instance, assume
that the target exchange rate is a simple, static nominal value (speci¯cally, the
authors assume that between 1985 and 1990 the world's industrial countries
agreed on target, nominal values for both the dollar-Deutschemark exchange
rate and the dollar-yen exchange rate). Ito (2002) assumes that the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate for Japan between 1991 and 2001 was 125 yen per
US dollar.
Other studies mirror the approach of Almekinders and Eij±nger (1996),
assuming that if the central bank does conduct intervention policy according to
an exchange-rate target then that target will hold only over the long run, not
over the short run or medium run. Artus (1977), Neumann (1984) and Knight
and Mathieson (1983) all assume that the central bank pursues a single, long-
25run target. But this target is not, as per Ito and Yabu (2004), a twelve-month
moving average. It is a target based on purchasing power parity.
Purchasing power parity
It is not illogical to think that that the monetary authorities may want to guide
the exchange rate towards a value that brings into line international purchasing
power. Indeed, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) ¯nd that purchasing power parity
was an important part of intervention policy for America's Federal Reserve
between 1982 and 1988 and Neely (2002) ¯nds, similarly, that the US monetary
authorities tend to intervene to support the US dollar when it is undervalued
relative to PPP and sell it under opposite circumstances. Frenkel et al. (2002),
meanwhile, use a real-exchange-rate target derived on the basis of purchasing-
power-parity conditions for Japan between 1991 and 2001. What is more, even
though neither Esaka (2000) nor Galati and Melick (1999) look speci¯cally at
the question of purchasing power parity as a target for Japanese exchange-rate
policy, both studies conclude that Japan intervened in the currency markets
during the 1990s in a manner consistent with there being some implicit target
level for the yen-dollar exchange rate.
One advantage of a weighted-average target is that it is easy to de¯ne and
test econometrically. Testing for the validity of PPP as a target is more chal-
lenging. The biggest challenge arises if the researcher is intending to devise a
model based on daily data. Unfortunately, the components of any PPP measure
of an exchange rate, namely domestic and foreign prices, tend to be reported
on a monthly basis and, therefore, if monthly PPP data is used in a model of
the daily exchange rate, it will lead to a target that proves, as noted by Ito
and Yabu (2004), to be \sticky". One answer to this problem is to interpolate
the monthly data into a daily format, as is done by Neely (2006) in his study
of US intervention. But interpolation is far from ideal. Any type of interpola-
tion, however sophisticated, means making strong assumptions about how the
interpolated data behave when observed at higher frequencies, and this criticism
does, perhaps, carry even more weight when the interpolated data is for such a
notoriously inexact measure of exchange-rate equilibrium as PPP.
Purchasing power parity, as a presumed target for intervention policy, is not
without its °aws. Although PPP is used regularly by private-sector economists
and popular commentators as a rough-and-ready guide to a currency's equilib-
rium value, it would be rash to assume that central banks cannot a®ord the
computational e®ort to come up with a better measure of exchange-rate equi-
librium. It makes sense, then, to look for an alternative to PPP as a plausible
target of intervention policy and, perhaps, to introduce more realistic formula-
26tions for both short-term and medium-term targets.
One aim of this study is to construct a model of intervention that has,
embedded within it, an exchange-rate target that is more than just a short-hand
expression of equilibrium devised solely in order to be computationally simple|
or more, in other words, than just a weighted average of previous exchange-
rate values, as per Ito and Yabu (2004). Instead, the aim is to allow for an
exchange-rate target that mirrors as closely as possible the monetary authorities'
perception of exchange-rate equilibrium.
What we mean by equilibrium exchange rate
Exchange-rate equilibrium is not a straightforward concept to model. There are
short-, medium-, and long-run concepts of equilibrium. What is more, di®er-
ent measures of exchange-rate equilibrium are appropriate for di®erent situa-
tions. A bewildering array of acronyms, representing di®erent interpretations of
exchange-rate equilibrium, have become established in the relevant literature,
yet still there is a debate over the optimality of equilibrium, over its determi-
nation, over its evolution and even over its existence.15
For all practical purposes, however, the concept of exchange-rate equilibrium
can, in fact, be employed successfully if the modeller takes into account the
relevant time horizon. For instance, an equilibrium that pertains over the short
run will not necessarily pertain also over the medium run or long run. For a
full discussion of the relevance of the time horizon, see Driver and Westaway
(2003), but for the purposes of this study it is necessary, here, to highlight just
a handful of salient points about the long, medium and short run.
First, an exchange rate that is in equilibrium in the short run can be de¯ned
as being in an equilibrium that, in line with the thinking of Williamson (1983),
satis¯es the condition that all fundamental determinants are at their current
values after netting out the in°uence of random e®ects such as bubbles.
A medium-run equilibrium is more di±cult to de¯ne. In its simplest form,
a medium-run equilibrium will exist when the economy is in balance both in-
ternally and externally. External balance implies that the current-account gap
must be sustainable, in the sense that it must be consistent with convergence,
eventually, to a stock-°ow equilibrium. Unfortunately there is no hard-and-fast
rule for de¯ning what is meant by sustainable, which highlights the fact that a
key feature of the internal-external-balance approach to exchange-rate equilib-
rium is that a large degree of judgment, or normative manipulation, is involved
in de¯ning external balance. The calculations involved in ¯nding internal bal-
ance are, thankfully, slightly less prone to normative in°uence. Internal balance
15See Milgate (1998) for a discussion of the concept of equilibrium and its development over
time.
27occurs when demand is at its supply-potential and the economy is running at its
natural speed limit. As such, an internal equilibrium can be de¯ned as occurring
when the economy is operating with no output gap and when unemployment
stands at a steady-state level above which in°ation will fall and below which
in°ation will rise (ie, at a non-accelerating-in°ation rate of unemployment, or
NAIRU).
Long-run equilibrium, meanwhile, can be de¯ned as occurring when the
economy reaches a state of stock-°ow equilibrium. To get to this state may,
of course, take years, or even decades. The important point is that stock-°ow
equilibrium in this context will occur when there is no reason for the level of
asset stocks to change as a proportion of GDP. This is di®erent from exchange-
rate equilibrium in the medium-term when there is no stock-°ow equilibrium.
In the medium term, equilibrium can occur at any prevailing levels of national
wealth. But in the long run, net wealth must be stock-°ow consistent.
A modelling framework for exchange-rate equilibrium
Of course, these de¯nitions of long-, medium- and short-run equilibrium are of
little use unless they can be represented in a modelling framework. Clark and
MacDonald (1999) outline a useful framework. Keeping to the spirit, if not the
letter, of the approach taken by Clark and MacDonald (1999), the exchange
rate can be represented as
st = ¯0Zt + ¿0Tt + "t (2.5)
where st is the exchange rate at time t; where Zt represents a vector of funda-
mentals that are expected to have persistent e®ects on the exchange rate not
just over the medium term (ie, over the business cycle) but also over the long
term; where Tt is a vector of transitory, or short-run variables (including dy-
namic e®ects from the fundamentals, Zt); where "t is a random error and where
¯0 and ¿0 are vectors of coe±cients.
Using this modelling framework, it is possible to describe, mathematically,
what is meant by long-, medium- and short-run equilibrium for an exchange
rate. A short-run equilibrium can, for instance, be de¯ned as
s
SEQ
t = ¯0Zt + ¿0Tt (2.6)
where fundamentals are at their current values, transitory e®ects are present,
but where there are no unanticipated shocks. Another valid way of representing
short-run equilibrium, suggested by Driver and Westaway (2003), is to assume
that equilibrium in the short run re°ects fundamentals at their current values
28but precludes a role for transitory e®ects, such that
s
SEQ¤
t = ¯0Zt (2.7)
and where, in the lexicon of Williamson (1983), the exchange rate is at a current
equilibrium. In the same way, exchange-rate equilibrium in the medium run,
s
MEQ
t , can be de¯ned as
s
MEQ
t = ¯0 ^ Zt (2.8)
where ^ Zt represents fundamentals at their trend, medium-run values (in the pro-
cess of adjusting towards a long-run equilibrium). Ultimately, when fundamen-
tals do reach their steady-state, long-run values ¹ Zt, exchange-rate equilibrium
can be represented by
s
LEQ
t = ¯0 ¹ Zt (2.9)
What must be noted is that even though these models for long-, medium- and
short-run equilibrium represent distinct concepts, at any given point in time
they will all hold true.
Equilibrium as a target
While a nation's monetary authorities may, as part of normal operating pro-
cedure, measure the actual value of the exchange rate against estimates of its
short-, medium- and long-run equilibrium values, what is less likely is that any
intervention in the currency markets by the monetary authorities will aim to
manipulate the exchange rate towards a value that will satisfy equilibrium at
all time horizons. What seems more likely is that when intervening in order
to drive the exchange rate towards a target value the monetary authorities will
have in mind just one time horizon. The question is, which time horizon? Short,
medium, or long?
On balance, it seems unlikely that any sensible central bank would be so
bold as to think that with just a handful of daily interventions it could force
the national currency into a position of long-run equilibrium. Most central
bankers are amply aware that currencies can and do deviate from their long-rum
equilibrium values due to the existence of persistent in°uences on the exchange
rate over the business cycle that make it undesirable to pursue blindly a target
consistent with Eqn.(2.9). For example, pursuing a long-run target of purchasing
power parity without acknowledging the fact that real factors can a®ect the real
exchange rate over the business cycle (as argued by, for instance, Mussa (1986))
would risk harming the economy. The productivity-bias e®ect on exchange
rates outlined originally by Bela Belassa and Paul Samuelson is a well-known
real determinant of any real exchange rate. In Japan it has, in fact, been an
29important in°uence on the exchange rate even in the long run.16
All this suggests that a central bank deploying currency-market intervention
in order to pursue an exchange-rate target is likely to avoid choosing a target
based on long-run equilibrium. On the surface, a target based on short-run
equilibrium might seem more likely|and, indeed, more attainable. Pursuing a
target that compensates for short-term bubbles (compensates in other words for
random disturbances, with the target taking a form outlined by Eqn.(2.6)) would
represent an exchange-rate policy aimed at eliminating misperceptions about
fundamentals.17 A policy such as this makes sense in principle. In practice,
however, the °aw in such a strategy is that bubbles are hard to identify.18 A
policy aimed at o®setting the e®ect of bubbles cannot hope to be e®ective if the
bubbles themselves cannot in fact be measured with su±cient accuracy.
An alternative to pursuing an exchange-rate target that compensates for
bubbles might be, perhaps, to target a short-term equilibrium that aims to o®-
set transitory in°uences on the exchange rate. In other words the central bank
might choose to adopt a target such as Eqn.(2.7). The advantage of such a
strategy would be that the central bank could focus on aligning the real ex-
change rate with its permanent, supply-side determinants while compensating
for transitory determinants such as nominal shocks thought to have no bearing
on the real exchange rate in the long run.19 All this seems reasonable. The
problem, however, is that transitory components can, for some currencies, ex-
plain a great deal of the movement of the real exchange rate. For Germany and
Japan, for instance, Clarida and Gali (1994) ¯nd that around 70% and 60%,
respectively, of the variances of these countries' real exchange rates are due to
transitory components. To ignore these transitory, cyclical components when
they play such a big part in the determination of the real exchange rates would
be to ignore the fact that the driving fundamentals contain important transi-
tory elements. Currency-market intervention aimed at compensating for these
transitory elements could, therefore, be self-defeating. The implication is that
no rational, forward-looking central bank would countenance such a policy.
If neither a target based on short-run equilibrium nor one based on long-
run equilibrium is a plausible proposition for central-bank intervention policy,
16A number of economists have argued that during the second half of the twentieth century
Japan experienced a prolonged Balassa-Samuelson e®ect. See for instance Marston (1987)
and Koedijk et al. (1998).
17See Bernanke and Gertler (1999) for a discussion about policy responses to asset-price
bubbles, and for rational speculative bubbles see, for instance, Buiter and Pesenti (1990).
18For a discussion about identifying exchange-rate bubbles see, for example, Norden (1986).
19For a °avour of the discussion about decomposing the real exchange rate into its perma-
nent and transitory components, see, for instance, Clarida and Gali (1994) for the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition and for structural-vector-autoregression estimates and see Clark and
MacDonald (2000) for cointegration-based estimates of permanent, equilibrium exchange
rates.
30the only alternative is to target a medium-run equilibrium. There are a num-
ber of reasons for thinking that a medium-run target, such as Eqn.(2.8), may
be preferable. First, the target allows for the cyclical adjustment of the fun-
damentals towards their stock-°ow-consistent values. This, surely, would be a
desirable feature of any exchange-rate policy|it makes sense to adopt a policy
that does not con°ict with any endogenous, cyclical tendency for the economy
to change. Indeed, survey results compiled by Neely (2000) suggest that most
monetary authorities do not intervene in order to correct long- or medium-run
misalignments, but instead aim to compensate for short-run volatility, with 90%
of respondents saying they intervene sometimes or always to resist short-term
trends in the exchange rate.
The second reason why central banks are more likely to target a medium-run
equilibrium rather than a short- or long-run equilibrium is the appropriateness
of the policy horizon. A medium-run target that allows for cyclical endoge-
nous change is less likely to con°ict with other policy objectives if those other
objectives are equally sensitive to the business cycle, having forward-parameter-
setting horizons of more than a year (eg, in°ation-targeting monetary policy)
but less than, say, seven years. In short, there seems to be ample support for
supposing that those central banks that do intervene in the currency markets
in order to pursue a target exchange rate do so in pursuit, frequently, of a
medium-run target.
What type of medium-run equilibrium
If a medium-run equilibrium is to be used in the intervention reaction function,
the next question is what form of medium-run equilibrium? There are a num-
ber of possibilities. Driver and Westaway (2003) highlight two main concepts
of medium-run equilibrium: the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (or
FEER) and Desired Equilibrium Exchange Rate (or DEER). Both are models
of internal-external balance, with equilibrium being de¯ned as the level of the
real exchange rate that is consistent with balance both internally and externally,
permitting changes over time in net foreign assets.
Unfortunately neither FEERs nor DEERs are particularly simple to cal-
culate. Estimates require either a fully speci¯ed macromodel or a partial-
equilibrium model containing a subset of the relevant equations. The partial-
equilibrium approach is more commonplace and, perhaps, simpler, but even with
this approach the necessary calculations are lengthy. First, net-trade and net-
income relationships are speci¯ed and the current-account trend is calculated
on the assumption that real exchange rates are at their actual levels (while it is
assumed that output levels at home and abroad are at their trend values). Cycli-
31cal factors will, therefore, account for the di®erence between the actual current
account and the trend current account, and the FEER is the real exchange rate
that brings into balance the trend current account with a sustainable level of
savings and investment in each economy (sustainable, that is, according to some
normative benchmark). Calculating DEERs is not much simpler. It involves
the same essential elements of estimation as for FEERs, but the real exchange
rate is conditioned upon some optimal trajectory for ¯scal policy.
Complexity of estimation is just one reason why, in all likelihood, neither
FEERs nor DEERs will be used as targets by any central bank aiming to in-
tervene in the currency markets in an e®ort to guide the current exchange rate
towards a medium-run equilibrium. Calculating both FEERs and DEERs, as
has been explained, requires estimating a large number of variables, something
that no central bank will be keen to entertain if hoping to respond quickly, with
intervention, to daily movements in exchange rates. What is more, much of the
data necessary for calculating FEERs and DEERs is available only with a long
lag. Data for net foreign assets, for instance, is available sometimes with a delay
of six months|and often longer.
Intuitively an exchange-rate target must, for operational purposes, possess a
certain number of qualities: it must be relatively simple and quick to calculate, it
must re°ect an accepted measure of equilibrium, and estimates of its value must
be timely (that is, any intervention in the currency markets must be conditional
upon the target being accurate at the time of intervention rather than accurate
at some arbitrary time in the past). In terms of simplicity and timeliness, it
is clear that neither FEERs nor DEERs ¯t the bill as functional exchange-rate
targets. There are, however, alternatives.
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is one obvious alternative. As a concept, it
is simple, and as a calculable measure of equilibrium it can, to an extent, be
timely if interpolation methods are used to decant monthly price data into a
daily format. But as has been explained earlier, PPP is a measure of long-run
equilibrium. On its own, it cannot be used as a reliable gauge of medium-run
equilibrium.
However, if PPP is combined with other elements that are sensitive to the
e®ects of the business cycle, then it can, in fact, be employed as a measure of
medium-run equilibrium. One such PPP-hybrid measure of the medium-run
equilibrium is the capital enhanced equilibrium exchange rate, or CHEER.
Capital-enhanced equilibrium exchange rate
The CHEER approach involves combining PPP with the theory of uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) and has been championed by, among others, Juselius
32(1991, 1995), MacDonald and Marsh (1997, 1999) and Juselius and MacDonald
(2000b,a). The basic premise of the approach is that while PPP may explain
exchange-rate movements in the long run, in the medium run an exchange rate
can diverge from PPP as a result of di®erences in interest rates across countries.
The CHEER approach does, in other words, re°ect a Casselian view of PPP
(see MacDonald and Marsh (1997)). But it di®ers in one important respect.
A strict Casselian approach would mean embracing the assumption that non-
zero interest di®erentials have no more than a temporary impact on the real
exchange rate. The CHEER approach, however, makes the assumption that
there is persistence in both interest-rate di®erentials and the real exchange rate.
Assuming that there is persistence in interest-rate di®erentials and in the
real exchange rate implies, here, that exchange rates can diverge from their PPP
values as a result of, for instance, savings imbalances that manifest themselves
as large current-account gaps. The important point here is that adjustment of
any current-account gap in response to relative prices will be slow if the mean-
reversion process of the real exchange rate towards PPP is also sluggish. A
persistent current-account gap will, of course, be ¯nanced through the capital
account, and so long as the capital account continues to function in this way, in-
terest rates will diverge from uncovered interest parity and the movement of the
exchange rate in the medium run will re°ect a capital-enhanced equilibrium.20
The CHEER approach is fairly simple to represent statistically. First, pur-
chasing power parity is de¯ned, according to convention, as
st = pt ¡ p¤
t (2.10)
where st is the log of the spot exchange rate (home currency per unit of foreign
currency), pt is the log of the domestic price level and where an asterisk denotes
a foreign variable. Meanwhile, uncovered interest parity (UIP) can be expressed
as
se
t+k ¡ st = (it ¡ i¤
t) (2.11)
where it is the yield on bonds with maturity k and e represents expectations
such that se
t+k ¡ st denotes the expected change in the exchange rate over the
next k periods. The implication of Eqn.(3.1) is that the domestic interest rate is
equal to the foreign interest rate plus the expected appreciation of the exchange
rate at an annualized percentage rate.
When the forecast horizon lengthens, it is reasonable to expect, as high-
lighted by Juselius (1995), that the formation of expectations will be in°uenced
increasingly by deviations from PPP. In this way, if the expected exchange rate
20Note that this capital-enhanced approach when applied, as it often is, to bilateral exchange
rates, will re°ect only partial equilibrium and will not re°ect equilibrium in the whole economy.
33is given as
se
t+k = pt ¡ p¤
t (2.12)
then an expression for the spot exchange rate, st, can be derived, containing
both PPP and UIP, by inserting Eqn.(2.12) into Eqn.(3.1), such that
(it ¡ i¤
t) = ®(pt ¡ p¤
t) ¡ st (2.13)
which, in this formulation, represents a Casselian version of exchange-rate equi-
librium. While this Casselian version of exchange-rate equilibrium does repre-
sent only a partial equilibrium, there is plenty of justi¯cation for its use here,
not least the fact that, as highlighted by MacDonald and Marsh (1997), for
recent sample periods covering the modern era of °oating exchange rates (ie,
since 1973), it does not seem appropriate to impose stock-°ow consistency given
that capital-account e®ects may have arisen as a result of productivity di®er-
entials or the impact of di®erent monetary policies across countries. It seems
right, therefore, to allow this Casselian formulation to be used, in this study, to
represent medium-run equilibrium for the exchange rate and it will, as such, be
employed as the exchange-rate target in the central-bank reaction function.
Optimal intervention
As has been explained earlier, by minimising the central bank's loss function
in Eqn.(2.1) subject to the constraint Eqn.(2.2), it is possible to recover an
expression for optimal intervention
Int¤
t = ¡
1
¸
(st¡1 ¡ sT
t ) (2.14)
Furthermore, assuming a Casselian version of exchange-rate equilibrium, the
target exchange rate can be expressed, now, as
sT
t = ®1pt + ®2p¤
t + !1it + !2i¤
t (2.15)
From Eqn.(2.15) it can be seen that if the central bank attaches importance to
a strict version of purchasing power parity, then ®1 will take a value close to
unity, and ®2 close to negative unity (that is, the monetary authorities will place
emphasis on a purchasing-power-parity target that re°ects price homogeneity).
Meanwhile, if interest di®erentials play an important role in exchange-rate tar-
geting, then negative !1 will be close in value to !2, whatever that value might
be. However, if it is unconstrained interest rates that are important (ie, if it
is unconstrained interest rates that are key to exchange-rate equilibrium in the
medium run), then negative !1 need not be close in value to !2. Substitut-
34ing Eqn.(2.15) into Eqn.(2.14) it is possible to derive an expression for optimal
intervention, Int¤, where
Int¤
t = ¡
1
¸
(st¡1) +
1
¸
(®1pt + ®2p¤
t + !1it + !2i¤
t) (2.16)
or similarly,
Int¤
t = ¯0st¡1 + ¯1pt + ¯2p¤
t + ¯3it + ¯4i¤
t (2.17)
where ¯0 = ¡1=¸, ¯1 = ®1=¸, ¯2 = ¡®2=¸, ¯3 = ¡!1=¸ and where ¯4 = !2=¸.
We estimate ¯ but there is no way to identify ® without additional assumptions.
From Eqn(2.16) it is clear that optimal, daily intervention is a positive function
of the di®erence between the value of the exchange rate on day t ¡ 1 and an
expression for medium-run equilibrium represented by a target exchange rate
containing prices and interest rates both at home and abroad. That is, optimal
intervention will increase in line with the extent of the deviation of the actual
exchange rate from its target level.
2.3.3 Friction
It must be noted that the formulation for optimal intervention that has been
developed so far in this study, represented by equation Eqn.(2.16), implies that
intervention is a continuous process, taking place every day. This does not,
of course, chime with reality. The stylised facts show that intervention takes
place on fewer than one trading day in every ten. There are long periods of no
intervention followed by periods when intervention is large and sustained. There
is, in other words, a high degree of serial correlation between interventions over
time, with intervention on any given day making it more likely that intervention
will be seen to occur again the next day.
This phenomenon of dynamic correlation between interventions has been
suggested, by Ito and Yabu (2004), to be due to the fact that intervention policy
is complicated by the existence of policy friction costs. With friction costs, the
central bank, in executing any given decision to intervene, must ¯rst convince
the nation's political authorities (in Japan's case, the Ministry of Finance) that
intervention is necessary, and it is this process of negotiation that is assumed to
represent, in itself, an intervention cost. If, on any given day, the central bank
succeeds in securing consent to proceed with intervention, then on subsequent
days intervention costs will be lower, causing intervention to be more likely. The
result is a high degree of dynamic correlation between interventions.
A friction model such as this, based as it is on the notion that the pursuit
of an optimal intervention strategy is hampered by the presence of intervention
costs, does have obvious intuitive appeal. However, it also has °aws. Most
35importantly, there is no hard evidence to support the notion that signi¯cant
intervention costs do exist.
Another explanation for dynamic correlation between interventions is the
idea, suggested by Herrera and Ozbay (2005), that it is the objective of the
central bank to minimise an intertemporal loss function that is non-time sepa-
rable, whereby current-period interventions depend not just on current-period
explanatory variables, but also on previous values and-or future values of the
explanatory variables. It could be the case, for instance, that the central bank,
in endeavouring to guide the nominal exchange rate towards a target level,
chooses to respond not only to current values of the exchange rate but also to
past values.
This idea has been explored by Bom¯m and Rudebusch (1997) in application
to in°ation targeting and much of the logic of the approach can be used, without
much di±culty, to explain dynamic correlation in a framework of exchange-rate
targeting. However, this approach still fails to account for the long periods
when there is no intervention. A friction model seems to represent one of the
most convenient ways to account for extended periods of no intervention and
the concept put forward by Ito and Yabu (2004) of policy frictions does seem
to be tractable. It is, therefore, adopted in this study.
If intervention occurs after a period of no intervention, then on subsequent
days the cost of persuading the political authorities to intervene again will be
lower. As such, once intervention has occurred, then the chances of intervention
occurring again, a day later, are higher and so we have a mechanism to explain
why intervention tends to be correlated. A cost function for friction costs F
at time t, where F+ represents the friction cost associated with purchasing yen
and F¡ represents the friction cost associated with selling yen, can be de¯ned
in the style of Ito and Yabu (2004) as
Ft =
(
F
+
F;t ¡ FD;t[I(Intt¡1 > 0)] if Intt > 0
F
¡
F;t ¡ FD;t[I(Intt¡1 < 0)] if Intt < 0
(2.18)
where Ft is the friction cost associated with intervention at time t. In addition,
FF;t represents ¯rst-time friction costs when intervention occurs for the ¯rst time
after a period of no intervention, and FD;t represents the size of the discount that
reduces friction costs in any given period when political consent for intervention
has been secured in the previous period.
Note that F
j
F;t > 0, FD;t > 0, F
j
F;t > FD;t and I(:) is the indicator function.
If Intt¡1 > 0 then I(Intt¡1 > 0) takes the value of unity. Otherwise it takes the
value of zero. Furthermore, FD;t > 0 implies that intervention on day t ¡ 1 is
associated with a reduction in the friction costs of intervention on day t. Where
36FF;t takes a positive superscript, this implies that the friction costs incurred
are associated only with yen-buying interventions. Where FF;t takes a negative
superscript, friction costs are those associated with yen-selling interventions.
Also, recall that Intt > 0 signi¯es yen-buying intervention and Intt < 0 signi¯es
yen-selling intervention.
One notable feature of Eqn.(2.18) is that it permits a role for asymmetry.
That is, Eqn.(2.18) captures the fact that the political authorities may be more
averse to, say, yen-buying intervention than yen-selling intervention, causing the
friction costs associated with yen buying to be larger. In Eqn.(2.18) this would
be represented by F
+
F;t > F
¡
F;t.
2.3.4 Indicator function
To avoid the problem of endogeneity (as explained in Section 2.3.1), in this study
the dependent variable, intervention, is modelled not as intervention amount,
but as an intervention indicator function. The intervention indicator function
takes one of three values: +1, 0, or -1, representing, respectively, either the
purchase of yen, no intervention, or the sale of yen.
If the central bank faces friction costs that impede its pursuit of an opti-
mal intervention strategy, then intervention takes place only if the bene¯ts of
intervention are higher than the costs. That is, intervention will occur only
when optimal intervention, Int¤
t, exceeds certain threshold values, °+1 (trig-
gering purchases of yen) and °¡1 (triggering sales of yen), determined by the
size of the friction costs. In this way, we can de¯ne optimal intervention as an
unobserved latent variable, Int¤
t, such that
Int¤
t = Xt¯ + ²t (2.19)
where we assume ²t » i:i:d:N(0;¾2), and where Xt¯ is de¯ned as
Xt¯ = ¯0st¡1 + ¯1pt + ¯2p¤
t + ¯3it + ¯4i¤
t + ¯5Intt¡1 (2.20)
While Int¤
t remains unobservable, we can de¯ne its observable corollary Intt,
where
Intt =
8
> <
> :
¡1 if Int¤
t < °¡1 + ¯5I(Intt¡1 < 0)
0 if °¡1 + ¯5I(Intt¡1 < 0) < Int¤
t < °+1 ¡ ¯5I(Intt¡1 > 0)
+1 if °+1 ¡ ¯5I(Intt¡1 > 0) < Int¤
t
(2.21)
where °¡1 < 0, °+1 > 0 and ¯5 > 0.21 This expression can, however, be
21Recall that if Intt¡1 > 0, then I(Intt¡1 > 0) takes the value of one. Otherwise it
takes the value of zero. Similarly, if Intt¡1 < 0, then I(Intt¡1 < 0) takes the value of one.
37simpli¯ed further given that, in practice, the direction of intervention on date t
is never di®erent from the direction of intervention on date t ¡ 1. Given this,
Eqn.(2.21) can be reformulated as
Intt =
8
> <
> :
¡1 if Int¤
t < °¡1
0 if °¡1 < Int¤
t < °+1
+1 if °+1 < Int¤
t
(2.22)
In this form, the model is, empirically, a multiple-response model, and more
speci¯cally an ordered-response model, in which the underlying latent variable
is optimal intervention, Int¤
t, and the observed variable is the intervention in-
dicator function, Intt. The form of this ordered-response model is determined
by the distribution assumed for ²i.
2.4 Estimation methodology
This section explains the empirical approach used to estimate Japan's interven-
tion reaction function and, in particular, o®ers an outline of the ordered logit
model, generalised ordered logit model and the partial proportional odds model.
2.4.1 Standard ordered logit model
Whenever the dependent variable in a regression is qualitative and can take
more than two possible values, with these values having a natural order or rank,
the standard approach is to employ either an ordered probit model or, as will be
discussed here, an ordered logit model, as ¯rst proposed by McCullagh (1980).
The ordered logit model allows for a qualitative dependent variable for which the
categories have a natural order that re°ects the magnitude of some continuous
underlying variable. Here, the underlying variable is optimal intervention, Int¤.
The qualitative dependent variable is the intervention indicator function, Int.
If the inherent ordering of the intervention indicator function were to be ig-
nored, and if, instead of an ordered response model, a multinomial logit model
were to be employed, the result would be mis-speci¯cation of the data-generating
process. Inferences about the response variable would be erroneous. Ordi-
nary least-squares estimation would be similarly inappropriate. Ordinary least
squares assumes that di®erences between categories of the dependent variable
are equal: the di®erence between a 1 and a 2 is the same as the di®erence be-
tween a 2 and a 3. But here, di®erences may not be equal: the intervention
indicator function re°ects only an ordinal ranking, not a cardinal ranking.
Otherwise it equals zero.
38The dependent variable, Int¤, representing optimal intervention, is an un-
observed latent variable and is de¯ned according to
Int¤
t = Xt¯ + ²t (2.23)
where ²t is a disturbance term and Xt is a vector of explanatory variables such
that
Xt¯ = ¯0st¡1 + ¯1pt + ¯2p¤
t + ¯3it + ¯4i¤
t + ¯5Intt¡1 (2.24)
with s, p, p¤, i and i¤ de¯ned according the descriptions o®ered in Section 2.3.
An assumption is made that the dependent variable has three categories so
that instead of observing Int¤ we observe Int, where, as discussed previously,
Intt =
8
> <
> :
¡1 if Int¤
t < °¡1
0 if °¡1 < Int¤
t < °+1
+1 if °+1 < Int¤
t
(2.25)
Here, the °s are unknown threshold parameters that must be estimated along
with ¯ in Eqn.(2.23). Estimation is undertaken by maximum likelihood, which
in the case of the ordered logit model requires that the cumulative density
function of ² is the logistic function. For more details see McCullagh (1980).
It is important to note that the estimation method is robust only if the
disturbance term in Eqn.(2.23) satis¯es certain regularity conditions that are
consistent with asymptotic normality. For instance, one such regularity condi-
tion is that of increasing information: the amount of information in the data
must increase inde¯nitely as the sample size increases. If, however, there is too
much dependence in the data, then this condition will not hold. One potential
source of dependence in the data is day-of-the-week e®ects. Day-of-the-week de-
scribe the tendency of daily asset returns to show repeated patterns from week
to week. For instance, Damodaran (1989) ¯nds that bad news tends to be re-
leased on Fridays and, due to the delayed release of information, Mondays tend
to be associated with lower returns. If day-of-the-week e®ects are present in the
daily yen-dollar exchange rate then dependence will be present and the max-
imum likelihood estimator may lack asymptotic normality. Researchers have
attempted to measure the extent to which day-of-the-week e®ects are present in
the yen-dollar exchange rate. Yamori and Mourdoukoutas (2003) and Yamori
and Kurihara (2004) ¯nd that day-of-the-week e®ects for the yen-dollar ex-
change rate disappeared in 1990s. This study accepts this ¯nding and continues
on the assumption that day-of-the-week e®ects do not contaminate the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator.
39The probability of observing Intt = ¡1 is equal to
PfInt¤
t = Xt¯ + ²t < °¡1g = Pf²t < °¡1 ¡ Xt¯g
=
Z °¡1¡Xt¯
¡1
f(²)d² (2.26)
where f(²) is the logistic function. Similarly, the probability of obtaining an
observation with Intt = 0 is equal to
Pf°¡1 < Int¤
t = Xt¯ + ²t < °+1g = Pf°¡1 ¡ Xt¯ < ²t < °+1 ¡ Xt¯g
=
Z °+1¡Xt¯
°¡1¡Xt¯
f(²)d² (2.27)
while the probability of obtaining an observation with Intt = 1 is equal to
Pf°+1 < Int¤
t = Xt¯ + ²tg = Pf°+1 ¡ Xt¯ < ²tg
=
Z 1
°+1¡Xt¯
f(²)d² (2.28)
The likelihood function is the product of all of these expressions. Maximising the
likelihood function with respect to the °s and ¯ gives the maximum likelihood
estimates. Greene (2008) o®ers further discussion.
Key to the standard ordered logit model is the assumption that the slope
coe±cients are equal across all of the outcome equations, represented here by
Eqn.(2.26), Eqn.(2.27) and Eqn.(2.28). This assumption is known as the pro-
portional odds assumption. It can be illustrated more simply as follows.
First, state the current problem in more general terms, estimating the proba-
bility P that the event indicator Y takes the value m = 1;:::;J. In this manner
Greene (2008) states the standard ordered logit model as,
P(Y > m) =
exp(¿m + x¯)
1 + exp(¿m + x¯)
for m = 1;2;:::;J ¡ 1 (2.29)
where x is a vector of variables accounting for deviations from a currency target
as de¯ned in Section 2.3, and where ¿ and ¯ are parameters to be estimated.
Note that in Eqn.(2.29) the only component that di®ers across event outcomes
is the cut-o® parameter, ¿. The link function's slope parameters, the ¯s, are
assumed to be equal. That is, Eqn.(2.29) shows that the standard ordered logit
model is equivalent to J ¡1 binary regressions with the critical assumption that
the slope coe±cients are identical across each regression. Here, for instance,
where the event outcomes are intervention outcomes, identical slope coe±cients
imply that the e®ect of a change in x, such as a change in Japanese interest
40rates, will have the same e®ect on the probability of yen-selling intervention as
it will on yen-buying intervention or no intervention. This may not, of course,
hold true. Probabilities may di®er. The intervention objective function may
not be symmetric.
One way to allow for varying slope coe±cients is to adopt the approach of
Williams (2006) and specify a generalised ordered logit model.
2.4.2 Generalised ordered logit model
This section presents a brief overview of the generalised ordered logit model,
which has been discussed elsewhere by Williams (2006), Clogg and Shihadeh
(1994) and Fahrmeir and Tutz (1994).
The generalised ordered logit model allows not only for di®erent intercepts
for each event outcome. It allows also for di®erent slope parameters. That is,
the generalised ordered logit model can be speci¯ed as,
P(Y > m) =
exp(¿m + x¯m)
1 + exp(¿m + x¯m)
for m = 1;2;:::;J ¡ 1 (2.30)
where ¯ is allowed to di®er for each of the event outcomes, m = 1;:::;J¡1. The
generalised ordered logit model nests the standard ordered logit model under
the restriction ¯2 = ::: = ¯J.
The probabilities that Y will take on values m = 1;:::;J ¡ 1 are given as,
P(Y = 1) = 1 ¡
exp(¿1 + x¯1)
1 + exp(¿1 + x¯1)
P(Y = m) =
exp(¿m¡1 + x¯m¡1)
1 + exp(¿m¡1 + x¯m¡1)
¡
exp(¿m + x¯m)
1 + exp(¿m + x¯m)
m = 2;:::;J ¡ 1
P(Y = J) =
exp(¿J¡1 + x¯J¡1)
1 + exp(¿J¡1 + x¯J¡1)
(2.31)
As such, the generalised ordered logit model can be thought of as a series of
simple, two-outcome logistic regressions where all multiple outcome categories
1;:::;J are allocated to one of two categorical states. For instance, if J = 5,
then the ¯rst outcome category is compared with a grouped combination of
categories 2;3;4 and 5. For the second outcome category, both J = 1 and J = 2
are taken together and compared with a grouped combination of categories 3;4
and 5. For the third outcome category, categories J = 1, J = 2 and J = 3 are
taken together and compared with a grouped combination of categories 4 and
5. And so on.
By allowing the ¯s to vary across values of m, the generalised ordered logit
41model allows for ordered outcome systems that violate the proportional odds
assumption. In other words, the generalised ordered logit model is more °exible
than the standard ordered logit model. However, the generalised ordered logit
model does have a drawback. Because of its permissive structure it can lead to
the estimation of more parameters than is necessary. That is, not all ¯s are nec-
essarily di®erent. Some may be equal. A special case of the generalised ordered
logit model that can overcome these limitations is the partial proportional odds
model.
2.4.3 Partial proportional odds model
The partial proportional odds model permits a relaxation of the proportional
odds constraint for those variables that violate it. The partial proportional
odds model is discussed further by Peterson and Harrell (1990).
In the partial proportional odds model, some of the slope coe±cients, the
¯s, can be the same for all intervention outcomes, m, while others can vary.
The model is less restrictive than the standard ordered logit model but o®ers
more parsimony than the generalised ordered logit model. For instance, in the
following model the ¯s for x1 and x2 are the same for all values of m but the
¯s for x3 are free to vary.
P(Y > m) =
exp(¿m + x1¯1 + x2¯2 + x3¯3m)
1 + exp(¿m + x1¯1 + x2¯2 + x3¯3m)
for m = 1;:::;J ¡ 1
(2.32)
Estimation of the partial proportional odds model is discussed further in Sec-
tion 2.6. Here it is su±cient to say that the partial proportional odds model
o®ers an attractive and tractable method of estimating the model of intervention
behaviour and is employed in this study in order to test the realised condition
of symmetry in the intervention objective function.
2.5 Data
This section describes the data and o®ers some cursory data analysis.
The frequency of the data is daily. The sample period extends from 01 April
1991 to 31 March 2006, comprising 3,915 data points. The dependent vari-
able, the intervention indicator function Int, is a constructed variable, and on
any given day takes a value of either +1, representing Bank of Japan interven-
tion in the currency markets to purchase yen (in exchange for US dollars), ¡1,
representing intervention to sell yen, or 0, indicating no intervention. Table 2.1
shows the frequency of each type of intervention. Construction of the dependent
variable is based on information provided by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.
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Notes: Dotted line shows Japanese yen in terms of yen per US dollar, reverse
scale, measured on the left-hand axis. Solid line shows the amount, in US
dollar billions, of Japanese intervention in the currency markets, measured
on the right-hand axis. Frequency is daily. Positive amounts of intervention
indicate purchases of yen. Negative intervention indicates sales of yen. Source:
Japanese Ministry of Finance and Bloomberg.
Table 2.1: Intervention indicator function
Int Freq. Per Cent Cum.
-1 311 7.9 7.9
0 3,571 91.2 99.2
+1 33 0.8 100.0
Total 3,915 100.0
Notes: Intervention indicator function Int,
where Int = ¡1 represents yen-selling in-
tervention, Int = 0, no intervention and
Int = +1, yen-buying intervention.
43Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Int 3915 -0.07 0.29 -1.00 1.00
sl 3915 4.74 0.10 4.39 4.99
pus 3915 4.56 0.11 4.36 4.76
pjp 3915 4.59 0.01 4.55 4.62
ius 3915 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.08
ijp 3915 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07
Intl 3915 -0.07 0.29 -1.00 1.00
Abbreviations: Int, intervention indicator function, sl, exchange
rate, lagged one period (yen per US dollar), pus, US consumer
prices, pjp, Japan consumer prices, ius, US interest rates, com-
pounded continuously, ijp, Japan interest rates, compounded con-
tinuously, Intl, intervention indicator function, lagged one period.
The spot exchange rate, s, is de¯ned in terms of Japanese yen per US dollar
measured at the start of the New York trading day and transformed using the
natural logarithm operator. The source for the daily exchange-rate data is
Bloomberg.
Japanese prices p, and US prices p¤, are based on consumer price indices
drawn from the International Monetary Fund's database of International Fi-
nancial Statistics. The consumer price indices are recorded, at source, on a
monthly basis. Cubic spline interpolation is used to transform the monthly
series into daily series. Daily prices are in natural logarithms.
Japanese interest rates i, and US interest rates i¤, are daily one-month trea-
sury bill rates, compounded continuously.22 Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics
(not reported) suggest that each series is nonstationary in levels but stationary
after ¯rst di®erencing. Table 2.2 o®ers a summary of the dataset.
2.6 Results
This section presents results from three empirical models of intervention in the
currency markets: an ordered logit model, a generalised ordered logit model and
a model that assumes partial proportional odds.
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.3. In the standard ordered logit
model the parameter vector ¯ is estimated together with two thresholds (cut
points) separating the three categorical outcomes. Most parameters have the
expected sign. For example, the association between intervention and the lagged
value of the exchange rate (sl) is positive. That is, a weakening yen is asso-
ciated with yen-buying intervention (Int = +1) and a strengthening yen with
22That is, where r is the interest rate in decimal form, the continuously compounded interest
rate, i, is calculated as i = ln(r + 1).
44Table 2.3: Ordinal outcome models of intervention
Variable Ordered logit Generalised ordered logit Partial proportional odds
Dep. var: Int ¯ ¯¡1 ¯0 ¯¡1 ¯0
sl 8.15*** 6.75*** 16.95*** 6.73*** 16.08***
(0.811) (0.861) (4.245) (0.861) (3.806)
pus 4.202** 4.02* -54.73*** 3.75* -46.24***
(1.964) (2.061) (19.823) (2.008) (12.724)
pjp -3.51 5.20 128.64*** 4.09 133.42***
(10.146) (11.741) (41.099) (11.564) (39.135)
ius 109.663*** 112.81*** 128.05 114.04*** 114.04***
(19.571) (20.919) (96.924) (20.435) (20.435)
ijp -35.24 -52.21** -103.73 -55.63** -55.63**
(22.472) (24.244) (93.678) (23.475) (23.475)
Intl 3.535*** 3.57*** 2.08*** 3.57*** 2.06***
(0.148) (0.159) (0.478) (0.159) (0.478)
const - -75.48 -437.05*** -69.05 -493.49***
- (58.825) (165.831) (57.791) (137.794)
Observations 3,915 3,915 3,915
Wald chi-square 986.6 1,031.6 1,031.3
Log likelihood -780.4 -757.9 -758.1
Pseudo R-square 0.3873 0.4050 0.4048
Notes: Table shows estimation results for three ordinal outcome models of intervention: or-
dered logit, generalised ordered logit and partial proportional odds model. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. (***) denotes signi¯cance at the 1% level, (**) at the 5% level,
and (*) at the 10% level. Abbreviations: Int, intervention indicator function, sl, exchange
rate, lagged one period (yen per US dollar), pus, US consumer prices, pjp, Japan consumer
prices, ius, US interest rates, compounded continuously, ijp, Japan interest rates, compounded
continuously, Intl, intervention indicator function, lagged one period. Int = +1 denotes yen-
purchasing intervention, Int = ¡1 denotes yen-selling intervention and Int = 0 denotes a day
on which no intervention occurred. Exchange rates and prices are in natural logarithms.
yen-selling intervention (Int = ¡1). The association between intervention and
US interest rates (ius) is also positive. Higher US interest rates are associated
with Japanese intervention to support the value of the yen. Meanwhile, the
association between intervention and Japanese interest rates (ijp) is negative|
higher Japanese interest rates are more likely to be associated with yen-selling
intervention (aimed, perhaps, at stemming the strength of the yen). The statis-
tical association between intervention today and intervention on day t and day
t ¡ 1 is positive, in agreement with the stylised facts.
As appealing as these results from the ordered logit model may appear, there
are two reasons to doubt them. First, it is misleading to rely on coe±cient
estimates alone in any evaluation of the economic signi¯cance of the covariates
in an ordered logit model. Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) show that it is wiser
to consult marginal e®ects. Second, as discussed earlier in Section 2.4, the
ordered logit model may be too restrictive in the sense that it assumes equal
parameter vectors in each part of the outcome distribution: that is, contrary to
the assumptions of the ordered logit model, di®erent outcome categories may
carry di®erent slope coe±cients. For instance, it is possible that changes in
interest rates may a®ect the respective likelihoods of intervention (yen-selling
45Table 2.4: Brant test of proportional odds assumption
Variable all sl pus pjp ius ijp Intl
25.76*** 5.68** 8.76*** 8.35*** 0.02 0.30 8.88**
(0.000) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.879) (0.587) (0.003)
P-values in parenthases (p > chi-square). (***) denotes signi¯cance at the 1% level, (**)
at the 5% level, and (*) at the 10% level. A signi¯cant test statistic provides evidence that
the proportional odds assumption has been violated. Abbreviations: all, all covariates, sl,
exchange rate, lagged one period (yen per US dollar), pus, US consumer prices, pjp, Japan
consumer prices, ius, US interest rates, compounded continuously, ijp, Japan interest rates,
compounded continuously, Intl, intervention indicator function, lagged one period.
and yen-buying) to di®erent extents. The relationship may, in other words, be
asymmetric, and as such, it may violate the proportional odds assumption.
Table 2.4 presents the results of a Wald test of the proportional odds as-
sumption as ¯rst proposed by Brant (1990). Testing, ¯rst, the hypothesis that
the slope coe±cients for all covariates are simultaneously equal, a chi-square
statistic of 25.76 suggests this hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level. Fur-
ther testing whether the proportional odds assumption holds for some covariates
but not others, Table 2.4 shows that the largest violations are for prices and
for the lagged values of the exchange rate and intervention. The implication is,
then, that the ordered logit model is not appropriate for modelling the inter-
vention behaviour of the Japanese monetary authorities. The proportional odds
assumption does not hold. An appropriate model should relax the proportional
odds assumption and allow all slope coe±cients, ¯j, to vary across intervention
categories j = ¡1;0;+1. In this respect, a more appropriate model is the the
generalised ordered logit model.
In the generalised ordered logit model the estimated parameters are di®erent
for each outcome category: yen-buying intervention, yen-selling intervention and
no intervention. Table 2.3 presents estimation results for the generalised ordered
logit model.
Results for the generalised ordered logit model can be interpreted in a man-
ner similar to results from a series of binary logistic regressions. That is, esti-
mation results for ¯¡1 compare the outcome category Int = ¡1 with, jointly,
categories Int = 0 and Int = +1. Similarly, estimation results for ¯0 compare
outcome categories Int = ¡1 and Int = 0 with category Int = +1. Positive
coe±cients indicate that higher values for an explanatory variable make it more
likely that intervention will match a higher outcome category (with the high-
est category being Int = +1, meaning yen-buying intervention, and the lowest
category Int = ¡1, yen-selling intervention).
Returning to Table 2.3, the signs taken by each estimated coe±cient for the
generalised ordered logit model of intervention are the same as those for the
46ordered logit model. Exceptions are the coe±cients for prices. The price coe±-
cients for the generalised ordered logit model seem more intuitively plausible: a
positive ¯0 coe±cient of 128.64 for Japanese prices implies that rising Japanese
prices are more likely to be associated with yen-buying intervention than with
no intervention or yen-selling intervention. Similarly, a negative ¯0 coe±cient
of -54.73 for US prices suggests that rising US prices are more likely to be as-
sociated with yen-selling intervention or no intervention than with yen-buying
intervention.
As discussed earlier in Section 2.4, the generalised ordered logit model has
the advantage of freeing the ordinal system from the assumption of proportional
odds. Its disadvantage is that it includes more parameters than are perhaps
necessary. This is because it frees all variables from the proportional-odds con-
straint despite the fact that the constraint may not need to be relaxed for all
variables. Some variables may conform to the constraint.
The partial proportional odds model overcomes these shortcomings by re-
laxing the proportional-odds constraint for those variables that violate it|and
imposing the constraint for those that conform to it. One preliminary indication
that the partial proportional odds model may be appropriate here is given by
the fact that, for the two outcome categories ¯¡1 and ¯0 in the generalised or-
dered logit model, some parameters exhibit fairly small di®erences in estimated
coe±cients: for instance, interest rates.
Estimation of the partial proportional odds model is undertaken using a
backwards, stepwise iterative procedure (Williams, 2006). First an uncon-
strained model is estimated. Then Wald tests are executed for each variable,
testing whether coe±cients di®er across equations|that is, each Wald test is
a test of the proportional odds assumption. If the test value is statistically in-
signi¯cant for one or more variables, the variable with the least signi¯cant test
statistic is constrained to have equal e®ects across equations. The model is then
re-estimated with the constraints imposed, and the procedure is repeated until
there are no more variables that conform to the proportional odds assumption.
The ¯nal model with constraints is then subjected to a global Wald test, bench-
marked against the unconstrained model. If the test statistic is insigni¯cant, the
¯nal model, with constraints, is accepted as not in violation of the proportional
odds assumption.
Table 2.3 displays the results for the partial proportional odds model. A
global Wald test allows for two variables to be constrained: Japanese interest
rates (ijp) and US interest rates (ius). Note that the parameter estimates for
ijp and ius are identical for the equations in ¯¡1 and ¯0. In line with a priori
assumptions, the parameter estimate for ijp is negative and for ius is positive.
A negative coe±cient for ijp suggests that higher Japanese interest rates tend
47to be more associated with yen-selling intervention than with no intervention
or yen-buying intervention. A positive coe±cient for ius suggests that higher
US interest rates tend to be more associated with yen-buying intervention than
with no intervention or yen-selling intervention.
For the variables that do not conform to the proportional odds assumption,
an examination of the pattern of coe±cients reveals information that would be
hidden if a simple, ordered logit model were estimated in which all variables are
forced to comply with the proportional odds constraint. For instance, a nega-
tive ¯0 coe±cient of -46.24 for US prices suggests that higher US prices|which
could, conceivably, coincide with a strengthening yen|are more likely to be as-
sociated with yen-selling intervention or no intervention than with yen-buying
intervention. This seems plausible if the Japanese monetary authorities aim to
stem excessive yen strength. Similarly plausible is a positive ¯0 coe±cient of
16.08 for the lagged value of the exchange rate. It suggests a weakening yen
is more likely to be associated with yen-buying intervention than with no in-
tervention or yen-selling intervention. Finally, a positive ¯0 coe±cient for Intl
suggests that previous yen-buying intervention on day t¡1 is more likely to be
associated on day t with further yen-buying intervention than with no interven-
tion or with yen-selling intervention. This chimes with a priori expectations.
Political costs are lower when intervention is repeated.
Clearly the partial proportional odds model o®ers a valuable contribution to
the estimation of intervention probabilities. But to measure the economic sig-
ni¯cance of the relationships under analysis, the estimated coe±cients presented
in Table 2.3 are not su±cient. It is necessary to consider marginal e®ects.
2.6.1 Marginal probability e®ects
To best interpret a probability model such as the partial proportional odds
model for the estimation of ordered outcomes it is useful to appeal to marginal
e®ects. Here, interpreting parameters in terms of marginal e®ects helps to an-
swer the question, How does the probability of observing either yen-buying
intervention, no intervention or yen-selling intervention change if one of the ex-
planatory variables changes? In Table 2.5 marginal e®ects for each intervention
outcome are evaluated at each variable's mean (¹ x). E®ects for all variables
except interest rates and the lagged value of intervention are reported as semi-
elasticities.
Interpretation of Table 2.5 is straightforward. Consider, for instance, the
marginal e®ect of a small, ceteris paribus change in Japanese interest rates, ijp,
on the probability of observing yen-selling intervention, Int = ¡1. Table 2.5
reports a value of 1.57. The implication is that a one percentage point increase in
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Variable Int = -1 Int = 0 Int = +1 ¹ x
sl -0.19*** 0.19*** 0.00 4.741
(0.023) (0.023) (0.001)
pus -0.11** 0.10* -0.00 4.559
(0.057) (0.058) (0.001)
pjp -0.16 0.11 0.00 4.592
(0.328) (0.327) (0.004)
ius -3.23*** 3.22*** 0.00 0.056
(0.560) (0.560) (0.004)
ijp 1.57** -1.57** 0.00 0.026
(0.655) (0.655) (0.002)
Intl -0.10*** 0.10*** 0.00 -0.071
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000)
Notes: Marginal e®ects evaluated at the means as semi-
elasticities for all variables except interest rates (ijp and ius) and
lagged intervention (Intl). Standard errors in parenthases. (***)
denotes signi¯cance at the 1% level, (**) at the 5% level, and (*)
at the 10% level. Abbreviations: sl, exchange rate, lagged one
period (yen per US dollar), pus, US consumer prices, pjp, Japan
consumer prices, ius, US interest rates, compounded continu-
ously, ijp, Japan interest rates, compounded continuously, Intl,
intervention indicator function, lagged one period.
Japanese interest rates raises the probability of yen-selling intervention by 1.57
percentage points. Meanwhile, the estimated marginal probability e®ect of a
change in American interest rates on the probability of yen-selling intervention
suggests that intervention is more sensitive to US monetary conditions than
Japanese conditions. The marginal e®ect is estimated as -3.23. By implication,
a one percentage point increase in US interest rates reduces the probability of
yen-selling intervention by more than three percentage points.
The most important inferences to be drawn from Table 2.5 come from com-
paring marginal e®ects across intervention outcomes. Comparison highlights a
number of key features. First and foremost, the economic importance of the
exchange-rate target, and its component parts, varies according to the type of
intervention under consideration.
Take, for instance, US consumer prices, which form a key component of the
exchange-rate target. Table 2.5 shows that US prices play an important role in
the decision to intervene in the currency markets to sell yen (signi¯cant at the 5%
level), are important in the decision to abstain from intervention (signi¯cant at
the 10% level), but are of little or no importance, statistically, in the decision to
intervene to support the value of the yen (statistically insigni¯cant). Similarly,
Japanese interest rates, US interest rates and the previous day's intervention and
currency value are signi¯cant in the determination of yen-selling intervention
and no intervention, but are not signi¯cant factors in shaping the decision to
49intervene to purchase yen.
In sum, the estimated model of intervention provides much help in explaining
Japan's daily decision to either refrain from intervention in the currency markets
or to intervene to sell yen: estimated marginal e®ects show that deviations from
a capital-enhanced version of purchasing power parity play a signi¯cant role in
the intervention decision. But the estimated model does little to explain the
decision to intervene to buy yen. This may be due to a number of factors.
For instance, yen-buying interventions account for less than 1% of all observed
interventions during the sample period (see Table 2.1). The chance, therefore,
of uncovering economic signi¯cance between the regressors and the regressand,
is small. The problem is one of power.23 The model may in fact o®er an
adequate description of yen-buying intervention but the number of yen-buying
interventions in the sample may be too small to support adequate estimation.
Another potential explanation for the model's lack of success in explaining
instances of yen-buying intervention is that the Japanese monetary authorities
are happy to accept a depreciated currency and, in terms of intervention, happy
to operate a policy of benign neglect. Such an explanation would ¯t with anec-
dotal reports that Japan's Ministry of Finance is more tolerant towards a weak
yen than a strong yen (Ito and Yabu, 2007).
A look at the sign and magnitude of the marginal e®ects gives a more de-
tailed picture. Consider, for instance, the marginal e®ects of a change in the
previous day's value of the exchange rate (here, yen per US dollar in natural
logarithms). A 1% drop in the value of the yen reduces the likelihood of yen-
selling intervention by 0.2 percentage points. Further, a 1% drop in the value
of the yen increases the likelihood of no intervention by a similar amount: 0.2
percentage points. The marginal e®ect on yen-buying intervention is negligible.
There is no identi¯able, statistical e®ect.
Table 2.5 shows that the likelihood of Japan intervening in the currency
markets to sell yen is in°uenced more by US prices than Japanese prices. A 1%
increase in US consumer prices, pus, is associated with a drop in the probability
of yen-selling intervention of 0.11 percentage points. The marginal e®ect on yen-
selling intervention of a change in Japanese prices is insigni¯cant. Similarly, the
marginal e®ect of a change in Japanese prices on the decision to refrain from
intervention is insigni¯cant. The marginal e®ect of a change in US prices on
the decision to refrain from intervention is positive and signi¯cant, with a 1%
increase in US consumer prices being associated with a rise of a tenth of a
percentage point in the probability of no intervention.
Clearly, foreign and domestic prices play very di®erent roles in the inter-
23As power increases, the chances of making a Type II error (failing to reject the null
hypothesis when the null is in fact false) decrease.
50vention decision. Foreign prices, namely US prices, play an important role,
perhaps due to the important consequences for global in°ation of price changes
in the US. Meanwhile, estimated marginal e®ects suggest domestic prices play
a limited role in Japan's decision to intervene.
Previous intervention has the expected e®ect. Previous yen-buying interven-
tion reduces the likelihood of subsequent yen-selling intervention. The magni-
tude of the reduction is 0.1 percentage points. Previous yen-buying interven-
tion increases the likelihood of no intervention by an equal magnitude. Mean-
while, the marginal e®ect of previous yen-buying intervention on subsequent
yen-buying intervention is negligible.
Summarising brie°y, the partial proportional odds model yields important
information on the intervention behaviour of the Japanese monetary author-
ities. Target variables do exist and, furthermore, seem to re°ect a form of
capital-enhanced purchasing power parity. Within this targeting process, the
Japanese monetary authorities respond to interest rates, prices and the recent
history of intervention and yen strength. All of these target variables help to
explain yen-selling intervention and periods of no intervention. But their ex-
planatory power is less strong in terms of yen-buying intervention: episodes
of yen-buying intervention are rare and statistical power is low. Even so, the
estimates reported in Table 2.5 tell us that deviations from the exchange-rate
target are associated with clear, economically signi¯cant marginal e®ects on the
decision to intervene.
2.6.2 Prediction
This section presents a brief analysis of in-sample predictions generated by the
partial proportional odds model of intervention. Predicted probabilities are
estimated as
^ P(y = mjx) = F(^ ¿m ¡ x^ ¯) ¡ F(^ ¿m¡1 ¡ x^ ¯) (2.33)
with cumulative probabilities calculated as
^ P(y · mjx) = F(^ ¿m ¡ x^ ¯) (2.34)
where F is the cumulative density function for " (F is logistic with V ar(") =
¼2=3) and where the ¿s are the cutpoints between the J ordinal categories,
m = 1;:::;J.
Figure 2.4 summarises the in-sample predictions of intervention generated
by the partial proportional odds model. There are three points to note. First,
the model is good at predicting days of no intervention: days of no intervention
are predicted mostly with probability greater than 0.75. Second, the model is
51bad at predicting days of yen-buying intervention. Most predictions carry a
probability of 0.25 or smaller. Third, the model is better at predicting yen-
selling intervention. Many instances of yen-selling intervention are predicted
with a probability of 0.75 or greater.
All of this con¯rms the ¯ndings presented in Section 2.6.1: the partial pro-
portional odds model yields important, economically signi¯cant information on
the intervention behaviour of the Japanese monetary authorities. Periods of
no intervention are predicted well. As are periods of yen-selling intervention.
But interventions to purchase yen, where the monetary authorities step in to
support of the value of the Japanese currency against the US dollar, are not
predicted with great accurately.
2.7 Conclusions
This study proposes a partial proportional odds model of Japanese interven-
tion in the currency markets between 1991 and 2006. The sample data is daily
with intervention data provided by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Interven-
tion is categorised each day into one of three outcome categories: yen-selling
intervention, yen-buying intervention or no intervention.
Estimation results show that Japanese intervention during the sample pe-
riod conforms to a model in which intervention is undertaken in order to prevent
the yen from straying too far from an equilibrium value de¯ned by a capital-
enhanced version of purchasing power parity. The proposed model is poor at pre-
dicting yen-buying interventions|yen-buying interventions are rare|but good
at predicting yen-selling interventions and periods of no intervention.
Marginal e®ects show that both interest rates and prices are signi¯cant eco-
nomically in determining the yen's equilibrium value and, as such, signi¯cant in
shaping the decision to intervene. A one percentage point increase in Japanese
short-term interest rates raises the probability of yen-selling intervention by two
percentage points. Meanwhile, a one percentage point increase in US interest
rates reduces the probability of yen-selling intervention by more than three per-
centage points. Compared with the in°uence exerted by Japanese monetary
conditions, US monetary conditions play a bigger role in in°uencing Japan's
decision to intervene in the currency markets.
In line with ¯ndings elsewhere in the literature, results here show that there
exists signi¯cant inertia in the intervention decision: intervention on day t is
more likely to take place if intervention occurred previously on day t ¡ 1. Con-
ceptually this phenomenon is captured by the idea that the intervention ob-
jective function is conditioned by friction costs. Political frictions impede the
intervention decision.
52Finally, results here show that a standard ordered logit model of interven-
tion, as has been used elsewhere in the literature to characterise empirically
Japan's interventions in the currency markets, yields misspeci¯ed results. A
more °exible approach, in the form of a partial proportional odds model, o®ers
a better characterisation of intervention behaviour, highlighting the fact that
individual independent variables in°uence di®erent intervention outcomes to
di®erent extents. This ¯nding may be useful to those policymakers and market
participants interested in anticipating future interventions.
In sum, evidence here suggests that Japan tends to intervene in the cur-
rency markets in a manner that is partially predictable and, as such, the model
of intervention introduced in this study holds useful informational content for
anticipating future interventions. The approach o®ered in this study allows for
a more °exible assessment of intervention than has been practised elsewhere in
the relevant literature. Future studies of intervention ought to, similarly, ac-
count for the di®erentiated response of intervention outcomes to variations in
key covariates.
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Notes: Figure shows predicted probabilities of intervention within the sample period
for the partial proportional odds model. Probability is measured on the left-hand axis.
Abbreviations: Probability of yen-buying intervention, Pr(+1), probability of no inter-
vention, Pr(0), probability of yen-selling intervention, Pr(-1).
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Misalignment and market
response
Using count-data techniques, this chapter studies the determinants of currency
choice in the issuance of international bonds. In particular, this study inves-
tigates whether bond issuers choose their issuance currency in order to exploit
the borrowing-cost savings associated with deviations from uncovered and cov-
ered interest-rate parity. Estimation results show that the choice of issuance
currency is sensitive to deviations from uncovered interest-rate parity but insen-
sitive, in general, to deviations from covered interest-rate parity. Furthermore,
the in°uence of deviations from uncovered interest-rate parity is stronger for ¯-
nancial issuers than for non¯nancial issuers. In as much as the issuance of in-
ternational bonds a®ects the relative international standing of world currencies,
one implication of these ¯ndings is that monetary policy, through its in°uence
on nominal interest rates, has a greater impact on the internationalisation of
currencies than has been previously accounted for.
3.1 Introduction
This study investigates the aggregate behaviour of issuers of foreign-currency-
denominated bonds|that is, bonds issued in a currency other than the currency
of the country in which the borrower resides|and addresses the question of why
issuers choose to issue bonds denominated in certain currencies and not others.
Evidence is o®ered showing that issuers of foreign-currency-denominated bonds
are sensitive to international di®erences in nominal interest rates and choose
their currency of issuance at least partly in response to these di®erences. Put
simply, macroeconomic factors matter, and contrary to much conventional wis-
55dom, the choice of issuance currency is not immune to perceptions of misalign-
ment or of uncovered yield.
Issuance of foreign-currency-denominated debt securities has been an impor-
tant feature in global ¯nancial markets for many years, with net issuance more
than tripling in value during the past decade (measured at constant exchange
rates), reaching USD 1.4 trillion in 2007. The choice of issuance currency is
a®ected by a number of factors. One major factor is the issuer's desire to en-
sure its ¯nancial obligations are in currencies that match the currencies of its
cash in°ows. By doing so, the issuer creates a \natural hedge" against its cur-
rency risk. Another factor is strategy. The issuer's strategic considerations may
include the desire to diversify its investor base and, for large-size bond issues,
the opportunity to exploit fewer credit constraints in more liquid, foreign bond
markets. A third factor a®ecting the choice of issuance currency (and a factor
that is not well explored in the academic literature) is the scope for reductions
in borrowing costs through issuing bonds in whichever currencies o®er the low-
est e®ective cost of capital. Lower e®ective borrowing costs can mean lower
covered costs (incorporating the cost of covering against exchange-rate risk) or
lower nominal costs, re°ecting, simply, lower nominal interest rates. Anecdo-
tally, participants in the international bond markets report that both covered
and uncovered costs play important roles in the choice of issuance currency.
It is this third factor, the scope for borrowing-cost savings, that forms the
focus of this current study. Furthermore, the focus is ¯rmly on the macroeco-
nomic aspects that a®ect the cost of borrowing. This study presents an em-
pirical assessment of the extent to which uncovered cost savings (de¯ned as
deviations from uncovered interest-rate parity) and covered cost savings (de-
¯ned as deviations from covered interest-rate parity) in°uence the issuance of
foreign-currency-denominated bonds.
This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First,
it employs a unique dataset that draws on the entire population of international
bond issues during the sample period. The second contribution is an analysis of
the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds by number of issues rather
than, as is customary in the literature but less appropriate, by value of issues
(that is, this paper draws on count-data techniques). Third, this study embeds
its model of bond issuance within a framework of random utility maximisation.
The ¯rst contribution of this study is its dataset, which incorporates, as far
as the author is aware, the largest sample of bond issues to ever have been used
in a study of this kind, with the value, at issuance, of the ¯nal sample having
an aggregate US dollar equivalent of $29 trillion. This study is the ¯rst to use
this dataset. Perhaps the most important unique feature of the dataset, after
its scale, is that it is constructed in a manner that allows for an assessment of
56bond-issuance behaviour by maturity. Bonds of a given maturity are matched
with interest rates and swaps of the same maturity. Therefore this study avoids
the inaccurate assumption (implicit in studies that pool all maturities together)
that bond issuers make consistent errors of judgement in the term structure
of their hedging strategies. The frequency of the data is quarterly and the
sample includes foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued by all issuer types
(eg, corporate, governmental, agency, ¯nancial, supranational) from a total of
116 countries over the period 1999 to 2008.1 The sample covers bonds issued in
the ¯ve main international currencies of issuance: the US dollar, the euro, the
Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the UK pound.
The second contribution of this study is the analysis of bond issuance by
number of issues rather than by value of issues.2 This study is the ¯rst to take
this approach. The approach is adopted because there is evidence (both anec-
dotal from market participants and statistical from a cursory analysis of the
data), that the number of issues is more responsive to changes in this paper's
key variables: deviations from both uncovered interest rate parity and covered
interest rate parity. This is because the issuer's decision over the value of any
bond o®ering tends to be determined before the actual date of the o®ering,
sometimes up to a year before, and is a®ected mostly by issuer-speci¯c factors
such as retained earnings, project ¯nance, target-debt ratios and share-price
valuation.3 Irrespective of the value of the bond issue, a broker will advise the
issuer of the most advantageous time to execute the bond o®ering. This advice
will be based, for issuers of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, on an eval-
uation of international ¯nancial conditions.4 At an aggregate level, therefore,
the main, detectable response to deviations from covered and uncovered interest
parity, in any given period, will not, necessarily, be a change in total value of
bonds issued in a certain currency, it will be a change in total number of bonds
issued.
In addition, there are two empirical advantages of conducting an analysis
of bond issuance by number of bonds issued. First, it eliminates the problem
of valuation-e®ects|that is, it eliminates the problem, inherent in an analysis
of the nominal value of bond issuance, of interpreting a rise in the value of
bond issuance in a given currency as a rise in issuance when, in fact, it may
represent nothing more than a strengthening of the issuance currency. Second,
1Money market instruments and debt securities with a maturity of less than one year are
not included in the sample.
2For comparison purposes, an analysis of value of issuance is also undertaken, as described
in Section 3.6.
3See, for instance, Myers (2001).
4Descriptions, presented in this paper, of the mechanics of standard bond-issuance proce-
dures are informed by the relevant literature and by market participants, including brokers,
underwriters and representatives of a number of major bond issuers.
57it permits the application of count-data techniques, which o®er a number of
advantages over other empirical approaches to choice behaviour, most notably a
freedom from the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives.5 This,
alone, makes count-data techniques a particularly powerful tool for tackling
the question of currency choice in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds.
The third main contribution of this study is the use of an econometric model
of bond issuance that sits within a framework of random utility maximisation,
making the model entirely consistent with utility theory. In particular, the
analysis is interpretable as describing a population of heterogenous decision-
makers (here, issuers of bonds choosing between a set of issuance currencies),
each of whom chooses, at each point in time, the best available alternative.
More formally, issuance behaviour is compatible with a random utility model
of observed choices, where the probability of choosing, in any given period,
issuance currency i is equal to the probability that an issuer chosen at random
from the population has a utility function that makes i the utility-maximising
alternative.
Summarising the main results, this study ¯nds that while deviations from
swap-covered interest rate parity do exist|implying that issuers of foreign-
currency-denominated bonds do have the opportunity, in any given period, to
achieve cost savings by issuing bonds in whichever currency o®ers the lowest
covered cost of issuance|issuers are not responsive. That is, the availability
of covered borrowing-cost savings does not trigger a statistically signi¯cant re-
sponse in terms of number of bonds issued. A signi¯cant response is, however,
associated with deviations from uncovered interest rate parity. If, in any given
period, the basis-point measure of uncovered borrowing-cost savings for, say the
euro, rises by 20 basis points, then the expected number of foreign-currency-
denominated bonds issued in euros increases, on average, by almost 10%. The
picture is very similar when issuance is examined in terms of number of bonds
issued in each of the ¯ve main issuance currencies as a share of total number of
bonds issued in all currencies. For two-year-maturity bonds, a 50-basis-point in-
crease in uncovered borrowing-cost savings is associated with a rise in currency
share of more than 2 percentage points. Furthermore, in terms of number of
bonds issued, ¯nancial corporations are even more responsive than the average
issuer to uncovered borrowing-cost savings.
5The assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that the relative prob-
ability of each option is independent and so does not change if other options are added or
retracted. More simply, if, given a choice between the US dollar and the euro as a currency
of issuance, a bond issuer prefers the US dollar, the assumption of independence of irrelevant
alternatives implies that this preference for the US dollar will not change by introducing as
an additional option, the yen. But in practice it may well change (see McFadden (1980) and
Luce and Suppes (1965)).
58The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the rel-
evant literature. Section 3.3 presents a model of the choice of issuance currency
and then describes how this model can be embedded within a framework of
random utility maximisation. Section 3.4 describes the empirical treatment of
the model while Section 3.5 provides a description of the data on bond issuance
and on this paper's constructed measures of covered and uncovered borrowing
costs. Section 3.6 presents the empirical tests and results, while Section 3.7
o®ers concluding remarks.
3.2 Review of the literature
Most of the existing academic studies that tackle the question of currency choice
in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds attempt to explain the
choice of currency as being motivated, mainly, by a desire to provide a hedge
against foreign cash in°ows.6 Allayanis and Ofek (2001), for instance, ¯nd
that for a sample of US non¯nancial ¯rms the issuance of foreign-currency-
denominated debt is correlated positively with foreign sales and trade. Mean-
while, Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) and Aabo (2006) ¯nd that an issuer's prob-
ability of issuing debt in foreign currencies is in°uenced strongly by the presence
of foreign operations.
Beyond this, other studies suggest that credit constraints in domestic bond
markets provide an impetus for issuing bonds in foreign currencies. Kedia and
Mozumdar (2003) and Siegfried et al. (2007) ¯nd that large corporations (as-
sumed to be more likely to encounter credit constraints at home) tend to issue
more in foreign currencies. Following a similar logic, Eichengreen and Haus-
mann (1999) suggest that for many emerging economies the domestic currency
cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically.
Financial markets are, in other words, incomplete.7
All of these studies o®er plausible explanations for the issuance of foreign-
currency-denominated bonds. What they ignore, however, is the possibility
that issuance in a foreign currency is driven by an opportunistic desire to lower
costs. That is, they ignore the possibility that issuers choose to issue bonds
in a foreign currency simply because the chosen currency o®ers, at the time of
issuance, lower e®ective borrowing costs than any other currency.
A number of studies assess, indirectly, the question of cost-reduction in the
issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds. Graham and Harvey (2001)
¯nd that 44% of the corporations in their survey cite lower borrowing costs as an
important reason for issuing bonds denominated in foreign currencies. Johnson
6See Allayannis et al. (2003), Elliot et al. (2003), and Kedia and Mozumdar (2003).
7See also Hausmann and Panizza (2003).
59(1988) ¯nds that Canadian ¯nancial ¯rms issue more debt in currencies that
o®er lower expected service costs, while Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) ¯nd
that Finnish ¯rms tend to issue bonds when the nominal interest rate for the
loan currency, relative to other currencies, is lower than usual. East Asian
non-¯nancial ¯rms are found by Allayannis et al. (2003) to react in a similar
fashion to nominal interest-rate di®erentials. However, Henderson et al. (2006),
investigating debt issues into the US, ¯nd only weak support for the proposition
that companies issue debt overseas in order to pro¯t from lower borrowing costs,
while Cohen (2005) ¯nds that bond issuance in a given currency tends to increase
with higher, not lower, interest rates in that currency.
The idea that cost savings can be secured by issuing bonds in low-interest-
rate currencies does, of course, violate traditional interest-rate-parity conditions.
The condition of uncovered interest rate parity asserts that any discount in
foreign interest rates will be o®set exactly by the expected appreciation of the
foreign currency. If this parity condition holds true, it leaves no scope for
exploitable cost savings from opportunistic issuance.
Empirically, however, uncovered interest rate parity does not, in general,
hold true (see, for instance, Isard (1996)). Most empirical studies ¯nd that
low-interest-rate currencies do not systematically appreciate over time, as sug-
gested by uncovered interest parity. In fact, they tend to do the opposite: they
depreciate. This suggests that in practice there are cost savings to be secured
by leaving exchange-rate risk uncovered and issuing bonds in low-interest-rate
currencies.
Of course, issuers may opt against leaving exchange-rate risk uncovered.
They may, if risk-averse, prefer to purchase cover. In this case, traditional
parity conditions once again state that there is nothing to gain, in terms of
cost-reduction, from issuing in one currency as opposed to another: covered
interest rate parity states that foreign interest costs are always equal to domestic
interest costs once the price of hedging against exchange-rate risk is taken into
account. The implication is that if covered interest rate parity holds true in
practice, there are no pro¯table arbitrage opportunities to be had from issuing
in a rival currency in an attempt to lower covered borrowing costs.
Most empirical studies suggest that covered interest rate parity, unlike un-
covered interest rate parity, does indeed hold true.8 Transactions costs associ-
ated with the relevant arbitrage strategies tend to be small and so deviations
from covered interest rate parity tend to be negligible (see Taylor (1987)). It
is important to note, however, that most of this evidence in support of covered
interest rate parity is based on empirical studies that look at time horizons of
8See, for instance, Taylor (1992) and Willet et al. (2002) for surveys of the literature on
covered interest rate parity.
60less than one year, with cover provided by the forward market. These horizons
are too short to be relevant for the vast majority of international bond issuance,
where bond maturities can range from one year to twenty years and beyond.
The forward market becomes illiquid for time horizons much greater than a
year and the potential cost of arbitrage strategies becomes, correspondingly,
higher. Indeed, studies of long-term covered interest rate parity tend to reveal
deviations from parity that are much larger and more persistent than those for
short-term covered interest rate parity (Fletcher and Taylor, 1996).
For issuers of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, exchange-rate cover is
provided not by the forward market, but by the swaps market. Speci¯cally,
issuers obtain cover by purchasing a currency swap (or an appropriate com-
bination of currency swaps). By issuing a foreign-currency-denominated bond
and combining it with a currency swap, an issuer can transform its ¯xed-rate
foreign payments into ¯xed-rate domestic payments, remaining entirely free of
exchange-rate risk. If swap-plus-bond yields are not constant across currencies
(implying a violation of swap-covered interest rate parity), the issuer can reduce
its total borrowing costs by issuing its bonds in whichever currency is associated
with the lowest swap-inclusive yields.
The challenge is to verify this empirically. McBrady and Schill (2007) o®er a
recent empirical appraisal of deviations from both uncovered and covered inter-
est rate parity for issuance of foreign-currency denominated bonds, concentrat-
ing on a small sample of issuers with no foreign subsidiaries or foreign-currency
cash °ows. They ¯nd that issuance of bonds responds to deviations from both
uncovered and covered interest rate parity. This study o®ers a closer examina-
tion of the responsiveness of bond issuance to covered and uncovered cost sav-
ings, drawing on a large, unique dataset, employing a utility-consistent model,
and adopting a novel empirical approach to tackle the question of currency
choice in international bond issuance, focussing in particular on the number,
not the value, of bonds issued in international currencies.
3.3 The Model
This study models currency choice in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds within a framework of random utility maximisation. In the model issuers
of foreign-currency-denominated bonds choose, all else remaining equal, to issue
bonds in currencies that o®er the lowest cost of borrowing either including, or
excluding, the cost of hedging against exchange-rate risk.
Furthermore, it is the central tenet of this study that when borrowing costs
in a given currency are low, the main detectable response, in terms of issuance,
is an increase in the number of bonds issued in that currency and not necessarily
61an increase in the value of bonds issued in that currency. This draws on the
notion that any window of opportunity o®ering lower borrowing costs in a given
currency will result in a greater number of entities issuing bonds in the low-cost
currency irrespective of the total value of issuance.9
This section o®ers an outline of the model of currency choice focusing on
a description of the main explanatory variables, \uncovered cost savings" and
\covered cost savings", in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2. Thereafter follows a
brief discussion of how this model of currency choice ¯ts into a framework of
utility maximisation when issuance is measured in terms of number of bonds
issued rather than value of bonds issued (Section 3.3.3).
Consider ¯rst an issuer that chooses to issue bonds denominated in foreign
currency for one reason only: to act as a natural hedge (an o®setting liability)
against its foreign-currency cash in°ows (in°ows generated perhaps by foreign
assets such as overseas subsidiaries). If such an issuer has h per cent of its
cash-in°ow-generating stock of assets denominated in foreign currency and, in
each period t, the issuer is faced with the question of what proportion, b, of its
borrowing to denominate in foreign currency, then in order to create a suitable
natural hedge against its foreign-currency cash in°ows, the issuer will choose
to issue foreign-currency-denominated bonds such that bt = ht + et, where the
random error et » N(0;¾2).10 The main concern of this study is to test whether
an issuer might choose to alter the currency composition of its foreign borrowing,
and deviate from h, in order to reduce its borrowing costs.
By altering the currency composition of its foreign debt an issuer can bring
about a reduction in its overall borrowing costs through two main channels.
First, an issuer may decide to leave its foreign-exchange risk unhedged in an
attempt to gain from favourable deviations from uncovered interest rate par-
ity. In other words, an issuer can reduce its borrowing costs by issuing bonds
in foreign currencies that ex post do not appreciate enough to o®set the sav-
ings accrued through borrowing at lower interest rates.11 This approach o®ers
\uncovered cost savings". Second, an issuer can hedge its foreign-currency risk
and look for arbitrage, risk-free, opportunities to lower borrowing costs when
deciding the currency choice of issuance. In this case, the issuer can reduce its
costs by issuing bonds in low-interest-rate currencies even after accounting for
the additional cost of covering for (hedging against) exchange-rate risk. The
next two sections discuss and explain these strategies.
9See, for instance, Fisher et al. (1989) and Graham and Harvey (2001).
10See also McBrady and Schill (2007) and Allayanis and Weston (2001).
11Alternatively, it is possible to reduce borrowing costs by issuing in foreign currencies for
which interest rates are relatively higher, but that ex post depreciate so much as to o®set the
extra cost associated with higher interest rates.
623.3.1 Uncovered cost savings
In the absence of exchange-rate hedging, an issuer of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds can realise savings on its borrowing costs if (i) it issues in a low-interest-
rate currency that does not appreciate enough to o®set the savings accrued from
the favourable interest-rate di®erential, or (ii), it issues in a high-interest-rate
currency that depreciates so much as to o®set the extra cost incurred from the
unfavourable interest-rate di®erential. Such savings are possible only if uncov-
ered interest rate parity does not hold and, as has been discussed in Section 3.2,
empirical evidence suggests that it does not. That is, most evidence suggests a
failure of the standard expression of uncovered interest rate parity,
rt;t+k = r?
t;t+k + (se
t;t+k ¡ st) (3.1)
where rt;t+k is the time t home interest rate (compounded continuously) that
pertains over time interval t + k, where r?
t;t+k is the time t foreign interest
rate (again, compounded continuously) de¯ned over the same interval, where
st is the log of the spot exchange rate (de¯ned in terms of home currency per
foreign currency), and where (se
t;t+k¡st) is the expected rate of foreign-currency
appreciation (compounded continuously) during the time interval t + k.
In Eqn.(3.1), the implication is that the domestic interest rate should, in
frictionless markets with perfect foresight, equal the foreign interest rate plus
the expected rate of foreign-currency appreciation. But if the empirical evidence
is right and the foreign currency tends, in practice, to depreciate rather than
appreciate when foreign interest rates are lower than domestic interest rates,
then an issuer, by issuing in a low-interest currency while leaving its currency
risk uncovered, can realise expected borrowing-cost savings equal to
"u
t ´ (rt;t+k ¡ r?
t;t+k) ¡ (se
t;t+k ¡ st) (3.2)
Of course, in Eqn.(3.2), "u is an \expected" cost saving and, as a result, risk
aversion will reduce the sensitivity of an issuer to "u.
As McBrady and Schill (2007) suggest, the proportion, b, of debt that the
issuer may decide to denominate in a foreign currency will be a positive function
of "u. Combining this with the fraction of borrowing set aside as a natural hedge,
h, against the issuer's foreign-currency cash in°ows, gives
bt = ht + ¯u"u
t + et (3.3)
where any expected uncovered savings in borrowing costs will cause the issuer
to increase b by an amount equal to ¯u"u. Likewise, b will decrease by this
63amount when "u is negative.
3.3.2 Covered cost savings
In perfectly integrated and liquid ¯nancial markets, where it is possible to hedge
foreign-exchange risk at a low cost, there is no opportunity for cost savings to be
made by borrowing in one currency rather than another. In this case, the cost
of borrowing is identical irrespective of the borrower's choice of currency (or
equivalently, the issuer's choice of issuance currency). More explicitly, arbitrage
will ensure the maintenance of covered interest parity, implying that interest
rates across countries will be the same once the cost of hedging foreign-currency
exposure is taken into account. Covered interest rate parity can, in the absence
of a risk premium, be expressed as
rt;t+k = r?
t;t+k + (ft;t+k ¡ st) (3.4)
where rt;t+k and r?
t;t+k are de¯ned as before, where ft;t+k is the log of the
forward exchange rate for k periods into the future and where st is the log of
the spot exchange rate (de¯ned in terms of home currency per foreign currency).
The quantity (ft+k ¡st) is the forward premium, and represents the price paid
in the forward market, over and above the spot exchange rate, to cover the
foreign-currency exposure that is incurred by borrowing at foreign interest rate
r?
t;t+k. If covered interest parity holds, the implication is that covered foreign
borrowing is no cheaper, or more expensive, than uncovered home borrowing.
Theory suggests that Eqn.(3.4) will hold true in frictionless markets and
empirical evidence suggests that covered interest rate parity is indeed the rule
rather than the exception. However, most empirical studies of covered interest
rate parity deal with time horizons of less than one year. These horizons are too
short to be relevant for the vast majority of international bond issuance, where
bond maturities can range from one year to twenty years and beyond. The
forward market becomes illiquid for time horizons much greater than a year.
For issuers of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, forward cover is provided
not by the forward market, but instead by the swaps market. Popper (1993) and
Fletcher and Taylor (1996) explain how issuers of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds cover exchange-rate risk using currency swaps.12
12Since these descriptions were ¯rst presented, in the 1990s, the swaps market has, to some
extent, moved on, and covering for exchange-rate risk is no longer undertaken in precisely the
same manner. Cover for an individual issue can now be acquired via a single, bespoke swap
rather than a combination of standardised swaps in the manner suggested by Popper (1993).
However, present-day methods of covering exchange-rate risk in the swaps market, and the
pricing of this cover, are derived precisely from the underlying logic outlined by Popper (1993),
and this logic is employed in this study with no known loss of accuracy.
64Looking again at Eqn.(3.4), what matters for issuers seeking to cover the
exchange-rate risk associated with foreign-currency-denominated bond issuance,
is not the forward premium, but instead the di®erence in continuously-compounded
currency swap yields, such that
rt;t+k = r?
t;t+k + (csw
t;t+k ¡ csw
?
t;t+k) (3.5)
where csw
t;t+k is the domestic currency swap yield of the relevant maturity k, and
csw
?
t;t+k is the foreign currency swap yield also of maturity k (with both yields
compounded continuously).
A standard currency swap (known also as a cross-currency, interest-rate
swap) transforms ¯xed-rate cash °ows in one currency into °oating-rate cash
°ows in US dollars. One important point to note is that a currency swap,
unlike a forward contract, is not an agreement to exchange a ¯xed payment in
two currencies. It is an agreement to exchange a stream of payments in two
currencies.
An issuer of a foreign-currency-denominated bond pays the rate r?
t;t+k to
borrow in the debt securities market and then enters a swap transaction to trans-
form its foreign-currency payment stream into a payment stream denominated
in domestic currency. In the swap transaction, the issuer receives the foreign-
currency swap rate, csw
?
t;t+k, and pays the domestic-currency swap rate, csw
t;t+k. In
this way, the issuer of the foreign-currency-denominated bond creates a \syn-
thetic" domestic-currency bond, incurring a cost equal to r?
t;t+k+(csw
t;t+k¡csw
?
t;t+k).
Eqn.(3.5) indicates that the cost of this \synthetic" domestic-currency bond
must be equal to the cost, rt;t+k, of issuing directly in domestic currency. Cov-
ered borrowing-cost savings will exist if the spread between bond yields and
currency-swap rates is not equal across currencies and is not arbitraged away.
The magnitude of any covered borrowing-cost savings, "c, will equal
"c
t ´ (rt;t+k ¡ csw
t;t+k) ¡ (r?
t;t+k ¡ csw
?
t;t+k) (3.6)
where the implication is that an issuer of bonds can achieve savings on its cov-
ered foreign-currency borrowing whenever the spread between foreign-currency-
denominated bond yields and swap rates, (r?
t;t+k¡csw
?
t;t+k), is less than the spread
between domestic bond yields and swaps rates, (rt;t+k ¡csw
t;t+k). Put simply, an
issuer can lower its borrowing costs by an amount "c if, rather than issue bonds
in domestic currency, the issuer chooses instead to issue in foreign currency
and swap its foreign-currency-denominated bond payments back into domestic
currency. Since the complete currency-swap arrangement allows the domestic-
currency principal and foreign-currency principal to be exchanged at maturity
65at the original exchange rate, the issuer accrues its cost saving, "c, with no
exposure to exchange-rate risk.
Following McBrady and Schill (2007), incorporating "c into the issuance
decision, it is now possible to hypothesize that an issuer chooses the foreign-
currency share, b, of its total borrowing according to
bt = ht + ¯c"c
t + et (3.7)
whereby, in response to positive "c
t, the issuer is expected to increase bt by an
amount equal to ¯c"c
t. The coe±cient ¯c measures the unit response of foreign-
currency borrowing share to the percentage change in covered cost savings. For
any period t, if "c
t takes a negative value, bt will decrease rather than increase.
Multiple-currency model
Empirically, the next challenge is to construct measures of both covered cost
savings and uncovered cost savings that accommodate a choice among multiple
currencies. There are ¯ve currencies in the sample. So far in this study the two
measures of borrowing-cost savings, "c and "u, allow for just two currencies:
domestic and foreign.
To accommodate a multiple-currency framework in the calculation of covered
cost savings, the foreign interest rate, r?
t;t+k, in Eqn.(3.6), is replaced by ri(t;t+k),
representing the continuously compounded yield on the k-year-maturity bench-
mark government bond associated with issuance currency i (where i = euro, US
dollar, yen, UK pound or Swiss franc), and where yields are calculated at the
start of quarter t.13
Meanwhile, the domestic interest rate, rt;t+k, in Eqn.(3.6), is rede¯ned as
ri(t;t+k), the contemporaneous average of all benchmark government bond yields
for currencies L (l = 1;:::;L), where L includes all currencies in the sample
other than the currency of issuance, i (that is, L includes all currencies asso-
ciated with the nationalities of the issuers, plus the issuance currencies other
than the issuance currency selected, i).
The contemporaneous average yield is, in fact, a weighted average, where
weights re°ect the value (US-dollar equivalent) of bonds issued in each currency
l at the end of the previous quarter, t ¡ 1. The logic behind weighting yields
by value is straightforward. Value, in this case, is used as a proxy for liquidity.
13Government bond yields are used to proxy borrowing costs for a number of reasons.
First, as highlighted by McBrady and Schill (2007), government bond yields, unlike corporate
bond yields, are free of contamination from default-risk pricing, which may otherwise a®ect
an issuer's choice of issuance currency. Second, yields on investment-grade corporate bonds
(which may could be a better proxy for the borrowing costs faced by issuers of foreign-currency-
denominated bonds) are unavailable for all currencies. Government bond yields are obtained
from Bloomberg.
66All else being equal, an issuer, in making a comparison between borrowing costs
available in the issuance currency (ri(t;t+k)) and in rival currencies (ri(t;t+k)),
will, among the rival currencies, be more concerned about borrowing costs avail-
able in currencies associated with liquid markets for debt. The more liquid the
market, the more attractive it will be as an alternative to the issuance-currency
market. Weighting yields by value does, therefore, allow liquidity to be incor-
porated directly into the issuer's decision over currency choice.
In order to complete the adjustments necessary to reset Eqn.(3.6) into a
multiple-currency framework, adjustments are made to the empirical treatment
of ¯xed-for-°oating currency swaps. The treatment adopted is identical to that
outlined for interest rates, above. That is, csw
?
t;t+k is replaced with csw
i(t;t+k),
representing the currency-swap rate, continuously compounded, for currency
i and maturity k, while csw
t;t+k is replaced with csw
t;t+k, the contemporaneous
weighted average of all currency-swap rates for currencies L (l = 1;:::;L), where
L includes all currencies in the sample other than the currency of issuance, i.
The new, multiple-currency formulation, is,
"c
it ´ (rt;t+k ¡ csw
t;t+k) ¡ (ri(t;t+k) ¡ csw
i(t;t+k)) (3.8)
where, in a similar fashion to Eqn.(3.6), (rt;t+k ¡csw
t;t+k) is the average weighted
spread between bond yields and currency-swap rates for all currencies L and,
likewise, (ri(t;t+k) ¡ csw
i(t;t+k)) is the spread for issuance currency i.
Unfortunately, while ¯xed-for-°oating currency swaps are the appropriate
measure of the cost of covering exchange-rate risk for issuance of foreign-currency-
denominated bonds, consistent time-series data on currency swaps are unavail-
able. A proxy is required. One amenable proxy, for which data are available, is
the interest-rate swap. An interest-rate swap is a mechanism that allows ¯xed-
rate payments in one currency to be swapped into °oating-rate payments in the
same currency. It di®ers, in magnitude, from a ¯xed-for-°oating currency swap
by an amount equal, in basis points, to a currency basis swap, which, itself,
represents a swap of °oating-rate payments in one currency into °oating-rate
payments in US dollars. This relationship between the three swap transactions
(currency swap, interest-rate swap and currency-basis swap) can be expressed
as,
csw
t;t+k = cbsw
t;t+k + isw
t;t+k (3.9)
where csw
t;t+k, as before, is the domestic ¯xed-for-°oating currency swap, where
cbsw
t;t+k is the domestic currency basis swap and where isw
t;t+k is the domestic
interest-rate swap.
An interest-rate swap is a good proxy for a currency swap only if it can be
established that currency basis swaps are small, in magnitude, compared with
67both csw
t;t+k and isw
t;t+k. This is, in fact, the case. Although there is insu±cient
data upon which to conduct tests of measurement error, the data that are
available for cbsw
t;t+k, for the ¯ve main currencies of issuance in the sample, show
that currency basis swaps vary by no more than 20 basis points throughout the
sample period (that is, they are bounded above by positive 10 basis points, and
below by negative 10 basis points).
Uncovered cost savings, "u
t , can also, like the concept of covered cost sav-
ings, be translated into a multiple-currency framework. Interest rates are dealt
with as before. That is, the foreign interest rate, r?
t;t+k, in Eqn.(3.2), is re-
placed with ri(t;t+k), the continuously compounded yield on the k-year-maturity
benchmark government bond associated with issuance currency i. The domestic
interest rate, rt;t+k, is rede¯ned as ri(t;t+k) the contemporaneous average of all
benchmark government bond yields for all currencies other than the currency
of issuance, i.
A full re-expression of uncovered cost savings, "u
it, as a multiple-currency
variable requires that (se
t;t+k ¡st), the expected appreciation of the foreign cur-
rency, be set in a new framework that gauges appreciation not as a bilateral
concept, but as a multilateral concept, with appreciation of the issuance cur-
rency measured against all other currencies. In addition, a choice must be made
regarding just how, empirically, to measure exchange-rate expectations.14
This study uses survey data to construct its measure of exchange-rate ex-
pectations. Surveyed exchange-rate expectations are obtained from Consensus
Forecasts, a British-based surveyor of ¯nancial forecasters (including banks,
economic consultancies and central banks). Bilateral forecasts for 14 major
currencies, with two-year forecast horizons (the longest available horizons), are
used to calculate implicit forecasts of the nominal e®ective exchange rates for
each of the ¯ve currencies of issuance in the sample. This multiple-currency
formulation of exchange-rate expectations permits a complete, re-expression of
14Typically, in empirical work, there are four di®erent approaches available for modelling
expected changes in the exchange rate. One approach is to assume perfect foresight and
measure expected changes in the exchange rate by observing ex post changes. That is, as-
sume (se
t;t+k ¡ st) = st;t+k ¡ st. The drawback with this approach is that when expectation
horizons are lengthy, as is the case in this study, with horizons of up to ten years, then
putting aside observations to be used as ex post measures of expected changes in the ex-
change rate causes the sample size to become prohibitively small. Two alternative approaches
are to assume static expectations, letting (se
t;t+k ¡ st) = 0, and extrapolative expectations,
where (se
t;t+k ¡ st) = st ¡ st;t¡k. The static-expectations approach is based on the idea that
exchange rates follow a random walk, while extrapolative expectations assume a backward-
looking behaviour. Although the theoretical basis for this seems unsound, in practice the
di®erence in results between from an extrapolative-expectations model and a perfect-foresight
model can be quite small (see, for instance, Cavaglia et al. (12) and MacDonald and Tor-
rance (1990)). A fourth approach is to use surveys of exchange-rate expectations, letting
(se
t;t+k ¡ st) = s
survey
t;t+k ¡ st, in an attempt to take a direct, as much as is possible, measure-
ment of expectations.
68uncovered cost savings, "u
t , where,
"u
it ´ (rt;t+k ¡ ri(t;t+k)) ¡ (sne
i(t;t+8) ¡ snit) (3.10)
with (sne
i(t;t+8)¡snit) representing the expected appreciation, over t+8 quarters,
of the nominal e®ective exchange rate for currency i.
One criticism of Eqn.(3.10) is that a forecast horizon of eight quarters
matches only one of the three maturity brackets (where the brackets are two
year, ¯ve year and ten year) that de¯ne the sample. However, the vast majority
of ¯nancial forecasters do not calculate forecasts for time horizons greater than
eight quarters, suggesting these two-year-ahead forecasts do, in fact, represent
long-term forecasts suitable for both a ¯ve-year horizon and ten-year horizon.
In addition, of those forecasters that do provide forecasts with horizons greater
than two years, these forecasts deviate only marginally from two-year-ahead
forecasts when compared with the extent of the deviations between two-year-
ahead forecasts and forecasts of less than a year.
3.3.3 Random utility maximisation
This section describes how the model, outlined above, can be set in a frame-
work of utility maximisation when the dependent variable, issuance of foreign-
currency-denominated bonds, is measured in terms of number of bonds issued
rather than value of bonds issued|that is, when the model is a count-data
model, with the dependent variable having no upper bound but having a lower
bound of zero.15 As discussed earlier, there is an a priori basis for thinking that
a count dependent variable should be more responsive to changes in covered and
uncovered borrowing-cost savings and, indeed, estimation results presented later
con¯rm that this is the case.
The question of currency choice in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds, when issuance is measured in terms of number of issues, has yet, in the
limited literature that addresses this question, to be phrased within a framework
of random utility maximisation.16 The econometric approach that lends itself
most readily to a utility-consistent treatment of choice is the polychotomous-
dependent-variable approach, where estimation of a multiple-choice discrete
variable is undertaken by a generalisation of the logit and probit models. Mc-
Fadden (1974) provides one of the ¯rst lasting contributions to utility-consistent,
econometric modelling of choice with polychotomous dependent variables by pre-
senting a conditional logit model based on random utility maximisation. Carl-
15See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a full discussion of count-data models.
16Claessens (1992) studies the optimal currency composition of external debt using a utility-
maximising approach where optimal means risk-minimising, and composition refers to cur-
rency composition by value.
69ton (1979, 1983), among others, employs the techniques of McFadden (1974) to
address the question of industrial location within a utility-consistent framework.
The conditional logit model does, however, have its limitations, the most
notable of which is its assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
which, in the present context of currency choice among issuance currencies,
states that issuers look at all currencies as similar after controlling for the ob-
servable characteristics tested in the model. If the assumption of independent
errors is violated, it can lead to coe±cient estimates that are biased.
Within the conditional logit model, no study has been able to fully ac-
commodate the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives problem. One solution,
however, is to eschew the conditional logit model and employ, instead, a Poisson
model|that is, a count-data model. Unlike a conditional logit model, which
deals with choice among a number of alternatives, a count-data model allows
the data to be treated in terms of number of non-negative integer events per
period, per choice category (where choice category, in the present context, is
issuance currency).
Only recently have attempts been made to set Poisson models within frame-
works of random utility maximisation. Guimaraes et al. (2003) derive a Poisson
model directly from random utility maximisation by ¯nding an equivalence re-
lation between the likelihood function of the conditional logit and the Poisson
regression. This study exploits the same equivalence relation in order to cast
its count-model-based analysis in a framework of random utility maximisation.
A count model of currency choice
This section gives an explicit description of how a count model of currency
choice can be set in a framework of random utility maximisation. The starting
point for this description is a statement of the equivalence relation derived by
Guimaraes et al. (2003).
First, assume that issuers of bonds maximise pro¯ts by minimising their
costs of issuance. Consider (without, for the moment, incorporating a time
dimension) J issuers of bonds (j = 1;:::;J), each of which select independently
an issuance currency i from a set of N potential currencies (i = 1;:::;N), then
the pro¯t the issuer will accrue, if it selects currency i, will be,
¼ij = ¯0xi + eij (3.11)
where ¯ is a vector of unknown parameters, xi is a vector of currency-speci¯c
variables (including covered and uncovered borrowing-cost savings) and eij is
an identically and independently distributed random term assumed to have an
70Extreme Value Type I distribution.1718
Using the approach employed by McFadden (1974), it is possible to show
that issuer j's probability of choosing issuance currency i, is equal to,
pi =
exp(¯0xi)
PN
i=1 exp(¯0xi)
(3.12)
which is the common representation of the conditional logit model. If, now, the
number of bonds issued in currency i is denoted by ni, it is possible to estimate
the parameters in Eqn.(3.12) by maximising the log-likelihood function,
logLcl =
N X
i=1
nilogpi (3.13)
Guimaraes et al. (2003) show that this log-likelihood function is equivalent to a
Poisson model with ni as its dependent variable and xi as its vector of explana-
tory variables. In other words, a Poisson model will yield the same results if ni
conforms to a Poisson distribution such that,
E(ni) = ¸i = exp(¯0xi) (3.14)
where ¸i is the Poisson mean parameter (in this case, the expected number of
bond issues).
The count model as outlined thus far still fails to account adequately for
the possibility of a violation of the assumption of independence of irrelevant
alternatives. The most straightforward answer is to add to the pro¯t function
an additional e®ect, °i, speci¯c to each alternative, which captures all the factors
that may a®ect the choice of issuance currency but are unaccounted for by the
explanatory variables, such that,
¼ij = ¯0xi + °i + eij (3.15)
and further, if °i is a random variable, then the probability of an issuer choosing
currency i is,
pi=° =
exp(¯0xi + °i)
PN
i=1 exp(¯0xi + °i)
(3.16)
17The Extreme Value Type I distribution, also known as the Weibull distribution, has the
property that the cumulative density of the di®erence between any two random variables with
this distribution is given by the logistic function. This property makes it possible to link the
random utility function with the logistic function. See Maddala (1983).
18Pro¯t is total. The disturbance term indicates that a proportion of the issuer's pro¯t is
stochastic. Pro¯t is not directly comparable with the accounting de¯nition of pro¯t. The
pro¯t function assumes issuer homogeneity, an assumption that can be questioned for its
plausibility.
71where choice of issuance currency is conditional on °.
One option for estimation of Eqn.(3.16) is to exploit the relation between
the conditional logit model and the Poisson model and estimate by means of
a Poisson regression with random e®ects. More appropriate, however, for the
purposes of modelling choice among issuance currencies (where there is no guar-
antee that the alternative speci¯c e®ects are uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables), is to assume that °i is a ¯xed e®ect, including a dummy variable for
each currency of issuance, i, so that,
pi =
exp(¯0xi + °i)
PN
i=1 exp(¯0xi + °i)
(3.17)
Introducing, now, a longitudinal time dimension to Eqn.(3.17), su±cient time-
series variation allows estimation of all parameters of interest. As such,
pit =
exp(¯0xit + °i)
PN
i=1 exp(¯0xit + °i)
(3.18)
where pit is the probability of an issuer choosing, in time t, to issue debt de-
nominated in currency i.
The formulation in Eqn.(3.18) is, as it stands, based on the Poisson re-
gression model, which assumes that the mean number of events per period,
¸i = exp(¯0xi), is equal to the variance ¸i. However, for most count data
and for the sample employed in this study, the mean does not equal the vari-
ance. An alternative model that relaxes this assumption of equidispersion and
allows instead for overdispersion (variance greater than the mean) is the neg-
ative binomial model, which represents a generalisation of the Poisson model.
The Poisson model is generalised by introducing an individual, unobserved ef-
fect into the conditional mean (Greene, 2008). It is then assumed, as per Hall
et al. (1984), that the conditional mean ¸it follows a gamma distribution with
shape parameter Á and scale parameter ±, speci¯ed such that Á = eXit¯ with
± common both across issuance currencies and across time. Taking the gamma
distribution for ¸it and integrating by parts gives,
p(nit) =
Z 1
0
1
nit
e¡¸it¸
nit
it f(¸it)d¸it (3.19)
=
¡(Áit + nit)
¡(Áit)¡(nit + 1)
µ
±
(1 + ±)
¶Áit
(1 + ±)¡nit (3.20)
which is the negative binomial distribution with parameters (Áit;±), where ¡(:)
is the gamma function. In order to add issuance-currency-speci¯c e®ects (that
is, ¯xed e®ects) to the negative binomial model, the approach of Hall et al.
72(1984) is adopted, allowing for the construction of the joint probability of bond
issuance in a given currency conditional on the full-period total of bond issues,
such that,
p(ni1;:::;niT) =
¡
³
1 +
PTi
t=1 nit
´
¡
³PTi
t=1 ¸it
´
¡
³PTi
t=1 nit +
PTi
t=1 ¸it
´
Ti Y
t=1
¡(nit + ¸it)
¡(1 + nit)¡(¸it)
(3.21)
which is the speci¯cation used for the empirical analysis presented in the next
section.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
This section presents an overview of the empirical techniques used to estimate
the model introduced above. The thesis that currency choice in bond issuance is
a®ected by covered and uncovered cost savings is tested, ¯rst, in a model where
the dependent variable is a count variable, de¯ned as number of bonds issued
in a given currency at time t (Section 3.4.1). In an extension of this approach,
and as a robustness check, estimation is also undertaken with the dependent
variable expressed as number of bonds issued in a given currency as a share of
all bonds issued (Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Count model empirical methodology
This section presents the empirical counterpart to the discussion in Section 3.3.3
of a count-model approach to choice among issuance currencies. Allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity across issuance currencies, ¯xed-e®ects panel regres-
sions are estimated in a manner suitable for a dependent variable that behaves
as a count variable, in this case the number of bonds issued in currency i. Recall
that a count variable is bounded from below by zero and has no e®ective upper
limit. Estimation is by means of a negative binomial model, which accounts for
overdispersion in the data (that is, accounts for the fact that the variance of the
dependent variable can, and often does, exceed its mean).19
Within this ¯xed-e®ects framework, the number of bonds issued in currency
i is assumed to depend on a vector of explanatory variables such that,
Bc
it = ®i + ¯Kit + °Rit + eit (3.22)
where Bc
it is the dependent variable de¯ned as number of bonds issued in cur-
rency i in period t, where ®i is a currency-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect, where Kit is
19See Hall et al. (1986) for a discussion of the ¯xed e®ects model in a negative binomial
setting.
73a vector of variables representing the incentive to issue bonds denominated in
currency i in order for these bonds to act as a natural hedge (as outlined in
Section 3.3), and where Rit is a vector of variables representing both covered
and uncovered cost savings.
In accounting for an empirical representation of aggregate tendency to is-
sue bonds in currency i as a natural hedge, the vector K contains variables
that re°ect issuance-currency-country fundamentals plus variables that capture
the scale of foreign-owned, cash-°ow-generating assets in the issuance-currency
region.20 Speci¯cally,
Kit = ¯1rgdpit + ¯2mait + ¯3dinvit + ¯4liqit (3.23)
where the frequency of all data is quarterly and where rgdp is real GDP (in
constant US dollar millions) in the issuance-currency country (or region) as a
share of total GDP across all issuance-currency countries; where ma is the num-
ber of cross-border mergers and acquisitions into the issuance-currency country
(or region), by acquirers that match, in nationality, the set of issuers in the
given currency (again this is measured as a share of total mergers and acqui-
sitions in all issuance-currency countries); where dinv is direct investment in
the issuance-currency country (or region) in US dollar millions as a share of
total direct investment into all issuance-currency countries; and where liq is
a proxy for ¯nancial depth, represented by total issuance of bonds and notes
in the issuance currency (both domestic and foreign issues), divided by GDP
(and, again, measured as a share of total liquidity in all issuance currencies).
For further details see Table 3.1.
The vector of variables, R, in Eqn.(3.22), contains the two main variables of
interest, namely, covered cost savings, "c
it, and uncovered cost savings, "u
it. These
two variables are measured at the beginning of each quarter and expressed in
terms of basis points. If issuers respond, as expected, to covered cost savings in
currency i by issuing, in aggregate, more bonds denominated in currency i, then
the parameter estimate for "c
it should be positive. Equally, if issuers respond, as
expected, to uncovered cost savings in currency i, then the parameter estimate
for "u
it should be positive also.
It should be note that one limitation of the empirical approach adopted is its
vulnerability to omitted-variable bias. This bias stems from the use of issuer-
country averages, such as r. To see this, consider the unrestricted interest-rate
di®erential for issuer l issuing in currency i, that is,
P
j6=l µj(rj ¡ ri). This is
20Choice of these variables draws on the ¯ndings of other studies that account for the
natural hedge, such as Cohen (2005) and Siegfried et al. (2007). Other variables, such as
imports and investment in the issuance-currency region, were discarded when found to be
statistically insigni¯cant in all cases.
74Table 3.1: Data Sources And De¯nitions
Variable De¯nition Source
Bc
i Number of issues of foreign-currency bonds denominated in
currency i, where foreign-currency bonds are de¯ned as all
bonds issued in a currency other than the currency of the
country in which the borrower resides
Dealogic (Bondware)
Bs
i Number of issues of foreign-currency bonds denominated in
currency i as a share of all issues of foreign-currency bonds
(share expressed as fraction of one)
Constructed variable
"u Uncovered borrowing-cost savings, de¯ned as deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity, where "u
it ´ (rt;t+k ¡
ri(t;t+k)) ¡ (sne
i(t;t+8) ¡ snit)
Constructed variable
"c Covered borrowing-cost savings, de¯ned as deviations from
swap-covered interest rate parity, where "c
it ´ (rt;t+k ¡
csw
t;t+k) ¡ (ri(t;t+k) ¡ csw
i(t;t+k))
Constructed variable
(r ¡ ri) Interest rate di®erential, de¯ned as home interest rate minus
issuance-currency interest rate, where home interest rate r is
expressed as a multiple-currency average
Constructed variable
r Contemporaneous average of all interest rates for currencies L
(l = 1;:::;L), where L includes all currencies in the sample
other than the currency of issuance, i (that is, L includes
all currencies associated with the nationalities of the issuers,
plus the issuance currencies other than the issuance currency
selected, i). The average is a weighted average, where weights
re°ect the value (US-dollar equivalent) of bonds issued in each
currency l at the end of the previous quarter, t ¡ 1
Constructed variable
r Yield on benchmark government bond, compounded continu-
ously
Bloomberg
(sne
i ¡ sni) Expected appreciation of the nominal e®ective exchange rate
for issuance currency i (index)
Constructed variable
sne
i Expected value of the nominal e®ective exchange rate for is-
suance currency i, with weights calculated to match trade
weights for sn (index)
Constructed variable
sni Nominal e®ective exchange rate for issuance currency i International Financial
Statistics, IMF
se Exchange-rate expectations, natural logarithm of, where ex-
pectations are proxied by two-year ahead consensus forecasts
Consensus Forecasts
s Exchange rate, natural logarithm of, expressed in terms of
home currency per foreign currency
Bloomberg
c Benchmark currency-swap yield (proxied by interest-rate-
swap yield)
Bloomberg
ma Number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions into the
issuance-currency region (by acquirers that match, in nation-
ality, the set of issuers in the issuance currency) as a propor-
tion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions into all issuance-
currency countries (in percentage points)
Zephyr, Bureau Van
Dijk
rgdp Constant GDP in the issuance-currency region as a share of
total constant GDP in all other issuance-currency countries
(in percentage points)
International Financial
Statistics, IMF
dinv Direct investment into the issuance-currency region as a share
of total direct investment into all sample issuance-currency
regions (in percentage points)
International Financial
Statistics, IMF
liq Capitalisation of market for issuance-currency debt securities
(both domestic bonds and foreign bonds) divided by issuance-
currency GDP, as a share of total capitalisation of market for
all debt securities in all issuance currencies divided by total
GDP (in percentage points)
Dealogic (Bondware)
75replaced with (rl ¡ ri). The concern is that this could lead to omitted variable
bias where
X
j6=l
µj(rj ¡ ri) =
X
j6=l
µjrj ¡
³X
j6=l
µj
´
ri (3.24)
=
³X
j6=l
µj
´
(rl ¡ ri) +
X
j6=l
µjrj ¡
³X
j6=l
µj
´
ri (3.25)
=
³X
j6=l
µj
´
(rl ¡ ri) ¡
X
j6=l
µj(rl ¡ rj) (3.26)
(3.27)
which shows that using only (rl ¡ ri) omits
P
j6=l µj(rl ¡ rj); at least some of
the (rl ¡ rj) could play signi¯cant role.
3.4.2 Currency share empirical methodology
An alternative to addressing the question of currency choice through a count-
data approach is to adopt an approach wherein the dependent variable is trans-
formed so as to represent the number of bonds issued in currency i as a share
of total number of bonds issued in all currencies. Currency share is an alter-
native gauge of currency choice and, as such, an empirical analysis of currency
share acts as a robustness check on the results from the model presented in
Section 3.4.1.
For currency share, the count variable, Bc
it is replaced with a share variable,
Bs
it, such that,
Bs
it = ®i + ¯Kit + °Rit + eit (3.28)
Transforming the dependent variable into a share variable is not without
consequence. The dependent variable is, now, bounded between zero and one,
and can, in theory, include both zero and one. The most appropriate estimator
for an endogenous variable with such characteristics comes from the fractional
logit approach developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Proper application
of this estimator in a panel requires, however, that the cross-sectional dimension
of the panel is large (N greater than 100), but here, this is not the case (N = 5).
For this reason, an alternative approach is adopted that assumes, as a starting
point, that a standard Gaussian model is appropriate, and deals with departures
from the Gauss-Markov conditions on an ad hoc basis.21
21As an empirical starting point, the Gaussian model does, in fact, seem valid for the
dependent variable expressed as a share variable, since there are no zero observations in the
two-year-maturity sample bracket, and just 3% of observations take the value zero in the ¯ve-
year-maturity bracket and the ten-year-maturity bracket. The standard linear Gaussian model
requires that the mean of the dependent variable is high enough so as not to be characterised
by a preponderance of zero observations.
76As a share variable, however, bond issuance exhibits a number of non-
standard characteristics. One of these characteristics is contemporaneous cor-
relation across error terms because, in any given period, currency shares sum
almost to one. In addition, disturbances are likely to be heteroscedastic across
issuance currencies. Furthermore, it is possible that currency-speci¯c residuals
are autocorrelated, with the autocorrelation parameter either constant for all
issuance currencies or, perhaps, di®erent for each currency.
More formally, if the disturbances in Eqn.(3.28) exhibit both heteroscedas-
ticity and contemporaneous correlation, the disturbance covariance matrix will
be represented by,
E[ee0] = ­ =
0
B
B B
B
@
¾11I11 ¾12I12 ¢¢¢ ¾1nI1n
¾21I21 ¾22I22 ¢¢¢ ¾2nI2n
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
¾n1In1 ¾n2In2 ¢¢¢ ¾nnInn
1
C
C C
C
A
where ¾ii is the variance of the disturbances for issuance currency i, where ¾ij
is the covariance of the disturbances between currency i and currency j when
the periods are matched, where i = 1;:::;n, and where I is a Ti by Ti identity
matrix, with Ti the number of periods.
Since our sample contains a limited number of heterogeneous units, the best
approach is to use ordinary least squares to calculate unbiased parameter esti-
mates in the absence of autocorrelation, and calculate Prais-Winsten estimates
when autocorrelation is present.22 For all regression speci¯cations examined,
Breusch-Pagan tests reject separate null hypotheses of cross-sectional indepen-
dence of the residuals.
3.5 The Data
Data on international bond o®erings are obtained from the Bondware database
maintained by Dealogic, a ¯nancial-information provider. This database pro-
vides coverage of the world's debt markets with information, along numerous
dimensions, on the entire population of bond o®erings. The sample period
extends from 1999 to the second quarter of 2008, with earlier data discarded
in order, primarily, to permit an examination of the role of the euro as an
issuance currency. Foreign-currency-denominated bonds are de¯ned as all non-
22See Prais and Winsten (1954). An alternative estimation technique would be the applica-
tion of feasible generalised least squares (FGLS). However, Beck and Katz (1995) have shown
that FGLS variance-covariance estimates are unacceptably optimistic when dealing with pan-
els where the number of heterogenous units is less than 20 and where there are 40 time periods
per unit or less. The implication is that FGLS is inappropriate for the purposes of the present
study.
77convertible, ¯xed-coupon, investment-grade bonds denominated in a currency
other than the currency of the nationality of the issuer.2324
The sample is restricted to ¯xed-coupon bonds, which account for 70% of
the total population of issues of foreign-currency-denominated bonds within
the sample period. The ¯nal data-set includes 172,352 bond o®erings with an
aggregate US-dollar-equivalent principal value of $29 trillion (gross issuance).
Table 3.2 displays aggregate statistics for the world's major issuance cur-
rencies ranked by outstanding amount of foreign-currency-denominated bonds
issued in each currency throughout the sample period. It can be seen that a
small number of issuance currencies, namely the US dollar, the euro, the yen,
the UK pound and the Swiss franc, dominate aggregate o®erings, with the top
¯ve accounting for 93% of total value of announced bond issuances and 87% of
the total number of issuances. In the empirical work that follows, the sample is
restricted to these ¯ve top issuance currencies.
Table 3.3 shows how the distribution of bond maturities, which range from 1
year to 100 years, is not uniform across the di®erent currencies. For this reason,
the sample of bonds is partitioned into three maturity brackets (two year, ¯ve
year and ten year) in order to match bonds with interest rates and swap rates
of corresponding maturity along the yield curve. All bonds in the sample are
allocated to one of these three maturity brackets.25 Table 3.4 presents a compar-
ison of aggregate annual o®erings of foreign-currency-denominated bonds both
by value and by number. One interesting observation is that during 2007 and
2008 the share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in euros dropped
sharply in terms of number of bonds issued, but not in terms of value. Over the
same period, interest rates were falling elsewhere in the world (most notably in
the US) but not in the euro area.
23Issuer nationality is de¯ned, in a manner consistent with the Bank for International Set-
tlements, as the nationality of the upper-most level of corporate responsibility, which, as a
de¯nition, accommodates the possibility that the issuer may be part of a multinational com-
pany, eg, a subsidiary, or a branch plant.
24In order to ensure that the issuers in the sample are, in fact, able to exercise a reasonable
choice among the ¯ve currencies in the sample, included are only those issuers that are observed
to issue bonds in at least three of the ¯ve issuance currencies during the sample period. This
sorting procedure is conducted by nationality rather than by individual issuer, so that if one
issuer of a given nationality is observed to issue in three or more di®erent currencies, then all
issuers of the same nationality are included in the sample.
25Securities with maturities of one year or less are excluded because for securities with
such short maturities the forward market can provide cover for exchange-rate risk. Bonds
with maturities greater than 15 years are omitted in order to reduce the scope for matching
errors generated by inexact matching of maturities between bonds, swap yields and interest
rates. The two-year-maturity bracket includes all bonds with maturities greater than one
year but less than or equal to three years. The ¯ve-year-maturity bracket includes all bonds
with maturities greater than three years but less than or equal to seven years. The ten-year-
maturity bracket includes all bonds with maturities greater than seven years but less than or
equal to 15 years.
78Table 3.2: Aggregate Issuance By Currency, 1999-2008*
Principal Amount, US$bn (%) Number of o®erings (%)
US dollar 13,755 47.1 96,533 56.9
Euro 8,646 29.6 36,852 21.7
Yen 3,810 13.0 9,979 5.9
Pound sterling 700 2.4 2,075 1.2
Swiss franc 350 1.2 2,449 1.4
Australian dollar 211 0.7 1,800 1.1
Other 1,759 6.0 19,969 11.8
Total 29,231 100 169,657 100
Notes: Principal amount (value in US$bn equivalent) and number of foreign-currency-
denominated bonds issued during 1999-2008 ranked according to principal amount. Per-
centages refer to issuance (by principal amount and by number of bonds issued) in
given currency as a per cent of all foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued. Foreign-
currency-denominated bonds are de¯ned as those bonds issued in a currency other than
the currency of the country in which the borrower resides. Includes only ¯xed-interest-
rate debt securities (ie, straight bonds). Excludes debt securities with maturities of less
than one year and more than 15 years. (*) Data for 2008 is for the ¯rst half of 2008.
Source is Bondware.
Table 3.3: Aggregate Issuance By Maturity, 1999-2008*
Number of o®erings (per cent) in issuance currency
2yr maturity 5yr maturity 10yr maturity
US dollar 22.6 40.8 36.6
Euro 55.1 24.6 20.3
Yen 10.8 40.7 48.5
Pound sterling 21.9 43.3 34.8
Swiss franc 12.6 42.4 45.0
Notes: Foreign-currency-denominated bonds of speci¯ed maturity issued
during 1999-2008 as a share of total foreign-currency-denominated bonds
issued in selected currencies. Maturity here refers to maturity \brackets",
as described in the text. Foreign-currency-denominated bonds are de¯ned
as those bonds issued in a currency other than the currency of the country
in which the borrower resides. Sample includes only ¯xed-interest-rate se-
curities. (*) Data for 2008 is for the ¯rst half of 2008. Source is Bondware.
79T
a
b
l
e
3
.
4
:
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
I
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
B
y
Y
e
a
r
O
f
O
®
e
r
i
n
g
,
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
8
*
P
a
n
e
l
A
.
T
o
t
a
l
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
o
®
e
r
e
d
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
U
S
d
o
l
l
a
r
9
,
0
4
6
7
,
4
2
8
1
4
,
4
7
9
1
2
,
9
8
5
1
5
,
5
8
9
1
4
,
2
9
9
9
,
7
1
0
7
,
7
0
9
4
,
5
0
2
7
8
6
E
u
r
o
2
,
8
2
8
2
,
3
7
0
2
,
1
1
3
2
,
1
5
3
3
,
7
5
1
6
,
4
0
5
7
,
9
3
7
6
,
7
6
5
2
,
2
5
8
2
7
2
Y
e
n
1
,
0
2
7
1
,
2
5
2
1
,
2
8
7
1
,
2
0
1
1
,
0
7
7
9
4
8
1
,
1
7
8
1
,
0
6
9
7
9
1
1
4
9
P
o
u
n
d
s
t
e
r
l
i
n
g
1
6
0
2
0
1
1
3
6
1
3
9
1
7
1
2
8
2
2
6
3
3
0
5
2
3
9
1
7
9
S
w
i
s
s
f
r
a
n
c
2
5
7
3
0
3
2
1
4
2
5
5
2
2
8
2
0
8
3
1
2
2
5
1
2
7
7
1
4
4
O
t
h
e
r
6
7
3
1
,
4
8
5
2
,
3
3
0
2
,
8
8
3
3
,
1
7
4
3
,
3
4
8
3
,
6
3
7
3
,
7
9
4
2
,
4
5
2
6
8
8
T
o
t
a
l
1
3
,
9
9
1
1
3
,
0
3
9
2
0
,
5
5
9
1
9
,
6
1
6
2
3
,
9
9
0
2
5
,
4
9
0
2
3
,
0
3
7
1
9
,
8
9
3
1
0
,
5
1
9
2
,
2
1
8
P
a
n
e
l
B
.
C
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
s
h
a
r
e
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
o
®
e
r
e
d
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
U
S
d
o
l
l
a
r
6
4
.
7
5
7
.
0
7
0
.
4
6
6
.
2
6
5
.
0
5
6
.
1
4
2
.
1
3
8
.
8
4
2
.
8
3
5
.
4
E
u
r
o
2
0
.
2
1
8
.
2
1
0
.
3
1
1
.
0
1
5
.
6
2
5
.
1
3
4
.
5
3
4
.
0
2
1
.
5
1
2
.
3
Y
e
n
7
.
3
9
.
6
6
.
3
6
.
1
4
.
5
3
.
7
5
.
1
5
.
4
7
.
5
6
.
7
P
o
u
n
d
s
t
e
r
l
i
n
g
1
.
1
1
.
5
0
.
7
0
.
7
0
.
7
1
.
1
1
.
1
1
.
5
2
.
3
8
.
1
S
w
i
s
s
f
r
a
n
c
1
.
8
2
.
3
1
.
0
1
.
3
1
.
0
0
.
8
1
.
4
1
.
3
2
.
6
6
.
5
O
t
h
e
r
4
.
8
1
1
.
4
1
1
.
3
1
4
.
7
1
3
.
2
1
3
.
1
1
5
.
8
1
9
.
1
2
3
.
3
3
1
.
0
T
o
t
a
l
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
P
a
n
e
l
C
.
T
o
t
a
l
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
,
g
r
o
s
s
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
(
U
S
$
b
n
)
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
U
S
d
o
l
l
a
r
1
,
0
5
6
.
7
9
1
9
.
7
1
,
8
4
2
.
8
1
,
7
9
4
.
5
2
,
0
6
0
.
4
1
,
9
5
5
.
6
1
,
6
0
1
.
5
1
,
7
3
8
.
3
5
7
4
.
6
2
1
0
.
8
E
u
r
o
7
5
6
.
2
5
5
7
.
2
6
6
2
.
7
5
8
7
.
3
7
8
1
.
7
9
0
9
.
1
1
,
9
5
6
.
5
1
,
7
7
8
.
5
4
6
1
.
8
1
9
5
.
0
Y
e
n
7
7
.
4
1
2
8
.
8
4
3
3
.
3
4
5
7
.
7
4
7
3
.
8
6
3
2
.
5
7
5
2
.
0
7
3
5
.
8
1
0
2
.
4
1
6
.
7
P
o
u
n
d
s
t
e
r
l
i
n
g
3
8
.
0
3
4
.
3
3
1
.
2
3
9
.
1
7
9
.
2
9
4
.
3
1
1
3
.
0
1
3
5
.
6
8
2
.
3
5
2
.
9
S
w
i
s
s
f
r
a
n
c
3
4
.
0
3
4
.
8
2
6
.
7
3
4
.
0
3
4
.
0
3
2
.
6
4
9
.
0
4
1
.
6
3
9
.
5
2
3
.
4
O
t
h
e
r
8
7
.
0
9
2
.
7
1
2
5
.
9
1
6
4
.
8
1
9
7
.
4
3
2
1
.
9
3
9
2
.
9
4
3
3
.
7
1
7
6
.
3
5
2
.
3
T
o
t
a
l
2
,
0
4
9
.
4
1
,
7
6
7
.
5
3
,
1
2
2
.
6
3
,
0
7
7
.
4
3
,
6
2
6
.
5
3
,
9
4
6
.
0
4
,
8
6
4
.
9
4
,
8
6
3
.
5
1
,
4
3
6
.
8
5
5
1
.
0
P
a
n
e
l
D
.
C
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
s
h
a
r
e
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
,
g
r
o
s
s
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
U
S
d
o
l
l
a
r
5
1
.
6
5
2
.
0
5
9
.
0
5
8
.
3
5
6
.
8
4
9
.
6
3
2
.
9
3
5
.
7
4
0
.
0
3
8
.
3
E
u
r
o
3
6
.
9
3
1
.
5
2
1
.
2
1
9
.
1
2
1
.
6
2
3
.
0
4
0
.
2
3
6
.
6
3
2
.
1
3
5
.
4
Y
e
n
3
.
8
7
.
3
1
3
.
9
1
4
.
9
1
3
.
1
1
6
.
0
1
5
.
5
1
5
.
1
7
.
1
3
.
0
P
o
u
n
d
s
t
e
r
l
i
n
g
1
.
9
1
.
9
1
.
0
1
.
3
2
.
2
2
.
4
2
.
3
2
.
8
5
.
7
9
.
6
S
w
i
s
s
f
r
a
n
c
1
.
7
2
.
0
0
.
9
1
.
1
0
.
9
0
.
8
1
.
0
0
.
9
2
.
7
4
.
2
O
t
h
e
r
4
.
2
5
.
2
4
.
0
5
.
4
5
.
4
8
.
2
8
.
1
8
.
9
1
2
.
3
9
.
5
T
o
t
a
l
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
N
o
t
e
s
:
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
i
s
s
u
e
d
i
n
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
8
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
i
s
s
u
e
d
(
P
a
n
e
l
A
)
i
n
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
a
n
d
n
u
m
b
e
r
i
s
s
u
e
d
a
s
a
s
h
a
r
e
(
i
n
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
o
f
a
l
l
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
i
s
s
u
e
d
(
P
a
n
e
l
B
)
.
G
r
o
s
s
i
s
s
u
a
n
c
e
t
o
t
a
l
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
(
P
a
n
e
l
C
)
i
n
U
S
-
d
o
l
l
a
r
e
q
u
i
v
-
a
l
e
n
t
s
a
t
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
s
.
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
a
r
e
d
e
¯
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
o
s
e
b
o
n
d
s
i
s
s
u
e
d
i
n
a
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
o
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
r
e
s
i
d
e
s
.
I
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
o
n
l
y
¯
x
e
d
-
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
r
a
t
e
d
e
b
t
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
.
E
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
d
e
b
t
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
o
n
e
y
e
a
r
o
r
l
e
s
s
,
a
n
d
w
i
t
h
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
t
h
a
n
1
5
y
e
a
r
s
.
(
*
)
D
a
t
a
f
o
r
2
0
0
8
i
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
¯
r
s
t
h
a
l
f
o
f
2
0
0
8
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
i
s
B
o
n
d
w
a
r
e
.
803.6 Results
This section presents results from empirical tests of the hypothesis that issuers
of foreign-currency-denominated bonds choose, all else being equal, to issue
in currencies that o®er the lowest available uncovered and covered borrowing
costs. Results from count-model panel regressions are presented ¯rst, followed
by results from an empirical model of currency share.
3.6.1 Count-model results
Results from empirical testing of the count model of currency choice among the
¯ve currencies of issuance (the US dollar, the euro, the yen, the UK pound and
the Swiss franc) are presented in Table 3.5. Coe±cient estimates and standard
errors (corrected for the overdispersion in the data) are displayed for the three
separate maturity brackets under analysis|two years, ¯ve years and ten years.
Table 3.5 reports a number of di®erent speci¯cations of the basic model, in
particular testing the impact of covered and uncovered borrowing costs sepa-
rately (columns 1 and 2) and jointly (column 3). In addition, columns 4 and 5
isolate the separate contributions to uncovered borrowing costs of interest-rate
di®erentials and expected exchange-rate appreciation.
Likelihood-ratio tests indicate that all speci¯cations outperform a pooled
estimator (where the negative binomial estimator takes a constant dispersion).
Parameter estimates suggest issuers of foreign-currency-denominated bonds do
not respond to covered cost savings, with "c
it proving to be statistically insignif-
icant across all three maturity brackets. While the availability of covered cost
savings appears to play a negligible role in the issuance decision, this is not the
case with uncovered cost savings. Issuers appear to be responsive to uncovered
cost savings when issuing bonds of all maturities. In all three maturity brackets
the estimated coe±cient on "u
it carries the expected sign, namely positive, and
its magnitude is similar (around 0.3), implying that a 20 basis-point increase in
uncovered borrowing-cost savings (the average absolute change in "u
it for bonds
of all maturities during the sample period is 25 basis points) is associated with a
7% increase in the expected number of bonds issued in the issuance currency.26
Table 3.5 also presents a decomposition of "u
it into its two component parts,
the interest-rate di®erential (rt;t+k ¡ ri(t;t+k)) and the expected appreciation
of the issuance currency (sne
i(t;t+8) ¡ snit).27 Examining these two component
26Note that percentage change in the expected number of bonds issued for a unit
change in each explanatory variable, holding other variables constant, is calculated as
100*[exp(estimated coe±cient)-1].
27Regressions were also estimated with alternative approximations of "expected apprecia-
tion" (based, for example, on backward-looking extrapolative expectations), but the results
were not materially di®erent.
81Table 3.5: Fixed e®ects negative binomial estimation
Panel A. Issuance of foreign-currency bonds, two-year maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
"
c 0.063 0.042
(0.12) (0.12)
"
u 0.332** 0.404**
(0.11) (0.11)
(r ¡ ri) 0.301** 0.335**
(0.11) (0.11)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) -3.036**
(1.07)
rgdp 0.024 0.032** 0.039** 0.031** 0.032**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
dinv -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ma 0.008 0.013 0.015* 0.013 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log likelihood -978.703 -974.267 -972.424 -975.059 -971.041
Likelihood ratio 152.795 159.068 160.095 157.859 164.849
Panel B. Issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ¯ve-year maturity
"
c -0.073 0.022
(0.01) (0.11)
"
u 0.212** 0.219**
(0.08) (0.08)
(r ¡ ri) 0.219** 0.218**
(0.08) (0.08)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 0.519
(0.75)
rgdp 0.030** 0.020* 0.019 0.020* 0.021*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dinv 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ma 0.018** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log likelihood -1005.457 -1002.062 -1002.041 -1001.823 -1001.585
Likelihood ratio 146.374 146.281 125.814 148.517 141.225
Panel C. Issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ten-year maturity
"
c -0.129 -0.012
(0.09) (0.09)
"
u 0.299** 0.296**
(0.08) (0.08)
(r ¡ ri) 0.311** 0.308**
(0.08) (0.08)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 1.054
(0.75)
rgdp 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dinv 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ma 0.009* 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log likelihood -1001.585 -995.025 -995.017 -994.387 -993.413
Likelihood ratio 129.332 122.63 119.45 124.336 125.762
Notes: Fixed e®ects, negative binomial, count-data model accommodating overdispersion. De-
pendent variable is number of foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in currency i at time t.
Regressions include ¯xed e®ects and year dummies. All explanatory variables are measured at the
beginning of the quarter and are expressed as proportions (as explained in the text), measured in
percentage points. The sample period is from 1999 to the second quarter of 2008. Standard er-
rors are in parenthases. (**) and (*) denote signi¯cance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. All
p-values for the likelihood ratio tests are smaller than 0.001.
82variables, it becomes clear that what drives the overall signi¯cance of "u
it is not
the expected appreciation, or depreciation, of the issuance currency, but the
nominal interest-rate di®erential.28 The interest-rate-di®erential parameter is
signi¯cant for bonds of all maturities and is similar, in magnitude, to parameter
estimates for "u
it. The implication is, according to these results, that nominal
interest rates do matter, whereas exchange-rate expectations are not generally
relevant for the choice of currency in international bond issuance. Figure 3.1
illustrates these ¯ndings graphically for euro-denominated bonds carrying a ¯ve-
year maturity: issuance can be seen to correlate strongly with interest-rate
di®erentials, less strongly with uncovered cost savings, and correlate hardly at
all with covered cost savings.
Table 3.5 shows that relative ¯nancial depth of the bond market associated
with each issuance currency (liq), relative share of direct investment into each
issuance-currency region (dinv) and relative share of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions into each issuance-currency region (ma) are found in general, for
bonds of all maturities, to be statistically insigni¯cant as drivers of currency
choice among issuance currencies.29 According to our evidence, these variables
fail to capture the potential incentive among issuers to issue foreign-currency-
denominated bonds in order for these bonds to act as a natural hedge against
foreign cash in°ows. The role of the natural hedge, if present, is captured by
¯xed e®ects or, potentially, rgdp.
Indeed, Table 3.5 shows that economic activity within the issuance-currency
region (rgdp) acts as a signi¯cant driver of issuance for all bonds in the sample
except for those with the longest maturities. For all bonds other than those that
fall into the ten-year-maturity bracket, the estimated coe±cients imply that a
one percentage point increase in the share of economic activity in the issuance-
currency region (the average absolute change in share throughout the sample
period is indeed one percentage point) is associated with an increase of roughly
4% in the number of bonds o®ered in the issuance currency.30
28Expected appreciation is signi¯cant as an explanatory variable for only short-maturity
bonds (Panel A), where the estimated coe±cient is of the expected sign, namely negative
(suggesting that issuers prefer to issue bonds in currencies that they expect, broadly, to
depreciate over time), and where the magnitude of the estimated coe±cient implies that a one-
basis-point increase in expected appreciation (the average absolute change in (sne
i(t;t+8)¡snit)
during the sample period is 1.5 basis points) is associated with a 9% drop in the expected
number of bonds issued in the issuance currency.
29Recall that variables liq, dinv, ma and rgdp are expressed as shares relative to total
amounts in all issuance-currency regions. These variables are expressed as relative shares in
order to facilitate comparability with results presented in subsequent sections, Section 3.6.1
and Section 3.6.2 Other formulations of these variables (for instance, relative rates of change),
yield similar results.
30Note that the variables rgdp, liq, dinv and ma are expressed in terms of percentage points.
83Figure 3.1: Issuance, interest-rate di®erentials and cost
savings
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Notes: Top chart shows the number of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds carrying a maturity of ¯ve years (for maturity details see text)
issued in euros versus the interest-rate di®erential (weighted average
of other interest rates minus euro interest rates) for the euro, where
all interest rates are of a ¯ve-year maturity. Centre chart shows the
number of foreign-currency-denominated bonds carrying a maturity
of ¯ve years issued in euros versus uncovered borrowing-cost savings,
as de¯ned in the text. Bottom chart shows the number of foreign-
currency-denominated bonds carrying a maturity of ¯ve years issued
in euros versus covered borrowing-cost savings, as de¯ned in the text.
Left scale corresponds to number of bonds issued. Right scale is
decimal scale for interest-rate di®erential, uncovered cost savings and
covered cost savings.
843.6.2 Currency-share-model results
Table 3.6 reports coe±cient estimates, standard errors (in brackets) and goodness-
of-¯t measures for panel estimation of the currency share of issuance of foreign-
currency-denominated bonds for the ¯ve sample currencies. More precisely, the
dependent variable is number of bonds issued in currency i as a share of num-
ber of bonds issued in all issuance currencies. The results are broadly consistent
with those presented in Section 3.6.1. Uncovered cost savings, "u, play an im-
portant role in the choice of issuance currency for bonds of all maturities: the
total share of the number of bonds issued in currency i tends to increase in
tandem with an increase in the magnitude of uncovered borrowing-cost savings
associated with currency i. For two-year-maturity bonds, a 50-basis-point in-
crease in uncovered borrowing-cost savings is associated with in an increase in
currency share of issuance of more than 2 percentage points.31 For ¯ve-year and
ten-year-maturity bonds, a 50-basis-point increase in uncovered borrowing-cost
savings is associated with an increase in currency share of around 0.8 percentage
points.
Estimates of the two component parts of "u, namely the interest-rate dif-
ferential, (r ¡ ri), and the expected appreciation of the issuance currency,
(sne
i ¡ sni), again, indicate that the nominal interest-rate di®erential is the
biggest factor in°uencing the statistical signi¯cance of uncovered borrowing-cost
savings.32 The expected change in the value of the issuance currency appears
to play no role in the choice of issuance currency for bonds across all maturities.
Similarly, covered borrowing-cost savings do not appear to exert an economically
important in°uence on currency choice during the sample period.
Relative economic activity, as in the count model, is found to be a signi¯cant
driver of currency choice for issuance of bonds of all maturities. For bonds with
a maturity of roughly two years, a one percentage point rise in real output in
the issuance-currency region relative to all other issuance-currency countries is
associated with a rise in currency share of issuance of around three percentage
points. For bonds with longer maturities, the in°uence of relative economic
activity is less strong, but still signi¯cant. The main di®erence with results from
the count model in Section 3.6.1 is the statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cient
associated with relative ¯nancial depth, liq. Financial depth exerts a small
but signi¯cant in°uence on currency choice among issuance currencies. A one
percentage point increase in relative ¯nancial depth (total capitalisation of both
domestic plus foreign announced issues denominated in issuance currency i)
31The average absolute quarterly change in currency share of issuance during the sample
period (for bonds that fall into the two-year-maturity bracket) is 3 percentage points. Recall
also that the average absolute change in "u
it during the sample period is 25 basis points.
32In tests of parameter equality, unreported, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of
equality of coe±cients for "u and (r ¡ ri).
85Table 3.6: Fixed e®ects Prais-Winsten estimation
Panel A. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, two-year maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
"
c -0.316 3.903
(2.19) (2.53)
"
u 4.370** 5.094**
(0.6) (0.75)
(r ¡ ri) 4.354** 4.266**
(0.61) (0.58)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 9.375
(27.93)
rgdp 3.204** 3.438** 3.294** 3.448** 3.466**
(0.33) (0.30) (0.32) (0.3) (0.31)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.428** 0.412** 0.387** 0.416** 0.424**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
dinv 0.001 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ma 0.654** 0.618** 0.568** 0.620** 0.625**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Adj. R
2 0.872 0.892 0.894 0.892 0.892
RMSE 9.611 9.157 9.112 9.153 9.175
Panel B. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ¯ve-year maturity
"
c -1.201 -0.044
(1.98) (2.30)
"
u 1.405** 1.397*
(0.43) (0.59)
(r ¡ ri) 1.331** 1.652**
(0.44) (0.41)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) -34.068
(22.08)
rgdp 2.216** 2.239** 2.240** 2.238** 2.172**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.257** 0.246** 0.246** 0.247** 0.217**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
dinv 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ma 0.097 0.072 0.073 0.074 0.055
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Adj. R
2 0.925 0.942 0.943 0.942 0.944
RMSE 6.530 6.473 6.491 6.479 6.421
Panel C. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ten-year maturity
"
c 0.523 2.082
(1.69) (1.88)
"
u 1.496** 1.882**
(0.37) (0.44)
(r ¡ ri) 1.508** 1.391**
(0.37) (0.36)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 12.425
(17.78)
rgdp 1.788** 1.899** 1.822** 1.903** 1.927**
(0.21) (0.19) (0.2) (0.19) (0.2)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.236** 0.234** 0.221** 0.235** 0.246**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
dinv 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ma 0.049 0.044 0.017 0.045 0.051
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Adj. R
2 0.955 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
RMSE 5.378 5.287 5.267 5.284 5.287
Notes: Fixed-e®ects panel estimation with panel-corrected standard errors, corrected for het-
eroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels (ie, across issuance currencies).
Accommodation for ¯rst-order autocorrelation (common to all panels) where present. Depen-
dent variable is number of foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in currency i at time t
as a share of all foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued (expressed in percentage points).
Regressions include ¯xed e®ects and panel-speci¯c time trends. All explanatory variables are
measured at the beginning of the quarter. The sample period is from 1999 to the second quar-
ter of 2008. Standard errors are in parenthases. (**) and (*) denote signi¯cance at the 1%
and 5% levels respectively.
86corresponds to a rise in currency share of issuance of around 0.3 percentage
points. Neither relative direct investment nor relative share of cross border
mergers and acquisitions in°uence the choice of issuance currency for bonds of
all maturities.
Finally, it is important to note that all of these ¯ndings are consistent with
this study's underlying assumption, outlined in Section 3.1, that it is more ap-
propriate to measure the number of bonds issued rather than the value of bonds
issued when assessing the responsiveness of issuance to changes in covered and
uncovered borrowing-cost savings. When Prais-Winsten panel regressions are
estimated with the dependent variable (in Eqn.(3.28)) de¯ned in terms of cur-
rency share of issuance value, the explanatory power of the key variables in this
study drops signi¯cantly. Adjusted R-square statistics for each regression are,
on average, 20 percentage points lower than those reported in Panels A, B and C
in Table 3.6. In addition, both "u and "c are found to be insigni¯cant in general
as determinants of choice among issuance currencies. Relative economic activity
is the only variable found to be consistently signi¯cant across all speci¯cations.
Financial versus non-¯nancial issuers
One common message from the count-model estimates in Section 3.6.1 and the
currency-share estimates, in Section 3.6.2, is that uncovered borrowing costs
do play an important role in currency choice for bond issuance. If there is no
omitted-variable bias then a signi¯cant number of issuers must be responding
positively to signals indicating cheaper uncovered borrowing costs in given is-
suance currencies. The purpose of this section is to examine whether this result
is sensitive to the distinction between the type of issuer, in particular di®eren-
tiating between ¯nancial and non-¯nancial issuers.
Before doing so, it is necessary to discuss the implications of allowing for
heterogeneity among issuers. The basic model of this paper is premised on
issuer homogeneity|the individual issuer is assumed to be representative of the
population of issuers as a whole. Relaxing this assumption runs contrary to the
underlying model of utility-maximising choice. The best way to introduce issuer
heterogeneity would be to construct a new panel count model of currency choice
that allows explicitly for issuer heterogeneity. This is beyond the scope of this
paper. As far as the author is aware there is no study, to date, that has succeeded
in incorporating agent heterogeneity into a panel count model. It has, of course,
been achieved in mixed (also known as heterogeneous) multinomial logit models
of choice. But agent heterogeneity has not been accounted for in count models of
choice. This subject is left for future research. Here, heterogeneity is accounted
for in a manner that is based on nothing more than expediency. The approach
87is discussed below.
In terms of number of bonds issued, ¯nancial corporations (ie, investment
banks, commercial banks, credit institutions and international banks) dominate
global issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds. Table 3.7 shows the
extent to which ¯nancial issuers dominate issuance in all major currencies, in
particular, in the issuance of shorter-maturity bonds. For instance, ¯nancial
issuers account for 97% of all bonds issued in euros with an average maturity of
two years.
If uncovered cost savings are an important in°uence on the issuance decision,
then it is conceivable that, of all potential issuers, ¯nancial corporations will
be most responsive to these cost savings because, ¯rstly, they have a greater
speculative motive, and secondly, they have the market knowledge necessary
to exploit such savings. Meanwhile, the empirical literature shows that non-
¯nancial issuers are concerned mainly with the need to ¯nd a natural hedge
when issuing foreign-currency-denominated bonds (see Section 3.2).
In order to assess the di®erence in issuance behaviour, if any, between ¯-
nancial issuers and non-¯nancial issuers, the full sample is split according to
Standard Industrial Classi¯cation codes (SIC codes) so as to separate all those
issuers operating in the ¯nancial sector (coinciding, mostly, with the 6000-7000
SIC classi¯cation codes) from the rest. The same Prais-Winsten regressions,
as above, are run on the two sample subgroups for each of the three maturity
brackets. Table 3.8 reports the results for ¯nancial issuers, and Table 3.9 for
non-¯nancial issuers.
The results suggest that ¯nancial issuers do, indeed, respond more strongly
than non-¯nancial issuers to uncovered borrowing-cost savings. For longer ma-
turities (beyond two years), coe±cient estimates for "u are larger and more
signi¯cant for ¯nancial issuers. Coe±cient estimates suggest that ¯nancial is-
suers are most responsive when the bonds they are issuing carry maturities
of roughly ¯ve years in length. For ¯ve-year-maturity bonds, a 50-basis-point
increase in uncovered borrowing-cost savings is associated with an increase in
currency share of around 1.8 percentage points. For short-maturity bonds, un-
covered borrowing-cost savings are a statistically signi¯cant driver of issuance
for ¯nancial issuers but not for non¯nancial issuers.
Coe±cients associated with control variables accounting for the natural
hedge (rgdp, liq, dinv and ma) are in general consistent with estimates re-
turned for the full sample in Section 3.6.2. Relative share of economic activity
is in general important for both ¯nancial and non¯nancial issuers. However, rel-
ative share of direct investment and relative share of mergers and acquisitions
exert an unexpected in°uence on issuance (ie, negative rather than positive)
in a few speci¯cations. Overall, the role of uncovered cost savings remains a
88consistent feature in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds of all
maturities.
3.7 Conclusions
This study examines the determinants of currency choice in the issuance of
international bonds, focussing on the presence of opportunistic behaviour by
bond issuers in response to deviations from covered and uncovered interest-rate
parity. Count-data techniques are used to study the number of bonds issued
across ¯ve major currencies during the period 1999 to 2008. In a robustness
check, this study also examines the number of bonds issued in each issuance
currency as a share of total number of bonds issued in all currencies. Results
are robust across all speci¯cations.
The main ¯nding is that the scope for uncovered borrowing-cost savings,
de¯ned as deviations from uncovered interest-rate parity, exerts a signi¯cant in-
°uence on the choice of issuance currency. These uncovered borrowing-costs
savings are assessed in terms of their two main component parts: nominal
interest-rate di®erentials and expected exchange-rate depreciation of the is-
suance currency. Interest-rate di®erentials are shown to have a statistically
signi¯cant impact on currency choice across di®erent empirical speci¯cations,
consistent with the ¯ndings of other studies. The implication is that issuers
prefer to borrow in currencies that o®er low nominal interest rates. Meanwhile,
issuance does not respond in a consistent manner to expected depreciation of
the issuance currency, suggesting that issuers do not, at the aggregate level, at-
tempt to lower borrowing costs by issuing bonds in currencies that are expected
to fall in value.
Assessing issuance behaviour by maturity of the bonds being issued reveals
that the in°uence of nominal interest-rate di®erentials is similar for bonds of all
maturities|that is, the in°uence is no stronger for long-maturity bonds than
it is for short-maturity bonds. However, the in°uence is stronger for ¯nan-
cial issuers (eg, investment banks, commercial banks and credit institutions),
suggesting that, perhaps, ¯nancial issuers are driven by a stronger speculative
motive than non-¯nancial issuers when choosing their currency of issuance and
have greater access to the type of market information that is necessary to exploit
such cost-saving opportunities.
This study ¯nds no robust evidence that covered cost savings systematically
a®ect the number of bonds issued in a given issuance currency. Arbitrage op-
portunities do seem to be present in the swaps markets, but are not taken up
by bond issuers. It is possible that the frequency of our dataset|quarterly
data|may introduce a measurement error that impairs a proper assessment of
89the impact of this variable.
Overall, our ¯ndings o®er a useful contribution to the understanding of cur-
rency choice in the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds by highlight-
ing the importance of uncovered borrowing-cost savings and nominal interest
rates. Furthermore, in as much as the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated
bonds a®ects the relative international standing of world currencies, these ¯nd-
ings suggest that monetary policy, through its in°uence on nominal interest
rates, has a greater impact on the internationalisation of currencies than has
been previously accounted for.
90Table 3.7: Financial issuers of international bonds and notes, 1999-2008*
Number of o®erings by ¯nancial entities
as share (per cent) of all o®erings
2yr maturity 5yr maturity 10yr maturity
US Dollar 85.2 73.7 72.3
Euro 97.1 71.0 53.6
Yen 60.3 51.3 85.7
UK Pound 81.5 79.8 64.0
Swiss Francs 88.2 70.8 76.6
Notes: Foreign-currency-denominated bonds of speci¯ed matu-
rity issued by ¯nancial entities during 1999-2008 as a share of to-
tal foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in selected curren-
cies. Maturity here refers to maturity \brackets", as described in
the text. Securities with maturities of less than one year are ex-
cluded. Foreign-currency-denominated bonds are de¯ned as those
bonds issued in a currency other than the currency of the coun-
try in which the borrower resides. Sample includes only ¯xed-
interest-rate securities. (*) Data for 2008 is for the ¯rst half of
2008. Source is Bondware.
91Table 3.8: Fixed e®ects Prais-Winsten estimation: Financial issuers
Panel A. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, two-year maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
"
c 0.403 1.934
(3.16) (3.89)
"
u 1.489* 1.848
(0.68) (1.27)
(r ¡ ri) 1.345* 2.013*
(0.61) (0.82)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) -70.949
(46.25)
rgdp 1.819** 1.923** 1.852** 1.919** 1.782**
(0.50) (0.46) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.176 0.173 0.161 0.175 0.112
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
dinv -0.051 -0.054 -0.056 -0.054 -0.058
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ma 0.872** 0.866** 0.841** 0.867** 0.829**
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Adj. R
2 0.776 0.782 0.781 0.782 0.785
RMSE 13.964 13.919 13.947 13.925 13.811
Panel B. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ¯ve-year maturity
"
c -0.302 3.104
(2.67) (3.13)
"
u 3.536** 4.112**
(0.72) (0.92)
(r ¡ ri) 3.522** 3.457**
(0.73) (0.70)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 6.822
(34.56)
rgdp 1.213** 1.401** 1.286** 1.409** 1.422**
(0.38) (0.35) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.268* 0.255* 0.235 0.258* 0.264*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
dinv -0.040 -0.048* -0.050** -0.048* -0.047*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ma 0.353 0.323 0.284 0.325 0.329
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Adj. R
2 0.827 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836
RMSE 10.871 10.612 10.603 10.609 10.638
Panel C. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ten-year maturity
"
c -2.617 -2.601
(1.39) (1.40)
"
u 1.940* 1.957*
(0.94) (0.89)
(r ¡ ri) 1.868* 2.145*
(0.94) (0.95)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 20.035
(20.33)
rgdp -0.158 -0.254 -0.158 -0.251 -0.212
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.086 0.069 0.085 0.069 0.087
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
dinv 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ma 0.085* 0.052 0.085* 0.052 0.063*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Adj. R
2 0.856 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.860
RMSE 7.697 7.685 7.669 7.684 7.683
Notes: Fixed-e®ects panel estimation with panel-corrected standard errors, corrected for het-
eroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels (ie, across issuance currencies).
Accommodation for ¯rst-order autocorrelation (common to all panels) where present. Depen-
dent variable is number of foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in currency i at time t
as a share of all foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued. Regressions include ¯xed e®ects
and panel-speci¯c time trends. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the
quarter. The sample period is from 1999 to the second quarter of 2008. Standard errors are
in parenthases. (**) and (*) denote signi¯cance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
92Table 3.9: Fixed e®ects Prais-Winsten estimation: Non¯nancial issuers
Panel A. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, two-year maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
"
c -2.272 -3.076
(2.92) (3.36)
"
u 1.456 -0.971
(0.80) (0.96)
(r ¡ ri) 1.432 1.495
(0.81) (0.80)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) -6.654
(38.31)
rgdp 1.663** 1.162** 1.646** 1.164** 1.151**
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37)
liq(t ¡ 1) -0.13 -0.206 -0.122 -0.204 -0.21
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
dinv -0.067** -0.072** -0.064** -0.072** -0.072**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ma -0.214 -0.365* -0.198 -0.364* -0.367*
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Adj. R
2 0.843 0.823 0.842 0.823 0.823
RMSE 10.738 11.377 10.752 11.378 11.409
Panel B. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ¯ve-year maturity
"
c -3.704 -3.284
(1.97) (2.29)
"
u 1.116* 0.507
(0.47) (0.64)
(r ¡ ri) 1.173* 0.847
(0.48) (0.44)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 34.519
(21.83)
rgdp 0.565* 0.453* 0.574* 0.459* 0.525*
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.212** 0.187* 0.208** 0.188* 0.218**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
dinv -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ma -0.091 -0.142 -0.1 -0.141 -0.123
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Adj. R
2 0.923 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.932
RMSE 6.979 6.975 6.929 6.971 6.918
Panel C. Currency share of foreign-currency-denominated bonds, ten-year maturity
"
c -3.557 -3.029
(2.16) (2.49)
"
u 1.200* 0.638
(0.51) (0.70)
(r ¡ ri) 1.243* 0.986*
(0.52) (0.49)
(sn
e
i ¡ sni) 27.242
(22.65)
rgdp 1.425** 1.325** 1.437** 1.330** 1.383**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24)
liq(t ¡ 1) 0.054 0.03 0.049 0.031 0.055
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
dinv 0.026 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.024
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ma -0.231* -0.280** -0.241* -0.280** -0.265*
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Adj. R
2 0.931 0.936 0.937 0.936 0.937
RMSE 7.386 7.378 7.346 7.374 7.352
Notes: Fixed-e®ects panel estimation with panel-corrected standard errors, corrected for het-
eroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels (ie, across issuance currencies).
Accommodation for ¯rst-order autocorrelation (common to all panels) where present. Depen-
dent variable is number of foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued in currency i at time t
as a share of all foreign-currency-denominated bonds issued. Regressions include ¯xed e®ects
and panel-speci¯c time trends. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the
quarter. The sample period is from 1999 to the second quarter of 2008. Standard errors are
in parenthases. (**) and (*) denote signi¯cance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
93Chapter 4
Currency dynamics and
hedging
This chapter o®ers a study of the association between movements in the price
of gold and the US dollar using a model of dynamic conditional correlations
covering 23 years of weekly data for 16 major dollar-paired exchange rates. The
aim is to address a practical investment question: Does gold act as a hedge
against the US dollar, as a safe haven, or neither? Key ¯ndings are as follows.
(i) During the past 23 years gold has behaved as a hedge against the US dollar.
(ii) There is no evidence to suggest that gold has acted as a consistent and
e®ective safe haven. (iii) In recent years gold has become increasingly correlated
(negatively) with the US dollar, more so than at any point during the past two
and a half decades, suggesting that gold has, during the recent ¯nancial turmoil,
acted as a particularly e®ective hedge against currency risk associated with the
movements in the US dollar.
4.1 Introduction
For many years gold as a tradable ¯nancial asset has had a reputation as a safe
haven from market turbulence. Market reports often refer to gold as a safe-
haven asset. But very few academic studies have addressed the role of gold as
a safe-haven asset and even fewer have examined gold's safe-haven status with
respect, speci¯cally, to currency movements. Further, to date, the work that has
addressed this issue su®ers from shortcomings that o®er scope for improvement.
This paper examines gold's ability to act as a ¯nancial safe haven and improves
on other work by addressing correlation rather than dependence, allowing for
system feedback and by focusing on the link between changes in the price of gold
94and the US dollar. Speci¯cally, this paper asks, Does gold act as a safe haven
against the US dollar, as a hedge, or neither? Movements in the price of gold and
the US dollar are analysed using a model of dynamic conditional correlations
covering 23 years of weekly data for 16 major US dollar-paired exchange rates.
Studies relevant to this paper are few. Perhaps most relevant is the work
of Capie et al. (2005) which assesses the role of gold as a hedge against the
US dollar by estimating elasticities for a model of the responsiveness of gold
to changes in the exchange rate. Capie et al. (2005) ¯nd that gold has in the
past acted as an e®ective hedge. But their approach takes the form of a single-
equation model in which the independent variable, the exchange rate, is assumed
to be una®ected by the time path of the dependent variable, the price of gold.
That is, the authors assume no feedback.1 Improving over the work of Capie
et al. (2005), this paper focuses on correlation, employing a dynamic model of
conditional correlations in which all variables are treated symmetrically.2
Baur and Lucey (2006) address the speci¯c question of gold's role as a safe-
haven asset. They ¯nd evidence in support of gold providing a haven from
losses incurred in the bond and stock markets. However, their approach includes
generated regressors, neglects interactions with the currency market and, like
Capie et al. (2005), permits no explicit role for feedback in its model of returns.
The work of Baur and McDermott (2010), similarly, neglects feedback in its
principal regression model even after allowing for it in a number of constructed
parameters.3
A handful of studies investigate the ¯nancial concept of a safe-haven as-
set without reference to gold. Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010) and Kaul and
Sapp (2006) examine safe-haven currencies while Upper (2000) examines Ger-
man government bonds as safe-haven investments. Other studies look at the
wider ¯nancial properties of gold without focusing on its role as a safe haven.4
None of these examine gold's ability to act as a safe haven with respect to the
US dollar.
In addressing the question of gold's use as a safe haven from currency risk,
it is instructive to ask, is currency risk large enough, in general, to elicit the
1Chen and Rogo® (2003), Clements and Fry (2008) and Swift (2004) among others highlight
the importance of allowing for feedback and co-determination in the analysis of currency and
commodity markets.
2In modelling exchange rates and the price of gold simultaneously this study adopts, im-
plicitly, the idea that exchange rates can be considered as asset prices (Engel and West, 2005)
and, therefore, directly comparable with prices for commodities such as gold. Indeed, there is
a large literature studying the link between exchange rates and commodities|see for instance
Chen and Rogo® (2003)|and this chapter draws directly from that literature.
3Baur and McDermott (2010) and Baur and Lucey (2006) also construct GARCH models
that include dummy variables, causing standard inference on their estimated coe±cients to
be potentially invalid (Doornik and Ooms, 2003).
4See for instance Cheung and Lai (1993), Faugere and Erlach (2004), Sherman (1982),
Sjaastad (2008) and Worthington and Pahlavani (2007).
95pursuit of safe-haven assets? Existing research suggests that it is. Santis and
Gerard (1998), for instance, show that currency risk is economically signi¯cant
and represents a large fraction of the total risk faced when investing overseas.
Andersen et al. (2007) show that exchange-rate volatility outstrips bond-market
volatility in their sample of futures prices for US, British and German markets
while Hau and Rey (2006) ¯nd that the ratio of exchange-rate volatility to equity
return volatility is close, but less than one, in line with their equilibrium model
of exchange rates, stock prices and capital °ows.
There are of course various ways to hedge against currency risk. Hedging
mechanisms can be ¯nancial or operational.5 Given the options available, why
might gold be used as a hedge or safe haven? The reasons are many. Gold, as a
¯nancial asset, is liquid, available, priced in US dollars and can be traded on a
futures market. Further, while gold as a hedge cannot be designed for purpose in
the same way as foreign-exchange derivatives, even bespoke hedging techniques
are less than perfect in their e®ectiveness (Hu®man and Makar, 2004). Gold,
as a natural hedge or haven, may be useful if e®ective. It is the e®ectiveness of
gold as a hedge and safe haven that this paper aims to examine.
Any discussion of investment safe havens and hedges requires clear de¯ni-
tions. What, exactly, is a haven? What is a hedge? This study adopts the
de¯nitional approach of Baur and Lucey (2006) and Kaul and Sapp (2006): If
an investor holds a given asset, °, then a haven is de¯ned as any other asset that
does not co-move with ° in times of stress. That is, a haven is uncorrelated or
correlated negatively with ° if ° experiences sharp changes in value. A hedge,
meanwhile, is an asset that is uncorrelated or correlated negatively with ° not
just in times of stress, but on average. The de¯nitional di®erence between a
hedge and a haven is subtle but important: an asset that functions as a haven
is uncorrelated or correlated negatively with ° in times of stress only, and not
necessarily on average.
The contribution of this study to the existing literature is two-fold. First,
this study assesses the role of gold as both a hedge and a safe haven with
respect to the US dollar. While other work has investigated the role of gold
as a hedge and a haven for bonds and equities, no study has tackled the same
subject with a speci¯c focus on exchange rates.6 Second, using the correlation
modelling techniques of Engle (2002), this study o®ers an empirical analysis of
a 17-variable system of returns, considering a larger number of currencies than
Capie et al. (2005).
This study's key ¯ndings are as follows. (i) During the past 23 years gold
5See Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Allayannis et al. (2001), Elliot et al. (2003) and Habib
and Joy (2010).
6For a discussion of gold's relationship with bonds and equities see Baur and Lucey (2006).
96has behaved as a hedge against the US dollar|that is, gold-price returns have,
on average, been correlated negatively with US dollar returns. (ii) There is no
evidence to suggest that gold has acted as a consistent and e®ective safe haven.
(iii) In recent years gold has become an increasingly e®ective hedge against the
US dollar, with conditional correlations more negative now than they have been
at any point during the past two and a half decades.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents some
background discussion of correlation models. Section 4.3 gives an empirical
outline of models of constant conditional correlations and dynamic conditional
correlations. Section 4.4 discusses the dataset, Section 4.5 presents results of
the empirical analysis, and ¯nally, Section 4.6 o®ers some conclusions.
4.2 Why Correlation Models?
Correlation models have many important ¯nancial applications. Accurate esti-
mates of the correlations of asset returns and, in turn, their volatilities (second
moments), are required for asset pricing, hedging, capital allocation and risk
management.7
Correlation features heavily in the models of risk and return ¯rst introduced
by Markowitz (1952) and now used widely in ¯nancial markets. Both the Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory use correlation as a
measure of dependence between di®erent assets in order to estimate an optimal
portfolio. However, the estimation and forecasting of correlation is not always
straightforward. It is complicated by a number of factors.
First, correlation between asset returns is not directly observable: daily
correlation today is not observable because there is only one observation in a
trading day. The conventional approach is to estimate the correlation matrix
using realised data on daily asset returns (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). More
recent techniques use higher frequency data to estimate realised correlations
(Andersen et al., 2001). Second, for many years correlations in ¯nance were
assumed to be constant and were modelled as such. But during the past 20
years studies have shown that correlations are time-varying.8 Further, they
often increase during periods of high volatility and market stress.9 Third, as the
number of assets increases, so the estimation of the correlation matrix becomes
increasingly di±cult|the curse of dimensionality becomes a major obstacle.
7For a recent discussion of asset pricing and capital allocation, see Cochrane (2005). See
Tsay (2005) for an introduction to correlation models in risk management. For the use of
correlation models in the estimation of hedge ratios, see, for instance, Bos and Gould (2007)
and Lien et al. (2002).
8For empirical evidence see, for instance, Furstenberg and Jeon (1989) and Koch and Koch
(1991).
9See, among others, Ang and Chen (2002) and Ramchand and Susmel (1998).
97Given these di±culties, the modelling of correlations has branched into a
number of competing ¯elds of research, all drawing on the seminal research into
¯nancial volatility undertaken by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). Alterna-
tive approaches include stochastic volatility models, implied volatility models
(with information extracted from options prices), and models that accommodate
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH e®ects).10 In
recent years multivariate GARCH models have been developed that allow for
time-varying correlations (Engle, 2002; Lien et al., 2002). In these approaches,
conditional variances are modelled as univariate GARCH processes|that is,
past innovations and variances of one variable are precluded from a®ecting the
conditional variances of other variables. This is a limitation. But in their favour,
these models cope well with the curse of dimensionality and can be augmented
to accommodate a variety of empirical dynamic phenomena.11
In this study a model of dynamic conditional correlations is used to examine
gold-price returns and exchange-rate returns. The next section, Section 4.3,
o®ers an econometric description of the model. It describes the dynamic model
and outlines its origins in the model of constant conditional correlations ¯rst
proposed by Bollerslev (1990).
4.3 Empirical Methodology
Correlation models attract as much attention from ¯nancial-market practition-
ers as they do from academics. Models vary from the simple (eg, rolling histor-
ical correlations) to the complex (based on varieties of stochastic volatility or
on models of multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedas-
ticity, known as GARCH models). Correlation models have been popularised
by, among others, Bollerslev (1990), Kroner and Claessens (1991), Engle et al.
(1990) and Ding and Engle (2001).
At the root of every correlation model is a structure of conditional corre-
lations. The conditional correlations between two random variables, r1 and r2
(here, for example, exchange-rate returns), both of which have a mean of zero,
are de¯ned as
½r1r2;t =
Et¡1(r1tr2t)
p
Et¡1(r2
1t)Et¡1(r2
2t)
(4.1)
All conditional correlations, ½r1r2;t, lie in the interval [¡1;+1] and are based on
information from the previous period (t¡1). One important point to note is the
nature of the link between conditional correlations and conditional covariances.
10See Campbell et al. (1997).
11For asymmetric dynamics see Cappiello et al. (2006), for smooth transition dynamics see
Silvennoinen and Tersvirta (2009).
98To see this link, ¯rst express each returns series, ri, as the product of the
conditional standard deviation (
p
hit) and the standardised error term (²it),
such that
rit =
p
hit²it hit = Et¡1(r2
it) i = 1;2 (4.2)
where ² is a standardised error term that has mean zero and variance one for
each series. Substituting Eqn.(4.2) into Eqn.(4.1) gives
½r1r2;t =
Et¡1(²1t²2t)
p
Et¡1(²2
1t)Et¡1(²2
2t)
= Et¡1(²1t²2t) (4.3)
From Eqn.(4.3) it can be seen that the conditional correlation, ½r1r2;t, is equal to
the conditional covariance between the standardised error terms, Et¡1(²1t²2t).
As will be discussed later, there are many alternative approaches to estimat-
ing correlation models for multivariate systems, but one of the most popular
approaches, and the one pursued here, is to assume that the variables under
analysis exhibit GARCH e®ects.
GARCH models, despite being introduced more than two decades ago by
Bollerslev (1986) as an extension to the ARCH model of Engle (1982), continue
to provide an important research tool for modelling the dynamics of asset prices
and, in particular, the phenomenon of volatility clustering.12 GARCH models
draw on the idea that the volatility clustering of asset prices can be captured
by allowing the variance of ²t, the error term, to depend upon its history. In
particular, Engle (1982) proposes that the variance of the error term at time t
depends upon the squared error terms from the previous period. Since many
¯nancial variables, not least exchange rates, are interrelated and a®ected by the
same market information, it makes sense to extend univariate GARCH models to
their multivariate equivalents in order to capture common dynamics. However,
extending a univariate GARCH system to its multivariate counterpart within
a correlation model is not easy. The number of parameters to be estimated
is large, and the construction of the conditional variance-covariance matrix is
complicated (Engle and Kroner, 1995).
In an e®ort to side-step these di±culties in the pursuit of a well-speci¯ed
correlation model, Bollerslev (1990) introduces a bivariate GARCH system that
assumes all conditional correlations are constant. An overview of this model
of constant correlations is presented in the next section, Section 4.3.1. Sec-
tion 4.3.2, meanwhile, presents a model in which the conditional correlations
are not constant, but dynamic.
12Bauwens et al. (2006) provide a good recent survey of the application of GARCH models.
994.3.1 Constant conditional correlations
This section o®ers an overview of a multivariate GARCH model of correla-
tions proposed by Bollerslev (1990) wherein conditional correlations between
the variables of interest are constant over time. By presenting this model, and
highlighting its drawbacks, the intention is to provide a good starting point for
the discussion of a multivariate GARCH model of conditional correlations that
are not constant over time, but are time-varying.
Bollerslev (1990) measures the closeness of association between movements in
exchange rates by constructing a multivariate time-series model that allows for
time-varying conditional variances and covariances but permits only constant,
not time-varying, conditional correlations.13 Constant conditional correlations
do, of course, imply that all conditional correlations between variables are ¯xed
over time. This is a restrictive assumption. Nonetheless, a brief discussion, here,
of the constant conditional correlation model will act as a useful introduction
to the dynamic conditional correlation model presented in Section 4.3.2.14
The constant conditional correlation model, in its construction as a tool to
analyse exchange rates, builds on the observation that the short-run dynamics
of exchange rates are contaminated with heteroscedasticity.15 Therefore, any
model that seeks to measure the closeness of association between the movements
of a number of exchange rates should, argues Bollerslev (1990), take the form
of a multivariate time-series model allowing for heteroscedasticity.
To set up the constant conditional correlation model, let rt denote a N £ 1
times series vector (where rt represents, for instance, a series of exchange-rate
returns), with time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht such that
rt = E(rtjÃt¡1) + ²t (4.4)
where Ãt¡1 is the measurable space generated by all the available information up
to and including time t ¡ 1. Meanwhile, the time-varying conditional variance-
covariance matrix can be de¯ned as
Ht = V ar(²tjÃt¡1) (4.5)
where Ht is positive de¯nite for all t (that is, the characteristic roots of H are
positive for all t). Together, Eqn.(4.4) and Eqn.(4.5) form a model of general
heteroscedasticity, allowing for both conditional and unconditional heteroscedas-
13That is, the variance and covariances of the current error term are time-varying functions
of the previous period's error terms, whereas the current-period correlations are constant
functions of the previous period's error terms.
14Bollerslev (1990) states that the constant conditional correlation model can be interpreted
as an extension of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model that allows for heteroscedasticity.
15See for instance Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Bollerslev and Ghysels (1996).
100ticity (a model of generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, or
GARCH model).
Next, let hijt denote the ijth element in Ht, corresponding, in the case
of Bollerslev (1990), to currency i and currency j. Also let rit denote the
ith element in rt and let ²it denote the ith element in ²t, the error vector.
Then, recalling that a correlation coe±cient is given by the covariance of the
two random variables standardised by the two standard deviations (½xy =
cov(X;Y )=
p
var(X)var(Y )), it can be seen that a scale-invariant measure of
the degree of co-movement between rit and rjt evaluated at time t ¡ 1 is given
by the conditional correlation
½ijt =
hijt p
hiithjjt
(4.6)
where the correlation coe±cient ½ijt is between ¡1 and +1 for all t and is not
a®ected by the scaling of the variables.
This measure ½ijt of co-movement will vary through time because Ht varies
through time. However, Bollerslev (1990) notes that ½ijt will be constant over
time (½ijt = ½ij) if the time-varying conditional covariances hijt are proportional
to the square root of the product of the corresponding two conditional variances
such that
hijt = ½ij
p
hiithjjt j = 1;:::;N; i = j + 1;:::;N: (4.7)
Whether or not Eqn.(4.7) holds true is an empirical matter (as it would be
for any other parameterisation of the conditional heteroscedasticity). Bollerslev
(1990) suggests that Eqn.(4.7) provides an adequate characterisation of the co-
movement of many ¯nancial series|while other studies, for instance those by
Longin and Solnik (1995) and Boyer et al. (1997), suggest that this model does
not hold well for all ¯nancial data.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the constant conditional correlation
model is its tractability when it comes to estimation and inference. To illustrate
this tractability it is useful to re-express the conditional variances, hiit, as
hiit ´ !i¾2
it i = 1;:::;N (4.8)
where !i is a positive, time-invariant scalar and where ¾2
it is greater than zero
for all t. Note that the decomposition in Eqn.(4.8) is only unique up to scale.
Given Eqn.(4.7) and Eqn.(4.8), the full conditional variance-covariance matrix,
Ht, may be partitioned as
Ht = Dt¡Dt (4.9)
101where Dt denotes the N£N stochastic diagonal matrix with elements ¾1t;:::;¾Nt
and where ¡ is an N £N time-invariant matrix with typical element ½ij
p!i!j.
That is, ¡ is a correlation matrix containing the conditional correlations. As
such,
¡ =
0
B
B B
B
@
½11!1 ½12
p
!1!2 ¢¢¢ ½1N
p
!1!N
½21
p
!2!1 ½22!2 ¢¢¢ ½2N
p
!2!N
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
½N1
p
!N!1 ½N2
p
!N!2 ¢¢¢ ½NN!N
1
C
C C
C
A
(4.10)
Dt =
0
B
B B
B
@
¾1t 0 ¢¢¢ 0
0 ¾2t ¢¢¢ 0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
0 0 ¢¢¢ ¾Nt
1
C
C C
C
A
(4.11)
with it following that Ht will be positive de¯nite for all t if and only if each of the
N conditional variances (hiit ´ !i¾2
it) are well de¯ned and ¡ is positive de¯nite
(that is, if ¡ is positive de¯nite then so too will be Ht because Dt is nothing
more than a time-varying scaling matrix). These conditions, argues Bollerslev
(1990), are easy to impose and verify compared with the conditions implied
by other parameterisations of the time-varying conditional variance-covariance
matrix Ht.16
Estimation: constant conditional correlations
Maximum-likelihood estimation of the constant conditional correlations model
requires the assumption of conditional normality (that is, requires the assump-
tion that, conditional on information up to and including period t¡1, the error
term ²t is distributed normally with mean zero and variance Ht). Recall, next,
that the log-likelihood function for the simple linear regression model can be
stated as
logL(µ) = ¡
N
2
log(2¼¾2) ¡
1
2
N X
i=1
²2
i
¾2 (4.12)
where µ is a K-dimensional vector of unknown parameters. Assuming con-
ditional normality, the log-likelihood function for the general heteroscedastic
model represented by Eqn.(4.4) and Eqn.(4.5) can be expressed as
logL(µ) = ¡
TN
2
log(2¼) ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
logjHtj ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
²0
tH
¡1
t ²t (4.13)
16See Baba et al. (1989) for an overview of similar conditions in the context of a multivariate
linear GARCH(p;q) model.
102where µ denotes all the unknown parameters in ²t and Ht.
Bollerslev (1990) states that under standard regularity conditions, the max-
imum likelihood estimate for µ is asymptotically normal and it is possible to
employ traditional inference procedures. However, evaluation of the likelihood
function in Eqn.(4.13) requires the inversion of one N £N matrix for each time
period t (that is, for evaluation it is necessary to ¯nd H
¡1
t ). As a result, the
maximisation of L(µ) by iterative methods can be costly, in terms of computa-
tional e®ort, even when T and N are not large. Computational e®ort is reduced
dramatically, however, by the assumption in Eqn.(4.7) that the time-varying
conditional covariances are proportional to the square root of the corresponding
two conditional variances.
Substituting Eqn.(4.9) into Eqn.(4.13), gives the amended log-likelihood
function
logL(µ) = ¡
TN
2
log(2¼) ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
logjDt¡Dtj ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
²0
t(Dt¡Dt)¡1²t (4.14)
= ¡
TN
2
log(2¼) ¡
T
2
logj¡j ¡
T X
t=1
logjDtj ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
~ ²0
t¡¡1~ ²t (4.15)
where ~ ²t = D
¡1
t ²t denotes the N £1 vector of standardised residuals. Bollerslev
(1990) notes that, apart from the term ¡
PT
t=1 logjDtj, a Jacobian term that
arises as a result of the transformation from ²t to ~ ²t, the likelihood function
in Eqn.(4.15) is easier to evaluate, requiring only one inversion of an N £ N
matrix.17 Eqn.(4.13) requires T inversions.
The log-likelihood function in Eqn.(4.15) is not linear in the parameters. As a
result, algebraic maximisation is infeasible and, instead, it is necessary to adopt
a numerical search technique.18. This increases the complexity of the approach
but even so, it is still much easier to evaluate Eqn.(4.15) than Eqn.(4.13).19
In the same manner as for seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), consistent
estimates of the variances and covariances (that is, of ¡), conditional on ~ ²t (t =
1,...,T) is given by ¡'s sample analogue, ^ ¡ = T¡1 P
t ~ ²t~ ²0
t, which is nonsingular
by construction and hence positive de¯nite. Drawing on the fact that maximum
likelihood estimators are invariant under strict monotone transformations (here,
the transformation is from ²t to ~ ²t), then the maximum likelihood estimate of
17Here, ¡
PT
t=1 logjDtj is a Jacobian term in the sense that it is a multivariate adjustment
factor arising from the transformation from ²t to ~ ²t (Wilks, 1962).
18A numerical search technique would be necessary, also, for maximisation of the general
heteroscedastic model in Eqn.(4.13)
19Note also that logjDtj, the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the determinant of
Dt, is simply the sum of log¾1t,...,log¾Nt.
103each of the conditional correlations will be given by
^ ½ijt =
P
t ~ ²it~ ²jt qP
t ~ ²2
it
P
t ~ ²2
jt
(4.16)
Meanwhile, the parameters in ¡ (note that ¡ contains 1=2N(N + 1) parame-
ters) can be concentrated out of the likelihood function.20 From Eqn.(4.15),
concentrating out gives,
logL(µ) = ¡
TN
2
log2¼ ¡
T X
t=1
logjDtj ¡
T
2
log
¯
¯
¯ ¯
1
T
X
t
~ ²t~ ²0
t
¯
¯
¯ ¯
¡
1
2
T X
t=1
~ ²0
t
µ
1
T
X
t
~ ²t~ ²0
t
¶¡1
~ ²t
= ¡
TN
2
log2¼ ¡
T X
t=1
logjDtj ¡
T
2
logT ¡
T
2
log
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
X
t
~ ²t~ ²0
t
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¡
TN
2
T X
t=1
~ ²0
t
µX
t
~ ²t~ ²0
t
¶¡1
~ ²t
= ¡
TN
2
(1 + log2¼ ¡ logT) ¡
T X
t=1
logjDtj ¡
T
2
log
¯ ¯
¯
¯
X
t=1
~ ²t~ ²0
t
¯ ¯
¯
¯
(4.17)
Despite the simpli¯ed nature of Eqn.(4.17), it must be noted that the infor-
mation matrix (that is, the variance of the score vector, which is calculated
by multiplying the Hessian of the log-likelihood function by ¡1) between the
parameters in Dt and ¡ is not block diagonal. As a result, in order to obtain
an estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix (the inverse of the in-
formation matrix) by standard maximum-likelihood techniques, we require the
derivatives of the full likelihood function in Eqn.(4.15). The maximisation of the
log-likelihood function requires iterative methods. Bollerslev (1990) employs the
algorithm proposed by Berndt et al. (1974) together with numerical ¯rst-order
derivatives to approximate ±logL(µ)=±µ.
In summary, the constant conditional correlation model is a bivariate gen-
eralised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model whereby
univariate GARCH processes are estimated for each variable. The correlation
matrix is then estimated using the standard, closed form, maximum likelihood
correlation estimator (by transforming the residuals using their estimated con-
ditional standard deviations).21 It is the assumption of constant correlations
20By concentrated out, we mean that ¡ can be expressed as a function of other parameters
in the likelihood function.
21Estimation of a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model
104that makes possible the estimation of large models. This assumption also en-
sures that the estimator is positive de¯nite, with the only requirements being
that each univariate conditional variance is not zero and that the correlation
matrix is of full rank.
Bollerslev (1990), studying the movements of the German mark, the French
franc, the Italian lira, the Swiss franc and the British pound between 1973 and
1985, claims that the assumption of constant conditional correlations is valid.
However, others disagree. Tsui and Yu (1999), for instance, ¯nd that there is
no constancy of conditional correlations for share prices in two major Chinese
stock markets.
Empirical rejection of the model of constant conditional correlations is allied
with a number of technical objections, the most prominent of which is the fact
that the constant correlation estimator, as proposed by Bollerslev (1990), does
not yield consistent standard errors. As an alternative to the constant condi-
tional correlation model, Engle (2002) proposes a model of dynamic conditional
correlations.
The dynamic model of Engle (2002) is set within a framework that preserves
the advantages of the Bollerslev (1990) model (preserves the empirical bene¯t
of estimating fewer parameters than those necessary in rival models such as the
BEKK formulation of Engle and Kroner (1995)) and yet is able to incorporate
non-constant (ie, dynamic) correlations. Section 4.3.2 outlines in detail the
model of dynamic conditional correlations and discusses its estimation.
4.3.2 Dynamic conditional correlations
This section introduces a multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional
correlations ¯rst proposed by Engle (2002), which itself builds upon the constant-
conditional-correlation model presented in Section 4.3.1. The advantage of the
dynamic conditional correlation model (also known as the DCC-GARCH model)
is that it o®ers a tractable way of modelling, simultaneously, both time-varying
conditional volatilities and time-varying conditional correlations.
The DCC-GARCH model can be best understood by recalling, ¯rstly, that
the conditional correlation between two random variables r1 and r2 (where r1
and r2 represent, here, asset-price returns), each with mean zero, can be de¯ned
as
½r1r2;t =
Et¡1(r1tr2t)
p
Et¡1(r2
1t)Et¡1(r2
2t)
(4.18)
is frequently carried out using numerical optimisation and quasi maximum-likelihood tech-
niques because closed-form estimates of the parameters are often not available. With nu-
merical optimisation, the resulting estimator depends on the implementation, with di®erent
optimisation techniques leading to potentially di®erent estimators. A closed-form estimator
is, therefore, preferable.
105The relation between the conditional correlations, ½rirjt, and the conditional
variances, hit, can be clari¯ed by expressing each returns series, rit, as the
product of the conditional standard deviation,
p
hit, and the standardised error
term, ²it, such that
rit =
p
hit²it hit = Et¡1(r2
it) i = 1;2 (4.19)
where ² is a standardised error term that has mean zero and variance one for
each series. Substituting Eqn.(4.19) into Eqn.(4.18) gives
½r1r2;t =
Et¡1(²1t²2t)
p
Et¡1(²2
1t)Et¡1(²2
2t)
= Et¡1(²1t²2t) (4.20)
From Eqn.(4.20) it can be seen that the conditional correlation, ½r1r2;t, is equal
to the conditional covariance between the standardised error terms, Et¡1(²1t²2t).
De¯ning the conditional variance-covariance matrix of returns as
Ht ´ Et¡1(rtr0
t) (4.21)
allows us, next, to highlight the key features of the DCC-GARCH model.
Dynamic conditional correlation estimators have a number of identifying
characteristics. First, and most obviously, they are designed to capture con-
ditional correlations that are time-varying in nature, and speci¯cally, designed
to capture GARCH-like, time-varying correlations. Second, like constant condi-
tional correlation estimators|and unlike other multivariate GARCH approaches
such as the parameter-restricted model proposed by Bollerslev et al. (1988)|
they can handle systems involving a large number of parameters. This is be-
cause the number of parameters to be estimated in the correlation process is
independent of the number of series to be correlated. Third, dynamic condi-
tional correlation models retain the °exibility of univariate GARCH models in
that univariate GARCH models are estimated for each variable and then, us-
ing standardised residuals from this ¯rst phase of univariate estimates, a time-
varying correlation matrix is estimated. As a result, this two-stage estimation
process preserves the simple logic of interpretation associated with univariate
GARCH models.
In the multivariate GARCH model of constant conditional correlations de-
scribed in Section 4.3.1, the conditional variance-covariance matrix of returns,
Ht, can be partitioned as
Ht = Dt¡Dt (4.22)
where Dt = diagf
p
htg and where ¡ is a correlation matrix containing the con-
ditional correlations. That ¡ contains the conditional correlations can be seen
106directly from noting that ²t = D
¡1
t rt, which allows us to re-express Eqn.(4.22)
as
¡ = D
¡1
t HtD
¡1
t
= Et¡1("t"0
t)
(4.23)
Eqn.(4.23) tells us that the conditional covariance between the standardised
residuals, Et¡1("t"0
t), is equal to the matrix of conditional correlations, ¡.
In the model of dynamic conditional correlations, as in the model of constant
conditional correlations, the elements of Dt are modelled as univariate GARCH
processes. That is, all time-varying conditional volatilities are assumed to be
represented adequately well by GARCH processes such that
hit = !i +
Pi X
p=1
®ipr2
i(t¡p) +
Qi X
q=1
¯iqhi(t¡q) (4.24)
for i = 1;2;:::;k with the usual GARCH restrictions for non-negativity of
variances and stationarity.22 Lag lengths for P and Q need not be the same.
In this way, with all time-varying conditional volatilities modelled as GARCH
processes, Dt becomes a time-varying diagonal matrix of standard deviations
from univariate GARCH models.
While in Eqn.(4.22) the conditional correlations are assumed to be constant,
Engle (2002) proposes the DCC-GARCH model in which correlations are dy-
namic. That is,
Ht = Dt¡tDt (4.25)
where ¡t is, as before, the correlation matrix, but where this correlation matrix
is now allowed to vary over time. The conditional variances of ¡t must be equal
to one. Other than this, requirements for the parameterisation of ¡t are the
same as for Ht.
Typical elements of ¡t will be of the form
½ijt =
qijt
pqiitqjjt
(4.26)
with the aim being to de¯ne qijt in such a way as to provide a dynamic cor-
relation structure (provide a parameterisation of ¡t) that is both useful and
tractable.
Engle (2002) notes that perhaps the simplest parameterisation of ¡t is the
22For stationarity,
PPi
p=1 ®ip +
PQi
q=1 ¯iq < 1.
107exponential smoother, whereby ½ijt is a geometrically weighted average of the
standardised residuals. Specifying the correlation matrix in the form of an
exponential smoother gives,
½ijt =
Pt¡1
s=1 ¸s²i(t¡s)²j(t¡s) q
(
Pt¡1
s=1 ¸s²2
i(t¡s))(
Pt¡1
s=1 ¸s²2
j(t¡s))
= (¡t)ij (4.27)
or similarly,
qijt = (1 ¡ ¸)(²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1)) + ¸(qij(t¡1)) (4.28)
where ½ijt =
qijt pqiitqjjt. While the exponential smoother o®ers simplicity, there
are of course other available speci¯cations. Engle (2002) suggests one natural
option is to relax the parameter restriction of ¸ in Eqn.(4.28) and allow qijt to
follow a GARCH(1,1) model, such that
qijt = ¹ ½ij + ®(²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1) ¡ ¹ ½ij) + ¯(qij(t¡1) ¡ ¹ ½ij) (4.29)
where ¹ ½ij is the unconditional correlation between ²it and ²jt. Rearranging and
substituting lags of Eqn.(4.29) recursively into itself, gives
qijt = ¹ ½ij + ®(²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1) ¡ ¹ ½ij) + ¯(qij(t¡1) ¡ ¹ ½ij)
= ¹ ½ij(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯) + ®(²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1)) + ¯qij(t¡1)
= ¹ ½ij(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)(1 + ¯ + ¯2 + :::) + ®
1 X
s=1
¯s¡1²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1) + ¯1qij(t¡1)
= ¹ ½ij
1 ¡ (® + ¯)
1 ¡ ¯
+ ®
1 X
s=1
¯s¡1²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1)
(4.30)
Eqn.(4.30) captures the main features of the model of dynamic conditional cor-
relations (the DCC-GARCH model) proposed by Engle (2002). The mean of
qijt will be ¹ ½ij. That is, ¹ qit » = ¹ ½ij. The mean variance will equal one. Mean-
while, the correlation estimator, ½ijt =
qijt pqiitqjjt, will be positive de¯nite be-
cause the variance-covariance matrix Qt ´ fqijtg is a weighted average of a
positive-de¯nite matrix, "t¡1"0
t¡1, and a positive semi-de¯nite matrix, Qt¡1.
The unconditional expectation of qijt is ¹ ½ij, while both qiit and qjjt each have
an expected value of one (mean variance is one). The model in Eqn.(4.30) will
be mean-reverting so long as ® + ¯ < 1.23
A more °exible representation of the DCC-GARCH model in Eqn.(4.30),
23When ®+¯ = 1, Eqn.(4.30) reduces to a correlation process characterised by exponential
smoothing, such that, qijt = (1 ¡ ¸)(²i(t¡1)²j(t¡1)) + ¸(qij(t¡1)).
108allowing for a GARCH(m;n) process in the dynamics of qijt, can be given by,
Qt = ¹ Q(1 ¡
M X
m=1
®m ¡
N X
n=1
¯n) +
M X
m=1
®m(²t¡m²0
t¡m) +
N X
n=1
¯nQt¡n
¡t = diagfQtg¡1QtdiagfQtg¡1
(4.31)
where Qt ´ fqijtg is the conditional variance-covariance matrix of residuals,
where ¹ Q is the time-invariant (unconditional) variance-covariance matrix found
by estimating Eqn.(4.24) in what is the ¯rst stage of the estimation process.
Meanwhile, diagfQtg is a diagonal matrix composed of the square root of the
diagonal elements of Qt such that
diagfQtg =
0
B
B B
B
@
p
q11 0 ¢¢¢ 0
0
p
q22 ¢¢¢ 0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
0 0 ¢¢¢
p
qkk
1
C
C C
C
A
(4.32)
implying that, as before, a typical element of ¡t will take the form ½ijt =
qijt=pqiitqjjt. Eqn.(4.31) tells us that Qt can be thought of as an autoregressive,
moving-average process capturing deviations in the correlations around their
unconditional values ( ¹ Q).
For the purposes of this study, the focus of interest is ¡t, and in particular,
½1jt = q1jt=pq11tqjjt, which represents the conditional correlation between the
price of gold and each exchange-rate pair, j, in the dataset.
Estimation: dynamic conditional correlations
This section describes a two-stage estimation process proposed by Engle (2002)
to estimate the multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional correlations
outlined above.
In the ¯rst stage, univariate GARCH models are estimated for each returns
series. In the second stage, the ¯rst-stage residuals are taken and transformed
by their standard deviations in order to estimate the parameters of the dynamic
conditional correlation model.
The multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional correlations can be
109speci¯ed as,
rtjÃt¡1 » N(0;Ht)
Ht ´ Dt¡tDt
D2
t = diagf!ig + diagf·ig ­ rt¡1r0
t¡1 + diagf¸ig ­ D2
t¡1
²t = D
¡1
t rt
Qt = ¹ Q ­ (¶¶0 ¡ A ¡ B) + A ­ "t¡1"0
t¡1 + B ­ Dt¡1
¡t = diagfQtg¡1QtdiagfQtg¡1
(4.33)
The assumption of multivariate normality in rtjÃt¡1 » N(0;Ht) permits max-
imum likelihood estimation. Without the assumption of normality (that is,
when the returns have non-Gaussian innovations), the estimator described by
Eqn.(4.33) can be interpreted as a Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) estima-
tor, resulting in estimated parameters that are both consistent and asymptoti-
cally normal.
The returns, rt, can be either mean zero or the residuals from a ¯ltered
series. The standard errors of the model will not depend on the ¯ltering method
because, as Engle and Sheppard (2001) note, the cross partial derivative of
the log-likelihood with respect to the mean and the variance parameters has
expectation zero when using the normal likelihood.
The third relationship in Eqn.(4.33), describing the behaviour of D2
t, indi-
cates that each variable follows a univariate GARCH process, where !i, ·i and
¸i are the familiar non-negative coe±cients of a traditional GARCH speci¯ca-
tion. If each variable were to follow something other than a univariate GARCH
process, this would not alter the formulation of the rest of the statistical model
in Eqn.(4.33).
Estimation of this multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional cor-
relations can, as suggested above, be done in two stages. In the ¯rst stage,
univariate GARCH models are estimated for each returns series, rt. The second
stage involves a transformation of the ¯rst-stage residuals by their standard
deviations (where estimates of the standard deviations are drawn from the ¯rst-
stage results), such that "t = D
¡1
t rt, with the transformed residuals being used
to estimate the parameters of the dynamic conditional correlation model in Qt.
The log-likelihood function for the estimator in Eqn.(4.33), where rtjÃt¡1 »
110N(0;Ht), can be expressed as
logL(µ) = ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + logjHtj + r0
tH
¡1
t rt
¶
= ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + logjDt¡tDtj + r0
tD
¡1
t ¡
¡1
t D
¡1
t rt
¶
= ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + 2logjDtj + logj¡tj + "0
t¡
¡1
t "t
¶
= ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + 2logjDtj + r0
tD
¡1
t D
¡1
t rt ¡ "0
t"t + logj¡tj + "0
t¡
¡1
t "t
¶
(4.34)
which can be maximised over the parameters of the model, where µ is the vector
of unknown parameters.
On its own, the formulation in Eqn.(4.34) does not o®er much in terms of
computational e±ciency when it comes to estimating large variance-covariance
matrices (that is, when it comes to dealing with many variables). It is the
two-step estimation process that o®ers the computational gains.
To help outline the two-step process, let the parameters of the model, µ,
be separated into two groups, such that (Á1;Á2;:::;Án;») = (Á;»), where
Á represents the parameters in D (the stochastic diagonal matrix of condi-
tional standard deviations), and where » denotes the additional parameters
contained in ¡ (the correlation matrix). The elements of Ái correspond to
the parameters of the univariate GARCH model for the i
th asset, such that,
Ái = (!;·1i;:::;·pii;¸1i;:::;¸qii).
Engle (2002) shows that the log-likelihood can be expressed as the sum of a
volatility component and a correlation component, where
logL(Á;») = logLv(Á) + logLc(Á;») (4.35)
The volatility component of the log-likelihood, logLv(Á), contains the parame-
ters of D from Eqn.(4.34) and can be written as
logLv(Á) = ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + logjDtj2 + r0
tD
¡2
t rt
¶
(4.36)
The correlation component of the log-likelihood, logLc(Á;»), containing the
111additional parameters in ¡, can be expressed as
logLc(Á;») = ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
logj¡tj + "0
t¡
¡1
t "t ¡ "0
t"t
¶
(4.37)
Note that the volatility component of the log-likelihood is just the sum of the
individual log-likelihoods for the GARCH models for each of the i assets. That
is,
logLv(Á) = ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ + logjDtj2 + r0
tD
¡2
t rt
¶
= ¡
1
2
T X
t=1
µ
nlog2¼ +
n X
i=1
³
loghit +
r2
it
hit
´¶
= ¡
1
2
n X
i=1
µ
T log2¼ +
T X
t=1
³
loghit +
r2
it
hit
´¶
(4.38)
which is jointly maximised by maximising each term separately. Estimation of
Eqn.(4.38) represents the ¯rst step of the two-step estimation process.
The second component of the log-likelihood, the correlation component,
logLc(Á;»), is used to estimate the correlation parameters. The squared error
terms are not dependent on the correlation parameters and are not, therefore,
included in the ¯rst-order conditions. They can be ignored.
The two-step approach to maximising the log-likelihood in Eqn.(4.35) can
be summarized as follows. First, ¯nd estimates of the parameters in Dt, the
stochastic diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations, which maximise
the log-likelihood logLv(Á). That is, in the ¯rst step, ¯nd
^ Á = argmaxflogLv(Á)g (4.39)
and then take this value as given in the second step, which involves maximising
the log-likelihood of the correlation component, such that
max
»
flogLc(Á;»)g (4.40)
Engle (2002) explains that the maximum of the second step will be a function
of the ¯rst-step estimates of the parameters, and as such, if the ¯rst step is
consistent the second step will be consistent.
1124.4 Data
This section presents an overview of the data and some preliminary analysis
o®ering motivation for the empirical work undertaken in Section 4.5.
The dataset consists of the price of gold (US dollars per Troy ounce) and
16 US dollar exchange-rate pairings (expressed in terms of home currency per
US dollar). The frequency of the data is weekly. The sample period extends
from 10 January 1986 to 29 August 2008, comprising t = 1;182 observations per
variable. Exchange rates are from Datastream. Gold prices are from Bloomberg.
In constructing the dataset the intention is to include as many exchange-rate
pairings as possible. Exchange rates are excluded from the dataset only if data is
unavailable at the selected frequency or if the exchange rate is ¯xed against the
US dollar during the sample period. The 16 currencies included in the sample,
all expressed in terms of home currency per US dollar, are the euro, yen, Indian
rupee, Taiwan dollar, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish krone, Israeli
Shekel, Maltese lira, New Zealand dollar, Norwegian krone, Singapore dollar,
South African rand, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, and the UK pound.
Demeaned continuously compounded percentage returns of the exchange
rates are calculated by taking the weekly di®erence of the natural logarithm
of each exchange rate, subtracting the sample mean, then multiplying by 100.
Demeaned returns for gold is calculated in a similar fashion.
Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the returns for the price of gold
and for the 16 US dollar exchange rates included in the sample. Table 4.1
suggests that gold-price returns, like other commodity-price returns, are more
variable than exchange-rate returns, mirroring the standard ¯ndings of other
studies.24 Variance for the price of gold (2.8) is more than double the average
variance of the 16 nominal exchange rates in the sample (which have mean
variance of 1.3).
All series seem to exhibit two common features of ¯nancial time series: excess
kurtosis and volatility clustering. Indeed, Table 4.1 shows that in Jarque-Bera
tests of normality, the null hypothesis of normality can be rejected in all cases
for both exchange-rate returns and gold-price returns.
Financial time series, and in particular exchange rates, often exhibit little
correlation in the mean processes (the returns) but signi¯cant correlation in
the variance processes (the square of the returns). See for instance Baillie and
Bollerslev (1989b) and Diebold and Nerlove (1989). Under such conditions,
GARCH modelling is particularly appropriate. The next step here, then, is to
quantify the correlation present in the returns and the square of the returns.
This is done by employing the Ljung and Box (1978) portmanteau test for serial
24See for instance Clements and Fry (2008).
113Figure 4.1: Gold-price returns and exchange-rate returns
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Notes: Percentage demeaned nominal returns. Exchange rates expressed as home currency per
US dollar. Frequency is weekly. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian
rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU).
114Figure 4.2: Exchange-rate returns
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Notes: Percentage demeaned nominal commodity-price returns. Exchange rates expressed as home
currency per US dollar. Frequency is weekly. Abbreviations: Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish
krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian
krone (SNO).
115Figure 4.3: Exchange-rate returns
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Notes: Percentage demeaned nominal currency returns. Exchange rates expressed as home cur-
rency per US dollar. Frequency is weekly. Abbreviations: Singapore dollar (SSG), South African
rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
116Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. dev. 1.660 1.147 1.229 0.755 0.580 1.135
Variance 2.757 1.317 1.511 0.571 0.336 1.288
Jarque-Bera 1,184 190 628 101,813 32,552 178
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. dev. 0.672 1.167 1.154 1.164 1.205 1.182
Variance 0.452 1.363 1.332 1.355 1.451 1.397
Jarque-Bera 209 37 65,142 19,984 502 280
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. dev. 0.551 1.503 1.169 1.299 1.105
Variance 0.304 2.259 1.368 1.686 1.221
Jarque-Bera 2,899 1,284 375 17 1,056
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All returns are demeaned. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro
(SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Aus-
tralian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone (SDK), Israeli
Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian
krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South African rand (SSA), Swedish
krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
correlation. Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, the test statistic
is asymptotically chi-square distributed.
Testing for serial correlation in the square of the returns, Table 4.2 shows that
the Ljung and Box (1978) portmanteau test for up to twentieth-order correlation
breaches the relevant critical value (31.401) for the 95% fractile in the asymptotic
chi-square distribution for nearly all the currencies and the commodities in the
dataset. That is, the null of no serial correlation is, for nearly all of the series,
rejected.
Clearly, the returns here are not independent through time. Large returns
tend to be followed by large returns, and small returns tend to be followed
by small returns. Furthermore, positive returns are not necessarily followed
by positive returns, nor are negative returns necessarily followed by negative
returns: sign carries no predictability. These features are typical of the empir-
ical characteristics, ¯rst formalised by Mussa (1979), of many ¯nancial series,
and the model perhaps best able to capture this pattern of time dependence is
the ARCH(q) model developed by Engle (1982), or more parsimoniously, the
GARCH(p;q) model developed by Bollerslev (1986). Indeed, in the empirical
analysis that follows, all conditional variances are assumed to behave in a man-
ner consistent with GARCH(p;q) processes.
117Table 4.2: Ljung-Box-Pierce Q-Test for Serial Correlation
GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
Ljung-Box (Mean) 120.043 81.245 122.472 86.258 134.654 94.589
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ljung-Box (Variance) 204.314 106.438 154.668 133.749 77.560 61.482
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
Ljung-Box (Mean) 86.529 81.228 31.255 25.161 81.812 59.321
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.195 0.000 0.000
Ljung-Box (Variance) 503.304 149.507 57.006 129.643 108.678 80.187
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
Ljung-Box (Mean) 110.883 132.219 88.959 75.842 97.630
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ljung-Box (Variance) 739.293 450.492 344.206 65.062 235.119
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All returns are demeaned. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP),
Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar
(SCA), Danish krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar
(SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South African rand (SSA), Swedish
krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
4.5 Results
This section presents results from an empirical analysis of the association be-
tween exchange rates and the price of gold using a model of dynamic conditional
correlations.
First, for the purposes of completeness, Section 4.5.1 presents results from a
model in which the conditional correlations are constant. Section 4.5.2 presents
results from a model in which the conditional correlations are dynamic.
4.5.1 Results: Constant conditional correlations
This subsection presents results from a constant-correlations model of the com-
plete set of returns introduced in Section 4.4. Guided by the preliminary analysis
presented in Section 4.4, the following analysis adopts a model of conditional
correlations that is assumed to be characterised by conditional variances that
follow a GARCH(p;q) structure.
The GARCH(p;q) model speci¯es the conditional variance as a linear func-
tion of the past q squared residuals and the past p conditional variances. As
outlined in Section 4.3, in its general form the GARCH(p;q) model can be
118represented as
Vart(²it) = hiit
= !i +
q X
k=1
®ik²2
it¡k +
p X
l=1
¯ilhiit¡l
(4.41)
given the time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht = V ar(²tjÃt¡1),
where hijt denotes the ijth element in Ht, where Ãt¡1 is the measurable space
generated by all the available information up to and including time t ¡ 1, and
where ²t is the error vector.
Eqn. (4.41) shows that the GARCH model can be thought of as a univari-
ate, autoregressive, moving-average model of the conditional second moments,
²2
it¡k and hiit¡l. This model has been shown in past studies to be particularly
suitable for capturing the short-run movements of international exchange rates.
See for instance Baillie and Bollerslev (1989b), Diebold and Nerlove (1989),
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Engle and Bollerslev (1986). Furthermore,
of all GARCH(p;q) models available, a GARCH(1,1) model has been shown to
o®er a particularly useful and parsimonious description of short-run, currency
dynamics. Implicit in the GARCH(1,1) model is an assertion that the best pre-
dictor of the variance in the next period is a weighted average of the long-run
average variance (!i), the variance predicted for this period (hiit), and the new
information in this period that is captured by the most recent squared residual
(²2
it).
As a step in testing the suitability, here, of the GARCH(1,1) structure, Ta-
ble 4.3 displays estimates for univariate GARCH(1,1) models for the observed
data. The three coe±cients listed in Table 4.3 come from the variance equation,
Eqn. (4.41). They are the intercept, !i, the coe±cient on the ¯rst lag of the
squared return, ®i1, and the coe±cient on the ¯rst lag of the conditional vari-
ance, ¯i1. The coe±cients ®i1 and ¯i1 sum to less than one, which is required
in order to have a mean-reverting variance process. Where the sum is close to
one, the reversion process is slow.
With few exceptions nearly all the parameters in the time-varying condi-
tional variances are individually signi¯cant at the 5% level of signi¯cance and
in likelihood-ratio tests for the absence of conditional heteroscedasticity (that
is, in tests of ®i1 = ¯i1 = 0 for all i), the test statistic, which takes a chi-square
distribution under the null hypothesis, is at its minimum, 44.9, with a criti-
cal value of 6.0, leading us to reject, for all i, the premise that the data can
be modelled adequately with a homoscedastic, seemingly-unrelated-regression
119Table 4.3: Estimates for time-varying conditional variances
i GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
!i 0.031 0.035 0.093 0.004 0.062 0.026
(0.015) (0.017) (0.046) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
®i1 0.895 0.914 0.866 0.576 0.426 0.929
(0.020) (0.026) (0.051) (0.022) (0.058) (0.024)
¯i1 0.101 0.058 0.065 0.424 0.574 0.051
(0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.048) (0.146) (0.016)
i SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
!i 0.000 0.037 0.209 0.033 0.005 0.079
(0.001) (0.018) (0.049) (0.013) (0.004) (0.033)
®i1 0.858 0.911 0.457 0.913 0.950 0.853
(0.018) (0.026) (0.054) (0.020) (0.011) (0.041)
¯i1 0.142 0.061 0.543 0.068 0.048 0.089
(0.020) (0.017) (0.148) (0.019) (0.011) (0.025)
i SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
!i 0.008 0.018 0.032 0.026 0.021
(0.003) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011)
®i1 0.868 0.861 0.920 0.950 0.938
(0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020)
¯i1 0.106 0.139 0.055 0.033 0.041
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Abbreviations:
Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan
dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Dan-
ish krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand
dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South
African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound
(SGB).
model (SUR model). See Table 4.4.
By employing the GARCH(1,1) model, the aim is to capture all the dynamic
features of the mean and the variance. The estimated residuals should be serially
uncorrelated and should contain no remaining conditional volatility. To test
for this, the ¯rst step is to create a set of standardised residuals ^ sit (where
^ sit = ^ ²it=^ h
1=2
it ). The standardised residuals will have a mean of zero and a
variance of one.
If there is any serial correlation in the standardised residuals, ^ sit, then the
implication is that the model of the mean is not properly speci¯ed. Here the
model of the mean is speci¯ed as, rit = E(ritjÃt¡1) + ²it. To test the suit-
ability of this model, it is necessary to calculate Ljung-Box test statistics for
^ sit. Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that the various test statistics
are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and the model of the mean has been poorly
speci¯ed. Table 4.5 shows that in tests for serial correlation in the standard-
ised residuals, there is little evidence of serial correlation. Mostly the mean is
adequately speci¯ed.
If the GARCH(1,1) model speci¯ed in Eqn. (4.41) captures adequately the
variance characteristics of the data under analysis then the residuals of the
GARCH(1,1) model should be free of any remaining GARCH e®ects. This can
be tested by calculating Ljung-Box test statistics for the squared standardised
120Table 4.4: Likelihood ratio test for absence of conditional heteroscedasticity
GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
Likelihood 142.251 51.925 39.258 380.801 129.378 44.930
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
Likelihood 126.243 56.867 144.446 68.594 130.123 45.628
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
Likelihood 154.661 316.120 64.442 28.245 70.431
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Probability values are in parentheses. The likelihood-ratio test statis-
tic is asymptotically chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of restrictions imposed (here, two, where ®i1 = ¯i2 = 0). Abbreviations:
Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar
(STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone (SDK),
Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian
krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South African rand (SSA), Swedish krona
(SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
residuals, ^ s2
it. If ^ s2
it is a good estimate of v2
it = ²2
it=hit then ^ s2
it should have
the characteristics of a white-noise process. If there are no remaining GARCH
e®ects then it will not be possible to reject the null hypothesis that the sample
values of the test statistics are equal to zero. Indeed, the Ljung-Box statistics
reported in Table 4.5 indicate that for the overwhelming majority of the re-
turns series the GARCH(1,1) model adequately captures all relevant volatility
dynamics.
Although the GARCH(1,1) model appears to o®er an adequate descrip-
tion of the volatility dynamics, it is useful to consider longer lag lengths. Ta-
ble 4.6, shows estimates for GARCH(4,4) models while Table , Table and Table
present the estimation results from GARCH(12,12) models. The results for the
GARCH(4,4) models show that for nearly all of the univariate series the second
lags and subsequent lags are not signi¯cant|the e®ect of lagged shocks dies out
fairly rapidly. Results from the GARCH(12,12) models are similar. Long lags
do not capture any particularly valuable dynamics.
Given the univariate analysis above, it is assumed that the GARCH(1,1)
model o®ers an adequate representation of the conditional variances under anal-
ysis. That is, in the correlation model that follows, the conditional variances are
assumed to follow a GARCH(1,1) structure while the conditional correlations
between the returns are assumed to take constant, non-zero values as outlined
previously in Section 4.3.1.
Incorporating the GARCH(1,1) structure for conditional variances into a
model of constant conditional correlations using the notation of Eqn. (4.4),
121Table 4.5: Model adequacy: tests for serial correlation in the standardised resid-
uals and squared standardised residuals
GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
Ljung-Box (Std resids) 40.130 10.337 16.802 51.036 38.156 18.237
Probability 0.005 0.962 0.666 0.000 0.008 0.572
Ljung-Box (Std resids sqrd) 18.867 15.108 33.631 19.145 15.974 9.494
Probability 0.531 0.770 0.029 0.512 0.718 0.976
SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
Ljung-Box (Std resids) 16.454 11.365 13.764 19.723 23.400 11.300
Probability 0.688 0.936 0.842 0.475 0.270 0.938
Ljung-Box (Std resids sqrd) 14.397 21.068 0.943 20.378 22.882 14.564
Probability 0.810 0.393 1.000 0.434 0.295 0.801
SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
Ljung-Box (Std resids) 22.779 29.206 12.902 9.599 17.361
Probability 0.300 0.084 0.882 0.975 0.629
Ljung-Box (Std resids sqrd) 14.328 7.910 20.501 12.729 15.665
Probability 0.813 0.992 0.427 0.889 0.737
Notes: Table reports Ljung-Box lack-of-¯t hypothesis tests for model misspeci¯cation. Under
the null hypothesis that the model ¯t is adequate, the test statistic is asymptotically chi-square
distributed. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA),
Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone (SDK),
Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO),
Singapore dollar (SSG), South African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF),
UK pound (SGB). Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency per US dollars.
Eqn. (4.5), Eqn. (4.6) and Eqn. (4.7), gives
rit = E(ritjÃt¡1) + ²it
Vart(²it) = hiit
hiit = !i + ®i1²2
it¡1 + ¯i1hiit¡1
i;j = oil,euro;::: i 6= j
hijt = ½ij
p
hiithjjt
(4.42)
where, as before, rit de¯nes the returns, hiit de¯nes the conditional variances and
hijt de¯nes the conditional covariances. Estimation of this model is undertaken
by maximum likelihood in line with the discussion in Section 4.3.1.
Maximum likelihood estimates for the model in Eqn. (4.42) are presented in
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 under the assumption of conditional normality (that
is, under the assumption that, conditional on information up to and including
period t ¡ 1, the error term ²t is distributed normally with mean zero and
variance Ht).
Conditional normality is, of course, a strong assumption. Bollerslev (1990)
notes that the assumption of conditional normality, in the context of modelling
asset prices even after accounting for ARCH e®ects, does not make for a good
approximation when using daily data because of the tendency of daily data
122Table 4.6: GARCH(4,4) estimates for time-varying conditional variances
i GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
!i 0.136 0.113 0.412 0.048 0.104 0.119
(0.051) (0.054) (0.102) (0.009) (0.005) (0.069)
®i1 0.236 0.051 0.138 0.336 0.681 0.085
(0.054) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.079) (0.033)
®i2 0.006 0.026 0.066 0.175 0.014 0.000
(0.021) (0.013) (0.031) (0.052) (0.042) (0.023)
®i3 0.070 0.076 0.000 0.096 0.275 0.000
(0.029) (0.035) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
®i4 0.035 0.000 0.085 0.163 0.030 0.081
(0.067) (0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.020) (0.075)
¯i1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.043) (0.060) (0.021) (0.085) (0.064) (0.033)
¯i2 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.099
(0.029) (0.031) (0.010) (0.076) (0.032) (0.032)
¯i3 0.289 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.418
(0.172) (0.032) (0.009) (0.056) (0.031) (0.031)
¯i4 0.352 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.228
(0.163) (0.076) (0.095) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
i SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
!i 0.021 0.104 0.066 0.029 0.010 0.221
(0.008) (0.078) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.063)
®i1 0.132 0.099 0.120 0.091 0.048 0.093
(0.030) (0.035) (0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)
®i2 0.077 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.036
(0.037) (0.025) (0.005) (0.038) (0.019) (0.027)
®i3 0.115 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.150
(0.031) (0.042) (0.008) (0.049) (0.018) (0.034)
®i4 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.029) (0.025) (0.041) (0.014) (0.015) (0.043)
¯i1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.164
(0.113) (0.076) (0.034) (0.022) (0.053) (0.322)
¯i2 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.242) (0.021) (0.043)
¯i3 0.484 0.266 0.364 0.239 0.000 0.001
(0.256) (0.256) (0.048) (0.127) (0.028) (0.060)
¯i4 0.157 0.347 0.366 0.463 0.852 0.403
(0.235) (0.235) (0.048) (0.203) (0.042) (0.280)
i SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
!i 0.021 0.073 0.146 0.045 0.072
(0.018) (0.077) (0.061) (0.039) (0.017)
®i1 0.154 0.335 0.069 0.069 0.092
(0.077) (0.050) (0.036) (0.028) (0.023)
®i2 0.027 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.388) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
®i3 0.088 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.077
(0.015) (0.150) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027)
®i4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.175) (0.499) (0.034) (0.039) (0.105)
¯i1 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.048) (0.405) (0.080) (0.044) (0.116)
¯i2 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.098) (0.601) (0.100) (0.068) (0.023)
¯i3 0.507 0.000 0.288 0.288 0.263
(0.511) (0.385) (0.157) (0.102) (0.295)
¯i4 0.152 0.251 0.387 0.613 0.508
(0.445) (0.256) (0.151) (0.136) (0.234)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthases. Abbreviations:
Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan
dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Dan-
ish krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand
dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South
African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound
(SGB). Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency per US dollars.
123Table 4.7: GARCH(12,12) estimates for time-varying conditional variances
i GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
!i 0.208 0.247 0.574 0.054 0.095 0.274
(0.081) (0.090) (0.223) (0.007) (0.000) (0.094)
®i1 0.208 0.064 0.118 0.365 0.609 0.090
(0.054) (0.020) (0.042) (0.046) (0.034) (0.032)
®i2 0.013 0.034 0.047 0.205 0.013 0.000
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.056) (0.013) (0.022)
®i3 0.079 0.033 0.000 0.216 0.268 0.000
(0.031) (0.028) (0.046) (0.044) (0.028) (0.019)
®i4 0.089 0.000 0.084 0.039 0.033 0.147
(0.039) (0.023) (0.032) (0.047) (0.040) (0.045)
®i5 0.050 0.038 0.078 0.030 0.000 0.000
(0.036) (0.021) (0.026) (0.012) (0.047) (0.019)
®i6 0.025 0.011 0.012 0.034 0.000 0.000
(0.025) (0.019) (0.039) (0.008) (0.037) (0.024)
®i7 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
(0.034) (0.018) (0.030) (0.014) (0.030) (0.038)
®i8 0.012 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038
(0.010) (0.036) (0.015) (0.007) (0.050) (0.027)
®i9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021
(0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.008) (0.023) (0.027)
®i10 0.000 0.043 0.023 0.112 0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.035) (0.028) (0.005) (0.011) (0.021)
®i11 0.052 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.044
(0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.002) (0.022) (0.028)
®i12 0.067 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.048 0.000
(0.034) (0.015) (0.045) (0.013) (0.029) (0.023)
¯i1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.046) (0.044) (0.033) (0.030) (0.024) (0.013)
¯i2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.054) (0.034) (0.010) (0.102) (0.006) (0.020)
¯i3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.038) (0.020) (0.009) (0.051) (0.006) (0.020)
¯i4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.074) (0.042) (0.000) (0.029) (0.052) (0.037)
¯i5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.015) (0.065) (0.029)
¯i6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.050) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.037) (0.011)
¯i7 0.069 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.068) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
¯i8 0.287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.089) (0.052) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.046)
¯i9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.438
(0.012) (0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.092)
¯i10 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.033) (0.025) (0.009) (0.003) (0.031) (0.020)
¯i11 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.021) (0.076) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011)
¯i12 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.053) (0.068) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.023)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthases. Abbreviations: Gold
(GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar
(STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone
(SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar
(SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South African
rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency per US dollars.
124Table 4.8: GARCH(12,12) estimates for time-varying conditional variances
i SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
!i 0.042 0.215 0.073 0.077 0.028 0.337
(0.017) (0.093) (0.013) (0.024) (0.016) (0.144)
®i1 0.139 0.100 0.155 0.113 0.041 0.095
(0.027) (0.036) (0.029) (0.022) (0.029) (0.046)
®i2 0.078 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.044
(0.038) (0.027) (0.004) (0.031) (0.023) (0.029)
®i3 0.090 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.123
(0.026) (0.028) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.042)
®i4 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023
(0.037) (0.036) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.044)
®i5 0.020 0.034 0.038 0.021 0.024 0.028
(0.015) (0.033) (0.026) (0.013) (0.023) (0.031)
®i6 0.121 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046
(0.041) (0.036) (0.003) (0.013) (0.037) (0.036)
®i7 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.034
(0.025) (0.029) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) (0.032)
®i8 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.058
(0.047) (0.033) (0.008) (0.012) (0.025) (0.041)
®i9 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.024 0.000
(0.042) (0.047) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.007)
®i10 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.000
(0.035) (0.030) (0.005) (0.013) (0.038) (0.038)
®i11 0.033 0.084 0.293 0.052 0.000 0.118
(0.035) (0.019) (0.037) (0.047) (0.016) (0.047)
®i12 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.031) (0.071)
¯i1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.037) (0.052) (0.023) (0.037) (0.016) (0.073)
¯i2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.114) (0.074) (0.006) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
¯i3 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.041) (0.026) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.088)
¯i4 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.044) (0.092) (0.022) (0.061) (0.014) (0.019)
¯i5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.609 0.000
(0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.027) (0.107) (0.057)
¯i6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.066) (0.050) (0.003) (0.018) (0.040) (0.051)
¯i7 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
(0.064) (0.056) (0.004) (0.023) (0.007) (0.096)
¯i8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.031) (0.029) (0.006) (0.031) (0.018) (0.077)
¯i9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.664 0.000 0.000
(0.028) (0.040) (0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.041)
¯i10 0.000 0.000 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.059) (0.019) (0.037) (0.021) (0.045)
¯i11 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.071) (0.012) (0.022) (0.025) (0.059) (0.054)
¯i12 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.200
(0.030) (0.024) (0.015) (0.035) (0.000) (0.106)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthases. Abbreviations:
Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Tai-
wan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA),
Danish krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New
Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG),
South African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF),
UK pound (SGB). Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency
per US dollars.
125Table 4.9: GARCH(12,12) estimates for time-varying conditional variances
i SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
!i 0.040 0.139 0.332 0.108 0.152
(0.011) (0.060) (0.121) (0.069) (0.069)
®i1 0.164 0.368 0.037 0.075 0.087
(0.040) (0.065) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032)
®i2 0.037 0.117 0.031 0.013 0.000
(0.029) (0.013) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017)
®i3 0.114 0.083 0.108 0.000 0.115
(0.038) (0.036) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033)
®i4 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
®i5 0.000 0.073 0.064 0.062 0.038
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.036)
®i6 0.034 0.034 0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.044) (0.033) (0.035) (0.022) (0.025)
®i7 0.030 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000
(0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.010) (0.034)
®i8 0.077 0.000 0.031 0.059 0.003
(0.027) (0.029) (0.022) (0.005) (0.010)
®i9 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000
(0.058) (0.015) (0.032) (0.026) (0.043)
®i10 0.029 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.000
(0.039) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
®i11 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.027 0.000
(0.032) (0.042) (0.005) (0.037) (0.044)
®i12 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.073
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)
¯i1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.031) (0.022) (0.003) (0.011) (0.046)
¯i2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.028) (0.029) (0.008) (0.054)
¯i3 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.045) (0.066) (0.052) (0.037) (0.038)
¯i4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.051) (0.027) (0.043) (0.044) (0.074)
¯i5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.091) (0.035) (0.016) (0.019)
¯i6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.034) (0.067) (0.037) (0.019) (0.050)
¯i7 0.034 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.177
(0.118) (0.056) (0.089) (0.131) (0.068)
¯i8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.252
(0.063) (0.038) (0.071) (0.090) (0.089)
¯i9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.000
(0.054) (0.032) (0.091) (0.011) (0.012)
¯i10 0.122 0.036 0.317 0.000 0.000
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.033)
¯i11 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.124
(0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.170) (0.021)
¯i12 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.410 0.001
(0.060) (0.000) (0.107) (0.025) (0.053)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthases. Ab-
breviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), Indian
rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar
(SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone (SDK), Is-
raeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dol-
lar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG),
South African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc
(SSF), UK pound (SGB). Exchange rates priced in terms of
home currency per US dollars.
126Table 4.10: Estimates: model of constant conditional correlations
i GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU SCA SDK SIS
!i 0.063 0.038 0.138 0.020 0.059 0.044 0.008 0.041 0.023
(0.039) (0.023) (0.055) (0.015) (0.026) (0.044) (0.003) (0.025) (0.013)
®i1 0.127 0.058 0.101 0.351 0.545 0.060 0.121 0.062 0.039
(0.050) (0.021) (0.037) (0.049) (0.231) (0.033) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024)
¯i1 0.863 0.913 0.807 0.649 0.455 0.907 0.867 0.907 0.945
(0.044) (0.033) (0.057) (0.090) (0.141) (0.062) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024)
½GLDi 1.000 | | | | | | | |
( | )
½SXEUi -0.309 1.000 | | | | | | |
(0.010) ( | )
½SXJPi -0.214 0.500 1.000 | | | | | |
(0.008) (0.017) ( | )
½SINDIAi -0.087 0.173 0.152 1.000 | | | | |
(0.020) (2.935) (0.030) ( | )
½STWi -0.155 0.262 0.268 0.085 1.000 | | | |
(0.054) (0.021) (0.018) (0.032) ( | )
½SAUi -0.341 0.248 0.148 0.097 0.261 1.000 | | |
(0.020) (0.037) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) ( | )
½SCAi -0.159 0.155 0.065 0.074 0.174 0.380 1.000 | |
(0.008) (0.124) (0.079) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) ( | )
½SDKi -0.320 0.976 0.501 0.173 0.260 0.246 0.160 1.000 |
(0.012) (0.027) (0.039) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) ( | )
½SISi -0.057 0.197 0.092 0.047 0.061 0.087 0.109 0.193 1.000
(0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) ( | )
½SMAi -0.287 0.603 0.297 0.124 0.203 0.228 0.148 0.581 0.179
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
½SNZi -0.256 0.319 0.231 0.116 0.252 0.676 0.287 0.323 0.097
(0.027) (0.182) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
½SNOi -0.300 0.859 0.435 0.144 0.241 0.274 0.202 0.863 0.183
(0.017) (0.039) (0.035) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
½SSGi -0.261 0.572 0.518 0.183 0.339 0.306 0.131 0.561 0.140
(0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
½SSAi -0.257 0.431 0.236 0.153 0.205 0.272 0.165 0.430 0.133
(0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
½SSKi -0.268 0.855 0.433 0.153 0.253 0.303 0.215 0.847 0.198
(0.021) (0.021) (0.348) (0.026) (0.021) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
½SSFi -0.317 0.911 0.542 0.145 0.227 0.194 0.102 0.919 0.156
(0.047) (0.156) (2.444) (0.022) (0.032) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
½SGBi -0.262 0.741 0.381 0.205 0.213 0.279 0.166 0.730 0.156
(0.026) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Notes: Table reports maximum likelihood estimates for a multivariate GARCH model of constant conditional
correlations where hit = !i + ®i1²
2
i(t¡1) + ¯i1hi(t¡1) and where hijt = ½ij
p
hiithjjt. The upper panel re-
ports parameters in the time varying conditional variances. The lower panel reports conditional correlations.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthases. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen (SJP), In-
dian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Canadian dollar (SCA), Danish krone
(SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS). Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency per US dollars.
127Table 4.11: Estimates: model of constant conditional correlations
i SMA SNZ SNO SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
!i 0.014 0.003 0.078 0.009 0.063 0.042 0.020 0.015
(0.013) (0.003) (0.035) (0.005) (0.033) (0.019) (0.035) (0.017)
®i1 0.041 0.039 0.111 0.104 0.211 0.067 0.023 0.039
(0.025) (0.012) (0.033) (0.034) (0.068) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018)
¯i1 0.951 0.960 0.837 0.864 0.776 0.902 0.965 0.949
(0.029) (0.012) (0.044) (0.043) (0.059) (0.028) (0.044) (0.032)
½GLDi | | | | | | | |
½SXEUi | | | | | | | |
½SXJPi | | | | | | | |
½SINDIAi | | | | | | | |
½STWi | | | | | | | |
½SAUi | | | | | | | |
½SCAi | | | | | | | |
½SDKi | | | | | | | |
½SISi | | | | | | | |
½SMAi 1.000 | | | | | | |
( | )
½SNZi 0.241 1.000 | | | | | |
(0.007) ( | )
½SNOi 0.518 0.331 1.000 | | | | |
(0.005) (0.018) ( | )
½SSGi 0.362 0.360 0.527 1.000 | | | |
(0.003) (0.007) (0.013) ( | )
½SSAi 0.288 0.251 0.436 0.337 1.000 | | |
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) ( | )
½SSKi 0.521 0.348 0.816 0.523 0.425 1.000 | |
(0.006) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008) (0.024) ( | )
½SSFi 0.526 0.286 0.797 0.534 0.368 0.777 1.000 |
(0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028) ( | )
½SGBi 0.479 0.332 0.692 0.495 0.390 0.676 0.684 1.000
(0.004) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) ( | )
Notes: Table reports maximum likelihood estimates for a multivariate GARCH model of constant
conditional correlations where hit = !i + ®i1²
2
i(t¡1) + ¯i1hi(t¡1) and where hijt = ½ij
p
hiithjjt.
The upper panel reports parameters in the time varying conditional variances. The lower panel
reports constant conditional correlations. Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthases. Abbre-
viations: Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dol-
lar (SSG), South African rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
Exchange rates priced in terms of home currency per US dollars.
128to be characterised by distributions that have fat tails. That is, measures of
kurtosis tend to be high. However, when using weekly data, the assumption of
conditional normality tends to be more reasonable.25 Coe±cients of kurtosis
tend to be much smaller.26 Weekly data is, indeed, employed in this study and,
as such, it is considered acceptable here to assume conditional normality.
Turning to the estimates in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11, all the parameters in
the time-varying conditional variances (that is, !i, ®i1 and ¯i1) are signi¯cant
at the 5% signi¯cance level. Similarly, estimates for the conditional correlations
(½ij) are all highly signi¯cant. The price of gold is negatively correlated with all
US dollar exchange rate pairs. Meanwhile, all exchange rate pairs are positively
correlated with each other.
Estimates of the unconditional variances, ^ !i(1¡ ^ ®i1 ¡ ^ ¯i1)¡1, for gold-price
returns and for all US dollar exchange-rate returns in the sample show that
unconditional variances are lower for nearly all the exchange-rate pairs than for
gold. The unconditional variance for gold price returns (6.28) is roughly three
times as large as for the returns on most US dollar exchange-rate pairs in the
sample.
Table 4.10 also shows that while gold price returns are correlated negatively
with the returns on all US dollar exchange-rate pairs during the sample period,
the strongest negative correlation is with returns on US dollars priced in terms
of Australian dollars (-0.341). Gold price returns are also correlated strongly
with returns on US dollars priced in terms of Danish kroner (-0.320), Swiss
francs (-0.317) and euros (-0.309).
A negative conditional correlation between the price of gold and the US dol-
lar would, if constant and stable, support an argument in favour of the relation-
ship between gold and the dollar being driven by a numeraire e®ect, whereby a
drop in the value of the dollar is associated with a rise in the price of gold simply
because gold is priced in dollars. If conditional correlations are, indeed, con-
stant and stable, then a numeraire e®ect would seem plausible. The presence
of a numeraire e®ect would imply an absence of pricing-to-market behaviour
among sellers of gold and would, instead, imply a role for pass-through pricing.
For aggregate prices, existing evidence suggests that pass-through e®ects are
small: prices of tradeable goods tend to respond incompletely to variations in
exchange rates.27 However, gold is unusual in its characteristics as a tradeable
commodity. It is homogenous and highly liquid. The presence of a durable nu-
25See Baillie and Bollerslev (1989b).
26Indeed, Enders (2004) notes that it is acceptable to ignore the issue of fat-tailed dis-
tributions when the sample is large. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimates use the normal
distribution even though the actual distribution of the residuals is fat-tailed. The reason is
that under weak assumptions the parameter estimates for the model of the mean and the
conditional variance are consistent and normally distributed.
27See for instance Berman et al. (2009) and Campa and Goldberg (2005).
129meraire e®ect linking gold-price returns and US dollar returns is not, therefore,
inconceivable.
Summarising the results from this section, the analysis above presents cau-
tious evidence in favour of the multivariate GARCH(1,1) model in Eqn. (4.42)
with constant conditional correlations as o®ering a reasonable representation
of the short-run dynamics of gold-price returns and exchange-rate returns for
those exchange rates in the sample. However, the analysis above su®ers from
clear limitations. To assume that conditional correlations are constant through-
out the sample period may be at best misleading and at worst erroneous. In-
terrelationships may have changed. Correlations may have strengthened. Or
weakened. Indeed, conditional correlations between gold-price returns and US
dollar returns, despite appearing to be characterised, in the results above, by a
negative correlation, may have experienced periods of positive correlation dur-
ing the sample period. Only an analysis of the dynamics of the conditional
correlations can throw light on these issues. The next section, Section 4.5.2,
o®ers an analysis of dynamic conditional correlations.
4.5.2 Results: Dynamic conditional correlations
This subsection presents results from a dynamic model of conditional correla-
tions of the asset returns described in Section 4.4. The model o®ers an accu-
rate, tractable way of modelling, simultaneously, both time-varying conditional
volatilities and time-varying conditional correlations.
Recall that, in Section 4.4, preliminary data analysis ¯nds evidence of condi-
tional heteroscedasticity which lends support to the use of ARCH-type models
and, in particular, to the use of GARCH(p;q) models to capture the volatility
behaviour of the data series. Analysis in Section 4.4 suggests that, here, the
most appropriate form of GARCH(p;q) model is the GARCH(1,1) model.
The multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional correlations is to be
estimated using maximum likelihood. However, since the series in our dataset
are consistently non-normal (see Section 4.4), the remedy here is to use the
quasi maximum likelihood method (Bollerslev et al., 1988) in order to generate
consistent standard errors that are robust to non-normality.
A comparison of the loglikelihood values among alternative lag speci¯ca-
tions suggests that our data are best captured by a DCC(1,1) with each of the
conditional variances captured by a univariate GARCH(1,1) model.
Table 4.12 displays estimation results for the DCC(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model
for the 17 asset prices under analysis: the price of gold, the US dollar against
the euro, the yen, the Indian rupee, the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar,
the Danish krone, the Israeli shekel, the Maltese lira, the New Zealand dollar,
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i GLD SXEU SJP SINDIA STW SAU
GARCH parameters
!i 0.063 0.038 0.138 0.020 0.059 0.044
(0.039) (0.023) (0.055) (0.015) (0.026) (0.044)
®i1 0.127 0.058 0.101 0.351 0.545 0.060
(0.050) (0.021) (0.037) (0.049) (0.231) (0.033)
¯i1 0.863 0.913 0.807 0.649 0.455 0.907
(0.039) (0.033) (0.057) (0.090) (0.141) (0.062)
i SCA SDK SIS SMA SNZ SNO
GARCH parameters
!i 0.008 0.041 0.023 0.014 0.003 0.078
(0.003) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.035)
®i1 0.121 0.062 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.111
(0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.012) (0.033)
¯i1 0.867 0.907 0.945 0.951 0.960 0.837
(0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.029) (0.012) (0.044)
i SSG SSA SSK SSF SGB
GARCH parameters
!i 0.009 0.063 0.042 0.020 0.015
(0.005) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019) (0.035)
®i1 0.104 0.211 0.067 0.023 0.039
(0.034) (0.068) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
¯i1 0.864 0.776 0.902 0.965 0.949
(0.043) (0.059) (0.028) (0.044) (0.032)
DCC parameters
a1 0.010
(0.000)
b1 0.988
(0.013)
Diagnostics
Â
2 ¡ test : Rt = R 317.085
(0.000)
Log-likelihood -13,108
Notes: Parameter estimates are based on the DCC-GARCH model:
hit = !i + ®i1²
2
i(t¡1) + ¯i1hi(t¡1) and Qt = (1 ¡ a1 ¡ b1) ¹ Q + a1("t¡1"
0
t¡1) + b1Qt¡1.
Probability values (p-values) are in parenthases. All estimation is undertaken with MAT-
LAB using the author's proprietary code. Abbreviations: Gold (GLD), Euro (SXEU), Yen
(SJP), Indian rupee (SINDIA), Taiwan dollar (STW), Australian dollar (SAU), Cana-
dian dollar (SCA), Danish krone (SDK), Israeli Shekel (SIS), Maltese lira (SMA), New
Zealand dollar (SNZ), Norwegian krone (SNO), Singapore dollar (SSG), South African
rand (SSA), Swedish krona (SSK), Swiss franc (SSF), UK pound (SGB).
the Norwegian krone, the Singapore dollar, the South African rand, the Swedish
krona, the Swiss franc and the pound sterling. Probability values re°ect t-stats
calculated with robust standard errors.
First, note from Table 4.12 that the GARCH parameters estimated under the
assumption of dynamic conditional correlation are identical to those estimated
for constant conditional correlation: the ¯rst-stage of the estimation process,
estimating the univariate GARCH models, is identical for both models. All uni-
variate GARCH processes show a high degree of persistence. That is, the sums
of ®i and ¯i are all close to one. Meanwhile, the estimated DCC parameters,
a1 and b1, imply a highly persistent correlation, with a half-life innovation of
six years.28 However, results of a test of parameter constancy indicate strong
28Half-life is de¯ned as the time it takes for a shock to correlation to reduce by half. Half-life
131evidence against the assumption of constant conditional correlations: the test,
developed by Engle and Sheppard (2001), uses a Â2-statistic to test the null of
Rt = R. The resulting test statistic, 317.1, is highly signi¯cant, rejecting the
null hypothesis of constant conditional correlations.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the evolution over time of ½1i, the dynamic
conditional correlation between the price of gold and the 16 major exchange rate
pairs in the sample. The sign of all correlation coe±cients over the sample period
is consistently negative. That is, there is a negative relationship between gold-
price returns and US dollar returns. Further, most if not all of the correlation
coe±cients in the sample grow in magnitude from the early 1990s onwards,
becoming increasingly negative, reaching their most negative at the end of 2008.
The negative relationship between the price of gold and the dollar's value in
terms of euros is particularly well-de¯ned, with ½12 reaching -0.6 in August
2008.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 also plot the bootstrapped 95% con¯dence intervals
for the estimated constant conditional correlations. The dynamic conditional
correlations vary widely, and for large periods of time stray beyond the limits of
the estimated con¯dence bounds. By implication, it is not descriptively useful
to assume that the conditional correlations between gold-price returns and US
dollar returns are constant. The conditional correlations display a great deal of
time-variation. Signi¯cantly, for nearly all currencies, the dynamic conditional
correlations turn increasingly negative during the ¯nal six years of the sample
period and remain outside the con¯dence intervals for the entirety of this period.
If the only link between the price of gold and the US dollar is a numeraire
e®ect|with a weak dollar implying, by pricing convention, more dollars per
troy ounce of gold|then we would expect the conditional correlation to be
stable. We would not expect a sharp change in magnitude. But Figure 4.4 and
Figure 4.5 suggest that the negative relationship between gold returns and US
dollar returns has grown stronger during the past decade and a half, becoming
particularly acute in the last ¯ve years.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 also o®er an insight into whether gold has, during
the sample period, behaved as a hedge against the dollar or whether it has
behaved as a haven.
Recall the de¯nitions of hedge and haven. An asset that functions as a haven
for another asset will not co-move with the other asset in times of stress. That
is, an asset acts as a haven if it is uncorrelated or correlated negatively with
another asset that is experiencing sustained losses. Meanwhile, an asset that
acts as a hedge is one that is uncorrelated or correlated negatively with another
asset on average. Note the di®erence: An asset that functions as a haven is
is computed as ln(0:5) + ln(a1 + b1).
132Figure 4.4: Dynamic conditional correlation: gold and exchange-rate returns
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Notes: Figure shows the dynamic conditional correlation between innovations in the price of gold
and eight major exchange rate pairs: US dollar against the euro (SXEU), the yen (SJP), the
Indian rupee (SINDIA), the Taiwan dollar (STW), the Australian dollar (SAU), the Canadian
dollar (SCA), the Danish krone (SDK) and the Israeli shekel (SIS). The dashed lines are the
con¯dence bands (bootstrapped) for the estimated constant conditional correlations. Returns are
percentage demeaned nominal currency returns. Exchange rates expressed as home currency per
US dollar. Frequency is weekly. The dynamic conditional correlations have a wide range and are
often outside the con¯dence bands resulting from the estimated constant conditional correlations.
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Notes: Figure shows the dynamic conditional correlation between innovations in the price of gold
and eight major exchange rate pairs: US dollar against the Maltese lira (SMA), New Zealand
dollar (SNZ), the Norwegian krone (SNO), the Singapore dollar (SSG), the South African rand
(SSA), the Swedish krona (SSK), the Swiss franc (SSF) and the pound sterling (SGB). The dashed
lines are the con¯dence bands (bootstrapped) for the estimated constant conditional correlations.
Returns are percentage demeaned nominal currency returns. Exchange rates expressed as home
currency per US dollar. Frequency is weekly. The dynamic conditional correlations have a wide
range and are often outside the con¯dence bands resulting from the estimated constant conditional
correlations.
134uncorrelated or negatively correlated with another asset in times of stress only,
and not necessarily on average.
Using these de¯nitions, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that gold has acted
as a hedge against the US dollar throughout the sample period. That is, gold-
price returns have been correlated negatively with US dollar returns, for all 16
exchange-rate pairs, not only in times of stress but also on average throughout
the 22-year sample period.
Supporting evidence is o®ered in Table 4.13. The table gives maximum
likelihood estimates of the constant conditional correlations between gold-price
returns and returns for the 16 US dollar exchange-rate pairings. All are nega-
tive and signi¯cant and are consistent with the hypothesis that gold provides an
e®ective hedge against the US dollar. The most consistently negative relation-
ships are between gold-price returns and US dollar returns in terms of euros,
Swiss francs, Australian dollars and Danish kroner.
The third, fourth and ¯fth columns in Table 4.13 show mean dynamic cor-
relations during periods of market stress, de¯ned according to the 10%, 5% and
1% quantiles of most negative exchange-rate returns. The smaller the size of the
quantile the more extreme the market stress. The quantile correlations de¯ne
the extent to which gold acts as a safe haven from US dollar volatility. That
is, for any given US dollar exchange-rate pair, if gold acts as an e®ective safe
haven, then quantile correlations will be more negative than the corresponding
constant correlations. Or they will be uncorrelated. Table 4.13 shows that,
in fact, neither is true. For most of the US dollar exchange-rate pairings the
quantile correlations are less negative, not more negative, than the constant
conditional correlations. The yen and the UK pound are exceptions at the 1%
quantile. However, the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant: quantile corre-
lations for the yen and UK pound are more negative by less than two asymptotic
standard errors. All of this suggests that gold's role as a safe haven from US
dollar movements is negligible.29 Gold's only e®ective role, in terms of o®ering
investment protection from movements in the US dollar, is as a hedge.
Indeed, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that since 2001 gold's e±cacy as
a hedge has become more pronounced. The negative conditional correlation
between gold-price returns and US dollar returns has grown increasingly strong.
The reason why is unclear.30 This period does coincide with a steady downward
29Baur and McDermott (2010) similarly ¯nd no consistent role for gold as a safe haven
from share-price movements for data of the same frequency, ie, weekly. They do ¯nd evidence
in favour of gold's role as safe haven for daily data, but the evidence is partial (supported
only at the 1% quantile) and economically trivial (marginal e®ects are very small). Baur and
Lucey (2006) ¯nd that gold is not a safe haven for bonds. For stocks, the only economically
meaningful role gold plays as a safe haven is, they ¯nd, for the UK. For other markets the
marginal e®ects are small.
30Potential explanations based on the increasing role of the derivatives market during the
135Table 4.13: Constant conditional correlations and quantiles
Const. corr. 10% quantile 5% quantile 1% quantile
US dollar exchange rate
Euro -0.309 -0.284 -0.269 -0.252
(0.010) (0.125) (0.110) (0.113)
Yen -0.214 -0.210 -0.218 -0.219
(0.008) (0.092) (0.087) (0.095)
Indian rupee -0.087 -0.132 -0.123 -0.290
(0.020) (0.097) (0.102) (0.133)
Taiwan dollar -0.155 -0.217 -0.230 -0.243
(0.054) (0.107) (0.106) (0.093)
Australian dollar -0.341 -0.337 -0.351 -0.364
(0.020) (0.127) (0.125) (0.111)
Canadian dollar -0.159 -0.218 -0.246 -0.270
(0.008) (0.165) (0.160) (0.188)
Danish krone -0.320 -0.280 -0.266 -0.241
(0.012) (0.110) (0.100) (0.107)
Israeli shekel -0.057 -0.056 -0.056 -0.096
(0.016) (0.103) (0.117) (0.105)
Maltese lira -0.287 -0.260 -0.242 -0.249
(0.007) (0.102) (0.091) (0.123)
New Zealand dollar -0.256 -0.223 -0.202 -0.173
(0.027) (0.141) (0.142) (0.149)
Norwegian krone -0.300 -0.281 -0.277 -0.255
(0.017) (0.138) (0.137) (0.139)
Singapore dollar -0.261 -0.232 -0.222 -0.204
(0.020) (0.139) (0.121) (0.062)
South African rand -0.257 -0.248 -0.240 -0.241
(0.019) (0.087) (0.083) (0.067)
Swedish krona -0.268 -0.233 -0.221 -0.182
(0.021) (0.135) (0.125) (0.130)
Swiss franc -0.317 -0.258 -0.256 -0.219
(0.047) (0.095) (0.095) (0.084)
UK pound -0.262 -0.249 -0.248 -0.280
(0.026) (0.144) (0.121) (0.112)
Notes: Table shows constant conditional correlations (Const. corr.) for gold returns versus the
returns of 16 US dollar exchange rates pairings estimated over the full sample period (10 Jan-
uary 1986 to 29 August 2008); table also shows mean dynamic conditional correlations for selected
quantiles (10%, 5%, 1%) of the most negative exchange-rate returns. Asymptotic standard errors
are in parenthases for constant conditional correlations. Quantile standard deviations are in par-
enthases for mean dynamic conditional correlations.
136spiral in the value of the US dollar. But other periods of dollar depreciation
have not gone hand in hand with strengthening negative correlations with gold.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that between 1985 and 1988, when the US dollar
lost 12% of its trade-weighted value, the correlation between gold returns and
US dollar returns did not turn increasingly negative.
4.6 Conclusions
This study investigates the nature of the relationship between the price of gold
and the US dollar, how it has changed during the past 25 years, and how these
changes cast light upon the role gold plays as an investment hedge and a haven.
Empirical results based on a multivariate GARCH model of dynamic conditional
correlations show that the conditional correlation between changes in the price
of gold and changes in the US dollar's exchange rate is broadly negative. That is,
increases in the price of gold tend to be associated with decreases in the value
of the US dollar. This correlation has not, however, remained constant over
time. During the past 7 years the correlation has turned increasingly negative.
In 2008 it was more negative than at any point during the past three decades.
The implication is that gold's role as an investment hedge against the US dollar
is much stronger and more durable than suggested by Capie et al. (2005).
Analysis of gold's role as a safe haven provides very di®erent conclusions.
Quantile correlations show gold does not act as an e®ective safe haven from
market stress. These results chime with those of Baur and McDermott (2010),
who ¯nd no evidence that gold acts as a consistent safe haven with respect to
weekly movements in international share prices. Baur and Lucey (2006) ¯nd no
evidence that gold acts as a safe haven for bonds.
Given these ¯ndings, identifying the factors that have contributed to gold's
strengthening role as a hedge against the US dollar o®ers plenty of scope for
further research.
1990s (Kearney and Lombra, 2008) or feedback trading (Campbell and Kyle, 1993; Cutler
et al., 1990; Delong et al., 1990; Kirman, 1993; Shleifer, 2000) are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis, o®ering some discussion, implications for
policy and outlining scope for future research.
5.1 Discussion
This section gathers together the results from the three analytical studies that
form the core of this thesis and o®ers some broad conclusions.
In the last two decades there have been a number of important developments
in the ¯eld of exchange-rate economics, with major steps forward taken in both
the empirical and theoretical treatment of exchange-rate determination. Econo-
metrics has been a signi¯cant driving force behind this progress. As has greater
access to high quality data. Consequently, the academic literature on exchange-
rate determination has proliferated. However, while the academic world has
done much to improve our understanding of exchange rates and exchange-rate
movements, many questions remain unanswered. This thesis examines three
unresolved issues.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of misalignment and policy response. How
do policymakers respond to exchange-rate misalignment? In particular, how is
intervention policy designed? What are the aims? The focus here is on o±cial
Japanese intervention in the currency markets. Does Japan intervene in a man-
ner that suggests it pursues a currency target? If so, what type of target? Fixed?
Time-varying? Does the target re°ect an assessment of exchange-rate equilib-
rium? The study presented in Chapter 2 addresses these questions by estimating
an intervention reaction function and testing the hypothesis that Japan inter-
venes in order to guide the exchange rate towards equilibrium. Equilibrium is
de¯ned as being consistent with a capital-enhanced version of purchasing power
parity. Estimation results show that Japan's interventions do indeed suggest
138the pursuit of a currency target that is compatible with an augmented form
purchasing power parity. Further, results suggest that the monetary authori-
ties are not equally tolerant towards currency weakness and currency strength.
Monetary authorities are more responsive to a strong currency|strong, that is,
relative to its equilibrium value.
In addition to these ¯ndings, which highlight the continuing importance of
partial-equilibrium models in shaping modern exchange-rate policy, Chapter 2
also o®ers an advance in the empirical treatment of intervention policy. The
advance is to discard the standard assumption of proportional odds that is
embedded in the ordered logit model of intervention. To assume proportional
odds is to assume that the determinants of intervention carry identical weight
in the policy process whatever the type of intervention under consideration:
sale of domestic currency, purchase, or abstinence. Weights, however, may not
be identical. In practice they may vary. To allow for this a °exible approach
is proposed in the form of a generalised ordered logit model, which permits
misalignment to a®ect intervention di®erently depending on the type of inter-
vention. This empirical innovation turns out to be critical: results show that
the monetary authorities do indeed react di®erently to misalignment depending
on the type of intervention under consideration.
The next issue to be addressed in this thesis, in Chapter 3, is market response
to exchange-rate misalignment. Exchange-rate misalignment is de¯ned in terms
of deviation from covered interest-rate parity and uncovered interest-rate par-
ity, two of the oldest conceptual pillars of the neoclassical approach to global
capital °ows and exchange-rate economics. The aim, in Chapter 3, is to mea-
sure market response to deviations from these parity conditions and the analysis
focuses on one speci¯c form of market response: the issuance of international
bonds. How does the issuance of international bonds respond to exchange-rate
misalignment? In particular, does misalignment a®ect the choice of issuance
currency? The analytical study presented in Chapter 3 addresses these ques-
tions by constructing a utility-consistent model of currency choice, focussing
on the number, rather than the value, of bonds issued, and by drawing on a
large, unique dataset of international debt securities. Results show that while
deviations from swap-covered interest-rate parity do exist, issuers do not seem
to respond to them. However, deviations from uncovered interest-rate parity do
a®ect the choice of issuance currency. Issuers, on aggregate, issue more bonds
in currencies that are associated with low and falling interest rates. Further,
¯nancial institutions are particularly responsive to deviations from uncovered
interest-rate parity.
Chapter 4 addresses the ¯nal research question tackled in this thesis: what do
exchange-rate dynamics reveal about hedging behaviour in the face of currency
139risk? Speci¯cally, does gold act as an e®ective hedge against changes in the
value of the US dollar? As an e®ective safe haven? As neither? De¯nitions
here are important. If an investor holds a given asset °, then a safe haven is
de¯ned to be any asset that is either uncorrelated or correlated negatively with
° in times of market stress. A hedge is de¯ned to be any asset that is either
uncorrelated or correlated negatively with ° on average. Studying weekly data
for 16 major dollar-paired exchange rates, Chapter 4 shows that for the past
23 years gold has behaved as a consistent and e®ective hedge against the US
dollar. However, the evidence suggests that gold does not provide an e®ective
safe haven: outside periods of market stress, gold remains correlated with the
US dollar.
The studies contained in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 o®er ¯ndings
that are well-de¯ned and actionable. But more importantly they have clear
implications for economic policy. The next section discusses these implications.
5.2 Policy implications
This section discusses the policy implications stemming from the three analytical
studies that make up this thesis.
Studying o±cial Japanese intervention in the currency markets yields a num-
ber of policy-relevant results. The ¯rst result is that currency targets matter:
Japan's intervention policy since 1991 has been consistent with the active pursuit
of an exchange-rate target. Interventions are timed and directed in a manner
that suggests Japan's monetary authorities aim to keep the national currency,
the yen, close to a time-varying target. Other central banks that have active
intervention policies may follow similar strategies. This can be veri¯ed empiri-
cally. What is important is that intervention policy in Japan, either explicitly
or implicitly, is compatible with the pursuit of an exchange-rate target and this
result can and should be explored elsewhere, for other central banks. Indeed,
it is more than possible, given the globalised nature of international ¯nancial
markets and evidence elsewhere of coordination among central banks, that other
monetary authorities do pursue similar strategies based on currency targets.1
Of course, the ¯ndings here should not be taken as proof of e®ectiveness. The
e®ectiveness of an intervention policy based on the pursuit of a time-varying
currency target is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, the scope is only to
model behaviour. Intervention may or may not be e®ective depending on factors
such frequency, surprise, coordination and credibility.
Japanese intervention in the currency markets can, this thesis shows, be
1For discussion of coordinated intervention and the coordination channel of intervention
e®ectiveness, see Sarno and Taylor (2001), Taylor (2005) and Reitz and Taylor (2008).
140modelled adequately as a process whereby the central bank seeks to minimise
deviations, both positive and negative, from a currency target. The precise na-
ture of this target is important. It is not a ¯xed target. Nor is it a volatility
target. Chapter 2 shows that Japan intervenes in the currency markets in or-
der to drive the exchange rate towards a target that re°ects an assessment of
partial equilibrium. The central bank's assessment is consistent with a partial
equilibrium model allowing for persistence in both the real exchange rate and
interest-rate di®erentials. The critical policy implication here is that, as the ex-
perience of Japan shows, it is possible, operationally, for a central bank to make
daily calculations of exchange-rate equilibrium that are transparent, tractable
and that convey information that is su±cient and rich enough to provide an
adequate platform for a daily intervention policy.
Chapter 3 investigates choice of issuance currency in the issuance of interna-
tional bonds and the ¯ndings o®er a number of policy implications. The ¯rst is
that nominal interest rates have a signi¯cant e®ect on the choice of issuance cur-
rency. Low interest-rate currencies attract more issuance despite the fact that
standard interest-rate parity conditions suggest there ought to be nothing to
gain, in terms of borrowing-cost savings, from issuing debt in low-interest-rate
currencies. The empirical evidence in Chapter 3 shows that low interest rates
exert a positive in°uence on issuance. What this entails for policy is straight-
forward. Changes in interest rates can, at the margin, have a signi¯cant e®ect
on the use of the national currencies in international transactions. Further,
monetary policy and the term structure of domestic interest rates can a®ect
the internationalisation of world currencies. The opposite is also true: a policy
of non-internationalisation of the domestic currency, such as that pursued by
Singapore, can be either undermined or strengthened by domestic interest-rate
policy.
The question of currency internationalisation is important for many countries
and for many existing and °edgling monetary unions. A country or monetary
union that allows international debt to be denominated in its own currency
generates a series of potential welfare gains. First, it experiences a welfare gain
because total demand for its securities will increase due to foreign demand, and
the return for holding these securities will fall. There will also be a related wel-
fare gain for the rest of the world in the form of an increase in choice of securities
to invest in. Second, there will be a general welfare gain as a result of the expan-
sion of the pool of investors. A bigger pool of investors will increase trade in the
securities of the issuance-currency country, boosting liquidity and reducing the
impact of demand shocks on prices. Third, for the issuance-currency country,
an increase in the use of its currency in international transactions will expand
the size of its foreign-exchange market, cutting transaction costs involved in
141trade in both goods and assets.
Chapter 4 asks, what do exchange-rate dynamics reveal about hedging be-
haviour in the face of currency risk? The ¯ndings throw up a number of policy
implications. Perhaps the most important is that gold acts as hedge against
changes in the value of the US dollar and, in as much as current thinking in ¯-
nancial economics suggests that the availability of hedging instruments increases
welfare and reduces market volatility, then the use of gold as a hedge should
not be restricted. Hedging practices should be allowed to continue. This rec-
ommendation does, however, come with one caveat. In recent years gold has
become increasingly correlated (negatively) with the US dollar, more so than at
any point in the past two and a half decades. This could, conceivably, represent
a source of systemic risk. Systemic risk is present whenever a wide range of as-
sets become highly correlated. Systemic risk is also associated with infrequent
events. But the high conditional correlation between exchange-rate returns and
gold returns revealed in Chapter 4 is not infrequent. It is persistent. The risk,
therefore, is not systemic, but it may, to some extent, be systematic, where
systematic risk refers to correlation between assets (and a common factor) with
no requirement that the correlated changes be infrequent.2 To this extent, the
tight relationship between the price of gold and the US dollar should be mon-
itored closely and future research should be directed towards investigating its
risk characteristics.
5.3 Future research
This section o®ers some thoughts on the extent to which future research can
build on this thesis and draw on its ¯ndings.
The ¯ndings presented here on intervention policy o®er a number of avenues
for further research. One avenue is to investigate the extent to which implicit
currency targets play a role in intervention policy for other developed nations.
To what extent is the experience of Japan mimicked elsewhere? Do assessments
of partial equilibrium drive intervention policy in other central banks? If so, this
would suggest that basic economic aggregates, or fundamentals as they are often
called, can and do play a bigger role in exchange-rate policy formation than is
commonly assumed. Another intervention issue that o®ers scope for future re-
search is that of e®ectiveness. For nations that pursue a currency target in their
intervention policy, to what extent can policy be shown to be e®ective? That is,
to what extent does intervention succeed in driving the exchange rate towards
its target, as intended? The existing literature on intervention e®ectiveness is
2For further discussion regarding systemic risk and systematic risk, see, for instance, the
survey by Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and also Das and Uppal (2004).
142already large.3 But no attempt has been made to explore the e®ectiveness of a
policy based on implicit currency targeting.
One of the key ¯ndings in this thesis is that the incentives to intervene in
the currency markets can change depending on the type of intervention under
consideration: intervention to buy foreign currency, to sell foreign currency or to
abstain from intervention in the current period. Future research should explore
alternative theoretical frameworks for such behaviour. That is, future research
should aim to explore the nature of the nonlinearities in the intervention reaction
function. How, exactly, do these asymmetric preferences manifest themselves?
A suitable starting point for any future research would be to draw from the
growing literature on nonlinearities in monetary policy reaction functions. See
for instance Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Ruge-Murcia (2004), Dolado et al.
(2002) and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002).
Of the ¯ndings presented in Chapter 3 on currency choice in the issuance of
international bonds, one area that o®ers particular scope for further research is
the ¯nding that, while there is no evidence that bond issuers respond to devia-
tions from long-term covered interest rate parity, quantitatively these deviations
do exist. Future research should look further into these unexploited arbitrage
opportunities. For how long do they remain unexploited? Why is round-trip ar-
bitrage so costly as to cause these arbitrage opportunities to remain unexploited?
Perhaps a more sophisticated description of issuance behaviour is required to ex-
plain why these cost-saving opportunities are not arbitraged away rapidly. The
introduction of dynamics may help. Empirically dynamics can be introduced
with a linear feedback model, allowing for a generalisation of the Poisson model
to an autoregressive process. Windmeijer (2006) provides a useful overview of
the literature on dynamics in panel count data models.
Another avenue for further research is to build on the ¯ndings in Chapter 3
by asking, what causes borrowers to expose themselves to currency risk by de-
nominating their debt, unhedged, in foreign currency? In emerging markets it is
argued that incomplete ¯nancial markets limit the ability of ¯rms to hedge their
foreign-currency exposure. Meanwhile, currency pegs give an implicit guarantee
against short-term movements in the exchange rate. But analysis of unhedged
foreign borrowing under °exible exchange rates remains scarce. McKinnon and
Pill (1999) and Burnside et al. (1999) analyse the desire of banks to take on
unhedged foreign debt. They assume that this desire is a consequence of moral
hazard arising from deposit insurance and other bailout guarantees. However,
this does little to explain the desire by the non-bank sector to issue unhedged
foreign debt. The aim should be to explain how currency-risk premiums arise en-
3For a survey of the literature see Neely (2005a). Also for recent treatments see Neely
(2005b), Fatum and Hutchison (2003), and Reitz and Taylor (2008).
143dogenously from the interest-rate di®erentials between countries and how these
premiums act as an incentive for borrowers to denominate their debt, unhedged,
in foreign currency.
Findings from the work in this thesis on hedging and exchange-rate dynam-
ics o®er substantial scope for further research. Secondary to the key results in
Chapter 4 is the ¯nding that in recent years gold returns have become increas-
ingly correlated (negatively) with returns on the US dollar, more so than at any
point in the past two and a half decades. This trend demands further analysis.
One useful approach would be to investigate the role of herd behaviour. Ra-
tional herd behaviour theories suggest that investors act in a herd-like manner
either because they receive similar or correlated information or because they
infer, rationally, information from the actions of other investors.4 Statistical
measures of herd behaviour gauge the average tendency of a group of money
managers to buy or sell the same assets at the same time. Measures such as
these could, potentially, be employed as time series in models of dynamic condi-
tional correlations designed to model the dependencies between herding, returns
and correlations for commodity prices, like gold, and US dollar exchange-rate
pairs. The models of conditional correlations presented in Chapter 4 o®er a
suitable, empirical starting point.
While this thesis o®ers plenty of scope for analytical extensions and further
research, the intention is that in itself, this thesis represents a useful contribution
to the ¯elds of applied econometrics and international ¯nance.
4See Froot et al. (1990), Hirshleifer et al. (1994) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
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